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Abstract
This thesis is comprised of two papers, both related to the criminal justice system. In the
first paper, I examine racial and ethnic sentencing differentials in US federal courts. The
aim is to better understand not just the magnitude of these differentials, but rather their
source. The second paper evaluates a cannabis depenalization policy in a single London
borough, and assesses how such a policy can impact both drugs, and non-drugs crime,
considering the responses of drug users and the police. As such, these papers contribute
to a large body of literature concerning the economics of crime. The first, by better
understanding sentencing outcomes, and the second, by considering how drug users and
police respond to change in illicit drugs policy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is comprised of two papers, both related to the criminal justice system. In
the first paper, I examine racial and ethnic sentencing differentials in US federal courts.
The aim is to better understand not just the magnitude of these differentials, but rather
their source. The second paper evaluates a cannabis depenalization policy in a single
London borough, and assesses how such a policy can impact both drugs, and non-drugs
crime, considering the responses of drug users and the police.
As such, these papers contribute to a large body of literature concerning the economics
of crime. The first, by better understanding sentencing outcomes, and the second, by
considering how drug users and police respond to change in illicit drugs policy. In a
seminal paper in the field, Becker [1968] modeled participation in criminal activities as
a rational consideration of the relevant costs and benefits. A stylized version of this
decision, where individuals commit crime if the expected returns exceed that of legal
work (the opportunity cost of crime) can be written as:
(1− p)U(Wc) + pU(f) > U(W ), (1.1)
where p denotes the probability of apprehension, Wc the gains from the crime, f the
monetarized sanctions imposed if caught, and W the legal wage. This simple equation
implies that crime rates should respond to several different factors. Ceteris paribus, crime
should fall as the apprehension rate rises, the penalties imposed on crime increase, or the
legal wage rises.
This model forms the basis of a growing empirical literature on the economics of crime,
with papers generally finding support for the key elements. This includes the impact of
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legal wages and employment oppurtunities [Grogger, 1998; Gould et al., 2002], and the
role of policing on crime [Levitt, 1997; Draca et al., 2011; Buonanno and Mastrobuoni,
2012]. Other papers have focussed on the different roles played by criminial sanctions,
namely the detterence effect of incarceration (where longer prison sentences result in
lower crime rates, as the model above predicts) [Levitt, 1998; Drago et al., 2009] and
the incapacitation effect (which is not a component of the Becker model) [Barbarino
and Mastrobuoni, 2014]. The Becker model has also been applied to a variety of other
areas, including income tax evasion [Allingham and Sandmo, 1972], the study of corrup-
tion of government officials [Rose-Ackerman, 1975], exam cheating [Kerkvliet, 1994] and
environmental regulation [Heyes, 2000].
The two sections below outline the component parts of this thesis.
1.1 Sentencing Differentials in US Federal Courts
The first paper considers racial and ethnic sentencing differentials in the US criminal
justice system (specifically in federal court sentencing), a system where such differences
are observed at many stages. For instance, black individuals are over twice as likely
to be arrested as their white counterparts [United States Department of Justice, 2012].
Hispanic defendants in state courts are significantly more likely to be denied bail, and
are required to pay higher amounts if bail is approved [Demuth, 2003]. In 2010, black
individuals were 5.8 times more likely to be incarcerated than whites. The corresponding
figure for Hispanics was 2.5 [Prison Policy Institute, 2012]. Blacks and Hispanics are also
disproportionately represented on death row [Criminal Justice Project of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 2013].
Although these statistics are noteworthy in their own right, it is also very important
to understand what drives such disparities. Do these ethnic differentials reflect different
levels of criminal activity of individuals committing crimes, or do they provide evidence
of disparate treatment of ethnic minority individuals by the criminal justice system?
The public policy implications will differ considerably depending on the answer to this
question.
The first paper contributes to our understanding in this area by focusing on racial and
ethnic differentials in a single stage of the criminal justice system, namely sentence length
decisions in US federal courts. It aims to distinguish between the two key explanations
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for these differences: unobserved offense heterogeneity and discrimination. Mustard
[2001, page 301] notes of the competing explanations for racial and ethnic sentencing
differentials that these“two interpretations are difficult to distinguish empirically, because
they provide similar testable implications”, whilst Spohn [2000, page 429] states that “the
findings of more than 40 years of research examining the effect of race on sentencing have
not resolved this debate.”
In order to separate between these two explanations, I consider the terrorist attacks
in the US on September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) as an exogenous shift to racial and
ethnic preferences in US society, and examine the impact of this shift on the change in
ethnic sentencing differentials in US federal courts. In order not to conflate this shift
with any changes in the types of offenses committed, I restrict my attention to the set of
individuals who committed their last offense before the attacks, and who are sentenced
within a 180-day window around the attacks, comparing sentencing outcomes for those
sentenced before 9/11 with those sentenced afterwards. I use a particularly rich dataset
that allows me to condition upon a wealth of factors that influence sentencing.
Past papers that have looked at the labor market impact of 9/11 for certain ethnic
groups [Da´vila and Mora, 2005; Kaushal et al., 2007; A˚slund and Rooth, 2005] consider
the simultaneous interaction between employers and employees to estimate the effect of
9/11 on labor market outcomes. An issue with these papers is that any effect picked up
will be a net effect; one that could be driven by either supply- or demand-side changes
in post-9/11 labor market behavior. An advantage of this paper is that, due to the
timing structure of the criminal justice procedure, I can hold fixed the key actions and
behavior of the individuals being sentenced (the “supply-side”), and consider only the
post-9/11 response of the courts (what could be thought of as the demand-side in this
criminal sentencing setting). This enables me to (at least broadly) isolate the source of
any resulting changes in ethnic sentencing differentials after 9/11.
The key result of the paper is that post-9/11, Hispanics experienced a 3.5% conditional
sentencing penalty. There was no change in sentencing outcomes for any other ethnic or
racial groups over this period. Departures from the sentencing guidelines play a key role
in this shift. Although it is not possible to ascertain whether this post-9/11 sentencing
penalty was due to sentencing judges or district attorneys (both of whom play critical
roles in departure decisions), Hispanic defendants with private defense counsels did not
experience any differential sentencing outcomes after the attacks.
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A battery of robustness checks are performed on the data in order to assess the
validity of the results. The results appear not to be driven by differential ethnic seasonal
trends around the time of the attacks, nor by the types of individuals sentenced before
and after September 11. Although there are some changes in the types of offenses for
which Hispanics are sentenced post-9/11, using duration models I find little evidence to
suggest that this is being driven by strategic re-ordering of the timing of the sentencing
of individuals after 9/11. The decomposition analysis highlights the role that shifts in
unobservables played in the post-9/11 Hispanic sentencing changes. As discussed in
greater detail below, a key explanation for such shifts in unobservables is a change in
discrimination.
Using such a “natural experiment” framework, the aim is to identify the causal
impact of a shift of racial preferences (which we may be able to think of as tastes for
discrimination a` la [Becker, 1957]) on ethnic sentencing differentials. A key insight of
Becker’s work on the economics of discrimination, is that the observed racial wage gap
in the labor market will reflect not average levels of discrimination of employers’, but
rather the level of discrimination of the marginal employer. In the short-run version of
Becker’s employer taste-based discrimination model, discriminating employers effectively
view (equally productive) racial minorities as having a higher marginal cost (wb + d,
where wb is the wage rate, and d a term that reflects employers distaste for hiring ethnic
minorities) than their non minority counterparts (whose marginal cost is just wa). In
response to this, minority employees will sort towards the least discriminating (i.e. lower
d) employers. If the relative supply of minority employees is sufficiently low compared to
the number of discriminating employers, equilibrium wages will reveal no discrimination
in the market. With a larger share of minority labor supply, the minority wage is set by
the most discriminating employer with whom minority workers match. In either case,
the equilibrium wage gap reflects the tastes of the marginal employer, not the average
level of discrimination in the labor market as a whole.
It is interesting to contrast this with the case of criminal sentencing. Here minority
defendants cannot sort over sentencing judges, and judges must make sentencing decisions
on all defendants who come before them. In this sense, the estimates presented in the
first paper will reflect the average preferences of those involved in sentencing decisions,
thus revealing a more complete picture of ethnic and racial disparities than one may find
from a similar labor market study.
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This paper ties in with a small body of literature that has measured on the impact of
9/11 on ethnic minorities. In these studies, the focus is on the labor market. Da´vila and
Mora [2005], using decomposition techniques, find significant earnings negative effects for
Middle Eastern Arab Men between 2000 and 2002. In a later study Kaushal et al. [2007]
employ difference-in-difference techniques to study the impact of 9/11 on a variety of
labor market outcomes. The authors document considerable earnings and wage declines
for Arab and Muslim men, but no effects on employment for these groups. This study
also provides suggestive evidence that these negative effects decline over time, and that
the estimated effects are stronger in less tolerant states (using hate crimes as proxies for
tolerance). Orrenius and Zavodny [2009] shift attention to the labor market outcomes
of another set of individuals; recent Latin American immigrants, a group who were par-
ticularly affected by the post-9/11 changes made to legislation regarding undocumented
workers and enhanced border security. Using a variety of comparison groups,the study
finds evidence of declining labor market outcomes for recent Latin American immigrants,
in terms of wages and employment, with the impact most pronounced for those with
shorter US residence. Related papers that link preferences shocks to negative labor
market outcomes (using difference-in-differences techniques) include Moser [2012] who
provides evidence of how World War1 negatively shifted preferences against Germans
in the US, and then links this shift to data on membership applications to the New
York Stock Exchange, where this discrimination led to German applicants being twice as
likely to be rejected. Miaari et al. [2008] consider the impact on job separations for Arab
individuals in Israel after the second Intifada (a period of Israeli-Palestinian conflict),
documenting rises in separation rates for this group post-second Intifada.
There is also a small, but growing body of economic literature that considers racial and
ethnic sentencing differentials. Mustard [2001] provides descriptive evidence of disparate
outcomes for both black and Hispanic defendants in U.S. Federal courts, along a variety
of different margins. A more recent paper by Rehavi and Starr [2012] further explores the
black-white sentencing differential, with data tracking individuals from arrest to offense.
The authors find that black defendants receive substantially longer sentences for the
same crimes. The study highlights the importance of the role of prosecutors in driving
these differentials through the mechanism of the initial charge that individuals receive.
Conditional on criminal behavior variables including arrest offense and criminal history,
black individuals are twice as likely to be initially charged with a mandatory minimum
11
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
offense as whites. Using decomposition techniques, the authors find that this difference
in initial charging explains at least half of the black-white sentencing differential.
A further set of papers employ a variety of identification strategies to further explore
this topic. Alesina and Ferrara [2011] propose a test of racial bias in capital crime
cases (where all cases are automatically appealed), based on the notion that if courts are
unbiased (in terms of defendant-victim race combinations), there should be no systematic
differences in the rates at which higher courts reverse capital punishment decisions
(errors in their framework) based on defendants race. The authors find that cases
involving ethnic minority defendants have significantly higher error rates when the victim
was white, compared to a non-white victim. These error differentials are found to be
driven by courts in southern states. Abrams et al. [2012] use the random assignment
of defendants to judges to document the variation in black-white differentials across
judges, documenting significant inter-judge differences in incarceration rates, but not
sentencing length. The authors also note that black judges tend to have smaller black-
white sentencing differentials. Finally, Shayo and Zussman [2011] use data on small
claims courts in Israel, and rely again on random assignment of cases to judges, who
are either Jewish or Arab. The study finds evidence of what the authors terms “ingroup
bias”, where both Jewish and Arab judges are more likely to settle in favor of the claimant
if they are of the same ethnicity. Observable characteristics of the judges don’t appear
to drive this bias. Interestingly, the authors then utilize information on the timing and
location of fatalities within Israel related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the
idea conflict fatalities that are both recent and local to the various courts may enhance
the salience of the divide between these two ethnic groups within those courts. The
evidence presented is in line with this idea; the ingroup bias is much lower in times of
no conflict, and increases as conflict escalates. As the authors note, “there is rather little
ethnic ingroup bias in the Israeli courts except during periods in which political violence
intensifies ethnic identification.”
1.2 Crime and the Depenalization of Cannabis Possession
In spite of the penalties involved, use of illicit drugs is widespread across much of the
world. It is estimated that between 167 and 315 million people aged 15-64 used an
illicit substance in the previous 12 months in 2011. In percentage terms this amounts
12
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to between 3.6 and 6.9 per cent of the world’s adult population [UNODC, 2013]. Given
the age patterns of use, these figures are much higher for young people. Combining data
on the US and a set European countries, Pudney [2010] documents rates of self-reported
cannabis use that exceed 25% in eight of the twenty countries considered. Amongst these
are both the US and the UK. The size of the UK drugs market was estimated to be
Aˆ£5.3 billion in 2004; roughly 40% of the market size of alcohol at that time. At this
time in England and Wales, there were an estimated 5.5 million users of Cannabis, the
most commonly used illicit drug.
There is large variation in terms of the drugs policy set by different countries. On one
side is the punitive approach taken by the US, under the moniker of the “war on drugs”,
where in 2007 there were 1.8 million arrest for drug-related offenses [Donohue et al.,
2011]. Those incarcerated for drug offenses comprised 16.8% and and 48% of state and
federal prisons in 2011 respectively [Carson and Sabol, 2012]. On the other side is a more
liberal, public health focus towards drugs use, such as that taken by Portugal in 2001,
which decriminalized possession of all drugs. The Netherlands is another example of more
liberal drugs policy, where the possession of small amount of cannabis is decriminalized.
Neither of these polar approaches are without critics. Punitive policies are costly (the
cost of drug use in the US in 2002 was estimated as 1.7% of GDP [ONDCP, 2004]) and
criminalizing individuals for the possession of small quantities of drugs can have large
individual costs. Critics of liberal policies note the potential harm of drugs on users
[Arseneault et al., 2004; van Ours and Williams, 2009, 2012], the scope for “gateway
effects’ ’ (where the consumption of soft drugs leads to harder drug use [van Ours, 2003;
Deza, 2013]) and the links between drug use and crime.
Of all drugs, it is cannabis that several recent policy changes across the world have
focused upon. Certain states of Australia have depenalized possession of small quantities
of cannabis, and in 2012, Colorado and Washington voted in favor of legalizing the
possession and sale of cannabis for recreational use. The focus of the second paper is
on a similar policy change, the Lambeth Cannabis Warning Scheme (LCWS) of 2001-2.
The LCWS mirrors some of the key cannabis policies seen elsewhere. The possession of
small quantities of cannabis was no longer an arrestable offense, whilst the penalties for
supply of the drug were kept unchanged. Key motivations for this policy were to free
up police resources to focus on more serious crimes, and to reduce frictions between the
police and the community.
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The nature of the LCWS is of interest for several reasons. It was initially announced
to last 6 months, and was later extended to run a total of 13 months. Thus, both
short- and long-run impacts of the policy can be investigated. Second, the policy was
introduced unilaterally in a single London borough, whilst cannabis possession in the
other 31 London boroughs was still subject to arrest. As noted in the second paper, this
has ramifications for the size of aggregate drugs markets in both Lambeth and the rest
of London, and allows the study of spatial spillovers from such a unilateral policy.
In order to evaluate the effect of the policy data was obtained from the London
Metropolitan Police at the borough-month level from April 1998 until January 2006.
The dimensions and detail of the data are worth noting, as they allow a variety of key
components of the policy to be identified. First, data series on three margins are utilized
in the paper; the number of offenses, the number of arrests and the number of crimes
cleared-up. The latter two series allow the study of how police effectiveness responded
to the policy. The data is also very detailed. Drugs data for each borough and month is
available at both the type of drug, as well as whether the offense was related to possession
or supply. Data is also available for the other key crime types; violence against the person,
sexual offenses, robbery, burglary, theft and handling, fraud and forgery, and criminal
damage.
With this data in hand, the first part of the paper studies how drugs crime in Lambeth
changed due to the policy. Cannabis possession in Lambeth rose substantially, both
during and after the policy. At the same time, police effectiveness against cannabis crime
fell. Given that one of the key reasons for the policy to be enacted was to re-allocate
police resources, this is the focus of the second part of the paper. Here, evidence is
provided of significant declines in five out of the seven classes of non-drugs crimes. In
total, non-drugs crime fell by 9.4% compared to the rest of London. At the same time,
there is evidence of a rise in police effectiveness against these crimes.
The third part of the paper considers the total welfare impact of the LCWS. This is
interesting as the policy led to large increases in the size of the local cannabis market,
but also to large falls in the majority of non-drugs crime categories. The policy likely
affected other non-crime outcomes within the borough. To measure the welfare effects
of the policy, the paper follows the work of Rosen [1974], by considering the impact of
the LCWS on house prices in Lambeth. The analysis here suggests that total welfare fell
due to the policy, finding large declines in house prices within the borough, particularly
14
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in high-drugs crime areas.
The final part of the paper develops and estimates a structural model, which encap-
sulates both drugs users’ and police behavior, in order to answer the question of what
would have happened had the policy run throughout the entire city of London, rather than
just in Lambeth. The results of the model suggest that by removing a key mechanism,
whereby cannabis users move to Lambeth to purchase cannabis, key policy benefits can
be retained, whilst some of the costs can be mitigated. This is of interest not least
because of recent cannabis policy changes across the world, where certain jurisdictions
liberalize their policy, whilst neighboring areas do not.
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Abstract
This paper aims to explain the source of ethnic sentencing differentials in US federal
courts by distinguishing between two key explanations for these disparities, namely
discrimination and unobserved offence heterogeneity. In order to do so, I consider the
terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 as an exogenous shift to racial and
ethnic preferences in US society, and examine the impact of this shift on the change in
ethnic sentencing differentials in US federal courts. In order not to conflate this shift
with any changes in the types of offences committed, I restrict my attention to the set of
individuals who committed their last offence before the attacks, and who are sentenced
within a 180-day window around the attacks, comparing sentencing outcomes for those
sentenced before 9/11 with those sentenced afterwards.
The key result of the paper is that post-9/11, Hispanics experienced a 3.5% conditional
sentencing penalty. There was no change in sentencing outcomes for any other ethnic or
racial groups over this period. Departures from the sentencing guidelines played a key role
in this shift. Although it is not possible to ascertain whether this post-9/11 sentencing
penalty was due to sentencing judges or district attorneys, Hispanic defendants with
private defence counsels did not experience any differential sentencing outcomes after the
attacks. A battery of robustness checks are performed on the data in order to assess
the validity of the results. Decomposition analysis highlights the role that shifts in
unobservables played in the post-9/11 Hispanic sentencing changes. As discussed in
greater detail below, a key explanation for such shifts in unobservables is a change in
discrimination.
CHAPTER 2. ETHNICITY, SENTENCING AND 9/11
Keywords: Discrimination, Criminal Sentencing
JEL Codes: J15
1
Ethnicity, Sentencing and 9/11
Brendon McConnell1
1I am especially grateful to Imran Rasul for his support over the course of this paper. Thanks
too to Richard Blundell, David Card, Silvia Espinosa, Sergio Firpo, Nicole Fortin, David
Green, Radha Iyengar, Michael Lovenheim, Rocco Macchiavello, Steve Machin, Derek Neal,
Aureo de Paula, Emma Tominey, Christian Traxler, Jim Ziliak and seminar participants at the
European Economic Association in Barcelona, UCL internal seminars, the Norface Migration
Network Conference on ”Migration: Economic Change, Social Challenge”in London, the ENTER
Jamboree in Toulouse, the CMPO Seminar in Bristol and the IZA Summer School in Munich. All
errors remain my own. Author aﬄiation and contact: McConnell (University College London,
brendon.mcconnell@ucl.ac.uk).
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2.1 Introduction
In US federal courts in 2001, 78% of convicted white offenders received a prison sentence.
The comparable figures for blacks and Hispanics were 90% and 94% respectively. Of
those sentenced, black males received 54% longer sentences than their white counterparts,
which translated into an extra 34 months in prison. These figures reflect only the average
outcomes for the different racial and ethnic groups, and do not take into account the
type and severity of crime committed, individuals’ criminal histories and other factors
relevant in sentencing. Controlling for such factors, racial differences are mitigated, but
still persist.
A large body of legal and criminological literature focuses on such differentials1,
particularly in the US, although no universal pattern has emerged from this body of
research. The large degree of heterogeneity in these studies in terms of the sample
sizes utilised, the quality and richness of the data, the types of courts (state or federal)
considered, whether or not sentencing was subject to determinate rules or based solely
on judicial discretion and the statistical tools used to estimate sentencing differentials
means that such an inconclusive result is unsurprising2.
A key issue faced by the literature is how to interpret racial and ethnic sentencing
differentials when found. Do these differences highlight discrimination by the courts (or
other parts of the criminal justice system), or merely reflect unobservable individual or
offence heterogeneity across different ethnic groups? Mustard [2001, page 301] notes of the
competing explanations for racial and ethnic differentials that these “two interpretations
are difficult to distinguish empirically, because they provide similar testable implications”,
whilst Spohn [2000, page 429] states that “the findings of more than 40 years of research
examining the effect of race on sentencing have not resolved this debate.” The inability
to determine the source of these disparities is a key limitation of the existing literature3.
Distinguishing between these two explanations in order to better understand the source
1Recent contributions include Schlesinger [2005], Johnson [2003] and Demuth and Steffensmeier [2004]
for US state courts and Schanzenbach [2005] and Steffensmeier and Demuth [2000] for US federal courts.
Although economics articles on this topic are less common, a recent paper by Mustard [2001] investigates
racial, ethnic and gender disparities in sentencing outcomes in federal courts.
2See Spohn [2000] for an extensive review of the earlier literature.
3A recent exception is a paper by Abrams et al. [2012] who approach the topic from a different angle, using
the random assignment of state court cases to judges in a US county in order to assess whether there
exist significant differences in the black-white sentencing differential across judges. Using Monte Carlo
technique to simulate a no-racial-bias counterfactual, the authors find large and significant inter-judge
differences in the incarceration rate, yet not in length of sentence.
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of ethnic and racial disparities in sentencing is the primary aim of this study.
To do so, I consider the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 (hereafter
9/11) as an exogenous shift to racial and ethnic preferences in US society, and examine the
impact of this shift on the change in ethnic sentencing differentials in US federal courts.
In order not to conflate this shift with any changes in the types of offences committed, I
restrict my attention to the set of individuals who committed their last offence before the
attacks, and who are sentenced within a 180-day window around the attacks, comparing
sentencing outcomes for those sentenced before 9/11 with those sentenced afterwards.
I use a particularly rich dataset that allows me to condition upon a wealth of factors
that influence sentencing. Using such a“natural experiment” framework, I aim to identify
the causal impact of a shift of racial preferences (which we may be able to think of as
tastes for discrimination a` la Becker [1957]) on ethnic sentencing differentials. To further
investigate the source of these disparities I also utilise decomposition techniques, which
have been used to investigate gender and racial gaps in earnings [Blau and Kahn, 1997;
Juhn et al., 1991]. In this analysis, such techniques enable one to separate between several
factors that drive ethnic differentials over time, including changes in the penalties to,
and quantities of, both observable and unobservable characteristics. This allows a better
understanding of the causes of the observed post-9/11 changes in ethnic differentials.
The key result of the paper is that post-9/11, Hispanics experienced a 3.5% conditional
sentencing penalty. There was no change in sentencing outcomes for any other ethnic
or racial groups over this period. Departures from the sentencing guidelines (detailed
below in section 2.2.1) played a key role in this shift. Although it is not possible to
ascertain whether this post-9/11 sentencing penalty was due to sentencing judges or
district attorneys (both of whom play critical roles in departure decisions), Hispanic
defendants with private defence counsels did not experience any differential sentencing
outcomes after the attacks.
A battery of robustness checks are performed on the data in order to assess the validity
of the results. The results appear not to be driven by differential ethnic seasonal trends
around the time of the attacks, nor by the types of individuals sentenced before and
after September 11. Although there are some changes in the types of offences for which
Hispanics are sentenced post-9/11, using duration models I find little evidence to suggest
that this is being driven by strategic re-ordering of the sentencing of individuals after
9/11. The decomposition analysis highlights the role that shifts in unobservables played
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in the post-9/11 Hispanic sentencing changes. As discussed in greater detail below, a key
explanation for such shifts in unobservables is a change in discrimination.
Past papers that have looked at the labour market impact of 9/11 for certain ethnic
groups [Da´vila and Mora, 2005; Kaushal et al., 2007; A˚slund and Rooth, 2005] consider
the simultaneous interaction between employers and employees to estimate the effect of
9/11 on labour market outcomes. An issue with these papers is that any effect picked up
will be a net effect; one that could be driven by either supply- or demand-side changes
in post-9/11 labour market behaviour. An advantage of this paper is that, due to the
timing structure of the criminal justice procedure, I can hold fixed the key actions and
behaviour of the individuals being sentenced (the “supply-side”), and consider only the
post-9/11 response of the courts (what could be thought of as the demand-side in this
criminal sentencing setting). This enables me to (at least broadly) isolate the source of
any resulting changes in ethnic sentencing differentials after 9/11.
Ethnic sentencing differentials have important social and economic implications. Such
disparities in both the extensive (receiving a prison sentence) and intensive (sentence
length) margin may exacerbate existing economic inequalities through a variety of mech-
anisms including shocks to household income due to incarceration, the negative impact
of parental incarceration on dependants and the scarring effects that arrests and criminal
history have on labour market outcomes (see Grogger [1995] and Finlay [2009]). As
with labour market discrimination, discrimination in sentencing may lead to self-fulfilling
equilibria where those minorities discriminated against change their criminal behaviour as
a response to perceived discrimination (see Arrow [1973] and Coate and Loury [1993a,b]).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the USSC sentencing guidelines
and the data. Section 2.3 discusses the impact that 9/11 had on racial and ethnic
preferences, and the implications that these have for sentencing outcomes. Section 2.4
presents descriptive statistics, as well as outlining my empirical method. The results are
presented in section 2.5 and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The USSC sentencing guidelines and data
2.2.1 The Sentencing Reform Act 1984 and the USSC sentencing guidelines
The data used in this analysis relates to the sentencing of convicted offenders in US federal
courts, and was obtained from the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC). Those
3
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sentenced within federal courts receive sentences based on a set of guidelines mandated
by the Sentencing Reform Act (hereafter SRA) 1984. The SRA proposed a system of
sentencing guidelines that would “further the basic purposes of criminal punishment:
deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation”4 through enhancing the
“ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing
system”5. Underlying the reform were the key aims of reducing “the wide disparity in
sentences imposed for similar criminal offences committed by similar offenders”6 as well
as achieving “proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately
different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity”7. Once passed by Congress,
the guidelines took effect from November 1, 1987.
As a result of these guidelines, two key factors determine sentencing in federal courts:
i.) the offence level of the crime and ii.) the criminal history of the offender. Table 2.1
displays the USSC sentencing table which specifies a sentence range, in months, based
on the intersection of the offence level and criminal history. So, for instance, a federal
judge sentencing an individual with an offence level of 23 and a criminal history category
IV must specify a sentence of between 73 and 87 months.
The offence level is composed of several different factors. Each offence type is given
a base level. Offence-specific characteristics are then added, and further adjustments
made to yield a final offence level. For example, an individual who commits a robbery
is allocated a base level of 20. If a gun was involved, 5 further points are added. If the
individual was a minimal participant in the robbery 4 points are subtracted. Lastly, if
the individual was found to be in obstruction of justice, 2 further points would be added,
yielding a final score of 23 points. The criminal history level is constructed to reflect past
sentences of imprisonment, offences committed while under the criminal justice system
(e.g.parole) as well as other factors such as escape attempts from prison. The level is
then collapsed into one of six criminal history categories.
The guidelines do, however, allow for departures to be made from the specified range
if the court finds “that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
4United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, ı¨¿œ3E1.1 (Nov. 2001) (hereafter USSC
Manual), Chapter 1.A.2.
5USSC Manual, Chapter 1.A.3.
6ibid.
7ibid.
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formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described”8.
As shown later, downwards departures occur frequently, whereas upwards departures
are rare. Downwards departures can occur for substantial assistance to authorities in
the investigation of other individuals or crimes (“Substantial Assistance” in the analysis
below) or for other reasons, such as guilt plea negotiations or voluntary disclosure of
an offence (denoted by “other” below). It is the District Attorney who files a motion
for departure, which is then considered by the sentencing judge. As noted by Albonetti
[1997, and see references therein], there is some concern in the legal literature that by
allowing departures, the guidelines have merely shifted the pre-guideline discretionary
powers that judges once had to prosecuting attorneys. Judges still retain some power, as
it is they who decide whether or not to accept the motion for a departure.
2.2.2 Data
For the main analysis detailed below, I consider the universe of individuals sentenced
in US federal courts within a 180 day window around September 11, 2001, subject to
certain selection criteria. Firstly, in order to focus solely on ethnic and racial sentencing
differentials, I abstract from considering gender disparities9 in sentencing and omit all
females from the full dataset10.
Next, I only consider males for whom there exists non-missing sentence length, crim-
inal history, offence level, offence type, district and age data. In order to minimise the
potential sample selection issues that omission of observations with missing entries entails,
I keep observations with missing entries for any other control variables, and include a
missing category when constructing dummies of the categorical variables used in this
analysis11.
Lastly I omit any individuals within the 6 month window who commit an offence after
9/11. Given that the crux of my identification strategy (which I detail explicitly below in
Section 2.4.2) involves a comparison of those sentenced prior to 9/11 with those sentenced
afterwards, it is imperative that any date-specific selection criteria are balanced across
8USSG §5K2.0
9Mustard [2001] documents both racial and gender differentials in federal courts, finding as large, and
at times larger, gender differences (in favour of females) than racial and ethnic differences (in favour of
whites) in sentencing.
10For the fiscal year of 2001, females comprised 14.5% of the 59 855 individuals sentenced in federal courts
11The only variables with a large number of missing entries is the variable defence counsel. For this
variable, 48.2% of my main sample have missing entries.
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the two groups. For this reason, for the subset of males sentenced before 9/11, I restrict
the final offence date to be 180 days before September 11, 2001.
2.3 9/11 and Preference Shifts
There is evidence that suggests the attacks of September 11th, 2001 shifted preferences
along a multitude of dimensions. One such dimension was society’s security/civil liberty
trade-off. The USA PATRIOT Act, signed on October 26th, 2001 increased the power
of law enforcement agencies to perform searches of private records (including e-mail
communication and phone histories) of US citizens, as well as extending the powers
of enforcement agencies in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-
related incidents. This focus on immigration resulted in two further, related Acts being
passed in mid- to late-2002 (i.e. both outside of the main time period of focus in this
analysis), the Enhanced Border Security Act12 (14 May, 2002) and the Homeland Security
Act (25 November, 2002).
There was also a notable spike in the reports of discrimination violence against Arab
and Muslim individuals (as well as those perceived to be either of these groups, for
instance South Asians or Sikhs). As Human Rights Watch [2002] noted“Arab and Muslim
groups report more than two thousand September 11-related backlash incidents. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation reported a seventeen-fold increase in anti-Muslim crimes
nationwide during 2001. In Los Angeles County and Chicago, officials reported fifteen
times the number of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim crimes in 2001 compared to the preceding
year”. Further reports of discrimination and hate crime victimisation are reported in
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee [2003]. The report also notes the rise of
discriminatory immigration policies, particularly focused on young Arab men.
Several recent studies have considered the impact that this preference shift has had on
labour market outcomes for such individuals in the US [Da´vila and Mora, 2005; Kaushal
et al., 2007] as well as other countries such as Sweden [A˚slund and Rooth, 2005]. These
papers are similar in spirit to this analysis, in that they utilise the attacks of 9/11 to
12According to Jenks [2002] the most important provisions of this Act included: i.) “A requirement that
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) make inter operable all its internal databases, so
that all information about a particular alien may be accessed with a single search”, ii.) “A requirement
that federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies share data on aliens with the INS and the State
Department” and iii.) “A requirement that all travel and entry documents, including visas, issued to
aliens by the United States be machine-readable and tamper-resistant and include a standard biometric
identifier.”.
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consider the impact on ethnic differentials caused by the exogenous shift of racial and
ethnic preferences 13. Studies focusing on the US have found that 9/11 had a negative
effect on the labour market outcomes of Arab and Muslim men [Kaushal et al., 2007] and
Middle Eastern Arab males [Da´vila and Mora, 2005].
Although it would be interesting to consider the impact of 9/11 on sentencing differ-
entials for Arab and Muslim individuals, these groups are not sufficiently identified in the
data, and even if they were, the sample size (presumably a subset of the small group of
“other” ethnicities in the data) would be too small to say anything reliable regarding such
individuals. At this stage, I consider other ethnic and racial minorities in the US. Is there
any evidence for a “spillover” effect from the increased discrimination and victimisation
of Arab and Muslim individuals noted above? Such effects could result from an increase
in the salience of race and ethnicity in post-9/11 US society, or a greater awareness of
those perceived in any way to be “outsiders”.
2.3.1 Post-9/11 Survey
Table 2.2 presents a selection of results from a 2002 survey of 1000 ethnic Californians,
who were asked variety of questions related to the ways in which 9/11 had changed
certain areas of their lives, as well as their perceptions. Unsurprisingly, Middle Eastern
individuals reported some of the largest changes, for instance 58% reporting an increase in
discrimination post-9/11 compared to just 3% of African-Americans. Middle Easterns are
also the most likely to have reported feeling depressed post-9/11. Albeit“soft”evidence, a
point to note here is that of the two largest ethnic minority groups in the US (Hispanics
and blacks), the responses of Hispanics were much more aligned with those of Middle
Eastern individuals than were African-Americans’. 58% of Hispanics thought the US
had too much world influence, compared to 27% of African Americans. When asked if
they preferred to be referred to ethnically as “American”, the affirmative response for
African-Americans was double that of Hispanics.
2.3.2 Assault Victimisation
Figure 2.2 displays the 2000-20001 change in the number of monthly assault victimisations
for whites, blacks and Hispanics (normalised by the 2000 count - to reflect seasonal
13 Other studies related in design include Moser [2012] who considers the impact that World War I had
on entry to the New York Stock Exchange for German traders, and Miaari et al. [2008] who consider
the impact of the second Intifada on the job separation of Arab workers in Israel.
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differences as well differences in scale - so essentially a growth rate). Given the physically
violent backlash against Arabs and Muslims noted above, it is possible that any preference
shifts against either blacks or Hispanics could also show up in victimisation results.
Victimisation growth rates for the three groups follow broadly similar patterns over the
first part of the year. Where the results differ is that just after 9/11 the growth rate of
assaults for Hispanics spiked substantially. That of blacks continued to decline, picking
up in December, and white rates increased as well, although less pronounced than the
changes for Hispanics.
On their own, these pieces of evidence are not particularly strong, but together,
they suggest a form of spillover effect from the direct impact of anti-Arab and Muslim
sentiment post-9/11 towards Hispanics. Even if such a shift in ethnic preferences did
occur, what would be the implications for the sentencing of Hispanics? First, note the
sentencing guidelines rule out any discrimination based on “Race, Sex, National Origin,
Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status”stating that such factors“are not relevant in
the determination of a sentence”14. Based on this, it is certain that I am testing the null
hypothesis of no discrimination. What is the role of the ethnicity of sentencing judges?
One of the findings of Abrams et al. [2012], who used the random allocation of cases
to judges to consider how racial sentencing gaps differ across judges, found that racial
sentencing differentials were smaller among African-American judges compared to their
white counterparts. Of those judges serving during the sample period 84% were white,
9% black and 5% Hispanic.
2.4 Descriptives and Empirical Method
2.4.1 Descriptives
Table 2.3 provides an overview of the key legal variables for this analysis. The average
sentence length in the sample is 61.6 months, so just over 5 years. Blacks receive much
longer sentences than any other ethnic group, with an average of 90 months compared
55 and 48 for whites and Hispanics respectively. Statistics are also presented for the
“other”15 ethnic group, yet given both the small sample size of this group and the ethnic
heterogeneity within this group, I do not focus on these individuals.
14 USSG §3H1.10, p.s.
15Comprised of groups including American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander and Multi-
Racial.
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Black defendants have higher offence severity as well criminal history scores than any
other ethnic group. Whites and Hispanics have similar averages for these two variables.
Higher criminal history scores reflect more extensive prior criminal behaviour, but will
also reflect the outcome of any past discrimination in the criminal justice system. Such
issues, although relevant to this study, are not expanded upon any further. I control for
the impact that these variables have on sentencing outcomes in all regressions below, in
order to consider current disparities, and specifically, conditional disparities.
A similar proportion of defendants are sentenced according to their original guideline
range, with 35-40% receiving downwards departures. There is some difference between
ethnicities in the type of departure; Hispanics are less likely to receive downwards de-
partures for substantial assistance to authorities, yet more likely to receive departures
for other reasons. There is considerable difference too in the pre-sentence status of those
from different ethnicities, with whites the least likely to be in custody (57%), Hispanics
the most (85%).
Table 2.4 presents further descriptives based on non-legal individual characteristics,
highlighting several differences across the groups. Just over a half of black defendants
are single (54%), compared to a third of Hispanics (33%) and whites (34%). Whites are
the least likely to cohabit and the most likely to be divorced. Whites have less children
and are over five years older than blacks and Hispanics on average. The modal education
category is “less than high school” for Hispanics and blacks, and “high school” for whites.
10% of whites are college graduates compared to 3% of blacks and 2% of Hispanics.
2.4.2 Empirical Method
My empirical approach is to consider the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as a natural experiment
that exogenously shifted tastes for discrimination, and to then examine the effect of this
shift on changes in ethnic and racial sentencing differentials. The key element of this
identification strategy is to solely consider the sentencing of a set of individuals who
committed their last offence before 9/11, and compare the outcomes of those sentenced
prior to 9/11 with those sentenced afterwards16. This rules out any changes in both the
16For this analysis I consider those sentenced within a 180-day window around 9/11. I investigated a
number of other windows-lengths around September 11, with results robust to local changes in window
length. There are two countervailing issues related to specifying the length of window around 9/11.
Windows too small do not yield a large enough sample size, whereas longer windows reduce the variety
of offences, as only those cases with a long distance from last offence to sentence date are considered,
which may introduce sample selection issues.
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supply and the type of offences committed as a response to the post-9/11 environment.
Figure 2.1 presents a schematic overview of my empirical strategy, detailing restrictions
on both the sentencing date, and the date of last offence.
In order to consider the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on ethnic sentencing
differentials, I use the following specification:
siet = α+
∑
e
δeEthnice + ρPostt +
∑
e
φe(Ethnice × Postt)
+ X ′iβ +
∑
g
γgGig +
∑
f
ωfOFFif +
∑
d
λdDid + iet (2.1)
where siet denotes the log of the sentence length for individual i of ethnicity e sentenced
on date t. The richness of this data is exploited by controlling for criminal history and
offence severity in a very flexible way, by explicitly accounting for the USSC guideline
table displayed in Table 2.1. A set of 257 dummies Gig (for all bar one of the cells of
Table 2.1) are included, each corresponding to a different combination of offence severity
and criminal history group. Thus the specification in equation 2.1 essentially considers
the within-guideline cell variation in sentencing length. A set of offence dummies OFFif
control for differences in sentencing penalties for different types of crimes. Xi is a vector
of individual and individual-case characteristics including marital status, dummies for
the age decile of the individual, number of dependants, highest education level, the type
of defence counsel and pre-sentence status. District dummies Did capture time-invariant
differences across districts, which will include district attorney and average judge effects.
Ethnice dummies control for sentencing differences across ethnic groups (where white
is the reference category) and a dummy Postt that equals 1 for sentencing dates after
September 11, 2001 allows for differences in sentencing after the terror attacks. Further-
more, the set of interactions Ethnice×Postt allows for heterogeneous sentencing effects of
9/11 across ethnic groups. Of particular interest in this study are the set of φe parameters
related to these interaction terms, which reflect any difference in the sentencing of ethnic
minorities post-9/11.
Ideally these parameters would solely reflect changes in the discriminatory nature of
the judicial system post-9/11. However these will also pick up any other ethnic group
specific changes. For instance, were defence lawyers to respond to the terrorist attacks by
implementing differential levels of effort for clients of different ethnicities, this too would
be captured by the φe parameters. Although this would now cloud the interpretation of
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the key parameters, it could be that this defence counsel response is a relevant facet of
discrimination in the criminal justice system. The main point here is that it is necessary
to carefully consider all other factors that may cause the φe coefficients to be non-zero
in order that such changes are not spuriously linked to discriminatory shifts. Lastly, the
error term iet is clustered at the ethnicity-district level, allowing for shocks to specific
ethnic groups to be correlated at the district level.
Equation 2.1 takes the form of a repeated cross-section, regression-adjusted difference-
in-differences (DD) model. It is thus important to consider the identifying assumptions
of such an approach. To do so, it is useful to decompose the error term iet in equation
2.1 into three terms:
iet = (φi + ψt + uiet) (2.2)
an unobservable individual fixed effect φi, a common macro shock ψt and an idiosyncratic
transitory shock uiet.
The first assumption underlying the DD approach is that selection into treatment
is not based on the individual transitory term uiet. This assumption is called in to
question in certain program evaluation studies where treatment selection is determined
by the outcome variable, and transitory shocks in this variable alter the likelihood of
treatment17.
There is no direct analogue to this issue in my analysis, although this assumption
may not be satisfied due to other reasons. For instance, one concern may be that if the
courts were perceived as being harsher on ethnic-minority individuals post-9/11, that
these individuals may change their attitude towards the criminal justice system, which
in turn could drive differential behaviour during the sentencing procedure. To the extent
that such attitudes (unobservable to the econometrician) are observable to the sentencing
judge, this would lead to changes in sentencing and thereby conflate the 9/11 effect of
the courts with an additional defendant response. With poorer quality data, this could
be an issue. However, the sentencing guidelines documented in section 2.2.1 explicitly
account for (at least some of the main) factors related to defendant attitude during
17A classic example of this is “Ashenfelter’s Dip” [Ashenfelter, 1978], where those who experience
transitory “dips” in earnings prior to a training scheme commencing are more likely to participate
in the scheme as a consequence of the dip. This group would likely experience a subsequent rise in
earnings from the dip, even in absence of the programme, therefore leading to an over-estimate of the
effect of the treatment.
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sentencing, and incorporate offence level reductions for the acceptance of responsibility18
and increases for obstructing or impeding the administration of justice19 during several
stages of the criminal justice procedure, including sentencing.
The next assumption, and key to identification of the treatment effect, is that the
treatment and control groups (ethnic minority groups and white respectively in my
analysis) share a common macro shock ψt. Were macro shocks to differ across groups,
it would not be possible to disentangle these shocks from the impact of treatment.
Although not directly testable, it is possible to perform certain robustness checks to
ascertain whether this is likely to be upheld in the data. I detail some of these in section
2.5.4 below. Finally, as I am using repeat cross-sectional data, it is essential that the
composition of the groups does not change systematically over time, that is:
E [φi|Ethnice = E,Postt = 0] = E [φi|Ethnice = E,Postt = 1] for all E
(2.3)
If equation 2.3 is not satisfied, it would lead me to spuriously attribute shifts in the
composition of the groups to treatment effects. Again, several robustness checks per-
formed in section 2.5.4 relate to testing the empirical validity of this assumption. If the
assumptions discussed above are satisfied, then by using variation in access to treatment
across both time and groups, the DD approach identifies the average treatment effect of
the treated (ATT), where “treatment” corresponds to ethnic minority status post-9/11.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Baseline Results
Table 2.5 presents the first set of results. The first column reports estimated parameters
from what is essentially an unconditional DD regression for log sentencing. Without any
control variables, there is no significant effect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks for sentencing
outcomes of any of the ethnic groups, including white defendants, who are the ethnic
base category here. Moving along the columns, sets of extra regressors are sequentially
included in the DD regressions. The final column, where all regressors outlined in
equation 2.1 are included is my baseline equation for the proceeding analysis. There
18USSG §3E1.1
19USSG §3C1.1
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are several points to note.
Firstly, although 9/11 did not significantly change conditional sentencing outcomes
for whites (the coefficient on Postt, ρˆ, is not significantly different from zero) or blacks, it
did for Hispanics. As the dependant variable is log sentencing, the coefficient of 0.035 can
be interpreted as a 3.5% increase in the conditional Hispanic sentencing differential (with
respect to whites) compared to before 9/11. Such a result is striking, as prior to 9/11,
the estimate δˆHispanic reflected a complete absence of a conditional sentencing penalty
for Hispanics. Secondly, the results reflect the importance of controlling sufficiently for
variables relevant in sentencing. For instance, unconditionally, black defendants receive
53% longer sentences than their white counterpart pre-9/11, yet once all regressors are
included, this sentencing penalty declines to 5.5%. Although discrimination could play a
role in generating this penalty, it is not possible to identify the extent to which it does so.
This is problem generally faced by the existing literature. What the results do show for
black defendants is that there was no change in the sentencing penalty post-9/11. This
is very much in line with the evidence discussed in section 2.3.
To better understand this result, Table 2.6 presents evidence on the role that guideline
departures play in generating the post-9/11 Hispanic sentencing penalty. The first column
is a replication of the last column of Table 2.5 as a reference point. The next column,
estimates from a Linear Probability Model regression of the likelihood of not departing
from the initial allocation of guideline cell, shows that Hispanics again differ from the
other ethnic groups. Post-9/11, non-Hispanics are 2.2% more likely to receive a departure,
which, given that only 1% of the sample receive upwards departures, means moving to
a cell with a lower guideline sentencing ranges. Hispanics on the other hand, are more
likely to stay within their initial cell. The third and fourth columns show the implications
that these differential departures have on sentencing. The pattern that emerges here is
not entirely straightforward. Pre-9/11, Hispanics receiving departures were sentenced
relatively harshly in their new cells, generating the conditional sentencing penalty of 3.5%
seen in column 4. Hispanics not receiving departures were sentenced relatively leniently,
which is reflected by the -0.029 point estimate in column 3. These two countervailing
differentials cancel out on average, to produce the estimate of the pre-9/11 conditional
sentencing differential found in column 1. What happened after 9/11 is that sentencing
outcomes for Hispanics receiving departures did not change significantly (φˆHispanic=0.02
with a standard error of 0.024), but the outcomes for those not receiving departures did,
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almost perfectly cancelling out the initial leniency experienced pre-9/11 with a penalty
of 0.03. It appears that this change is what is driving the main result of an increased
Hispanic sentencing penalty.
2.5.2 Quantile regression
Extending the focus of the analysis, I consider estimates of the post-9/11 changes in
sentencing differentials for ethnic minorities for a large range of conditional quantiles of
the sentencing distribution. For the τth conditional quantile, I use the model:
Quantτ (siet|.) = ατ +
∑
e
δe,τEthnice + ρτPostt +
∑
e
φe,τ (Ethnice × Postt) + Z ′ipiτ
where Z ′i =
[
X ′i G
′
ig OFF
′
if D
′
id
]′
(2.4)
and all individual terms are as described in section 2.4.2. The additional τ subscripts
denote the different parameter values for each conditional quantile τ of siet. Figure
2.3 displays the results of point estimates on the EthnicHispanic × Postt term from
91 separate quantile regressions based on the 10th to the 90th conditional sentencing
quantile. The figure illustrates a larger (although not statistically significantly different)
post-11 effect for lower conditional quantiles, which then declines (non-monotonically)
across the conditional sentencing distribution. How to interpret this? This pattern may
be reflecting the increase in sentencing differentials for those Hispanics not receiving
guideline departures. Recall from Table 2.6 that this group received lower conditional
sentences than their white counterparts prior to 9/11.
2.5.3 The Role of Defence Counsel
Another dimension to consider here is the role played by the defence counsel. Table 2.7
presents the DD estimates separately based on type of defence counsel20. Hispanics
represented by private defence counsels are insulated from any post-9/11 sentencing
increases, and in fact receive 6% lower sentences than their white counterparts. The
post-9/11 sentencing differentials are much more pronounced for those represented by
either Court Appointed (CA) or Federal Public Defenders (FPD), with differentials of
20It should be noted that this sub-group analysis is limited by the poor recording of defence counsel
type in this data, thus the sample sizes are small. Furthermore, if non-recording of defence counsel
information (this is done by the USSC, not the defendant) is correlated with unobservables driving
sentencing, then the samples will also yield biased point estimates.
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6.2% and 4.5% respectively, both significantly different from zero. The outcomes differ
when considering solely those who do not receive a departure. For these individuals,
those represented by FPDs still experience an increased post-9/11 differential,whereas
those with CA counsels do not21. At this point, it is not clear if the different sentencing
penalties experienced by Hispanics represented by the different counsel reflect selection
effects due to defendants22 or whether different defence counsels responded differentially
to 9/11. Data that I am currently collecting should hopefully shed light on this issue
considering several previous stages of the criminal justice system in conjunction with
sentencing, in order to separate out defence counsel responses with judicial responses.
2.5.4 Robustness Checks
In this section I present a set of analyses that checks the validity and robustness of
the results discussed above. In the first of these, Table 2.8, results are shown for
a set of regressions investigating the stability of the sample composition (based on
observables) between the pre- and post-9/11 periods. The purpose of this check is
related to the third assumption discussed in section 2.4.2. Although the fixed effect
is unobservable, considering the stability of many observable characteristics may help to
ascertain whether such an assumption is likely to be valid. Each variable of interest was
regressed upon all other variables conditioned upon in the main analysis. So for instance a
dummy for highest education being High School was regressed upon all other individuals
characteristics, guideline cell dummies, offence type dummies and district dummies.
There were no significant Hispanic (or any other ethnic group) changes post-9/11
in any of the individual characteristics of defendants. These include age, educational
attainments, number of dependants, pre-sentence status and criminal history score. Thus
I am comparing very similar individuals before and after the attacks. The only differences
between the pre- and post-9/11 time periods are in the types of offences for which
Hispanics are sentenced. This can be seen in the last 3 columns. After 9/11 Hispanics
were less likely to be sentenced for drug trafficking offences, and more likely to be tried
for immigration offences. The fact that offence severity also declines is due to the fact
that drug trafficking carries a higher baseline severity score than does an immigration
21Iyengar [2007] provides a very thorough analysis of the different characteristics of, and incentive
structures faced by, these different defence counsels.
22Although defendants should be randomly allocated a defence lawyer, Iyengar [2007] finds that this is
not always the case, so although there should not be, there may be selection effects here
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offence (mean offence severity scores are 24 and 16 respectively). This change in offence
type and severity is controlled for in all regressions, so the remaining concern is that
other unobservables, related to offence characteristics, shifted too.
I further consider this issue by investigating whether or not the duration between the
date of last of offence and sentencing date changed for Hispanics after 9/11 compared
to before. The purpose of this section of analysis is to consider whether the changes
in offence types observed in Table 2.8 could be due to a re-ordering of individuals post-
9/11. One concern is that individuals who committed certain offences particularly salient
after 9/11, such as immigration or terrorism-related offences, may have been processed
particularly rapidly after the attacks as a signal of the courts’ resolve to punish such
offences. A related issue is that the worst, or most chronic, offenders may have been
rushed through the system in order to be made examples of post-9/11. If either of these
concerns meant that Hispanics were over-sampled in the courts post-9/11 response, then
the main results from above could be due to Hispanics being incidentally sentenced more
harshly due to the types of crimes they commit, rather than explicit discrimination per
se. Such responses of the courts would shift the composition of the sample after 9/11,
and could also invalidate the first assumption listed in section 2.4.2 that stated that
treatment may not depend on the individual transitory term uiet.
The duration analysis presented in Table 2.9 relates to both of these concerns, con-
sidering the full sample, and then specific offences individually. Two different duration
models are utilised; a Weibull Proportional Hazard Model with Gamma distributed
unobserved heterogeneity and a Cox semi-parametric Proportional Hazard model. In this
duration analysis, all control variables used in the main analysis above are conditioned
upon here too. It should be noted that the regression coefficients presented relate to
the hazard rate, thus a negative coefficient indicates a lower hazard rate, which in turn
means a longer duration. The converse also applies.
The first two columns of Table 2.9 present results based on the full sample, and
show that there was no significant post-9/11 change in the duration from date of last
offence to sentencing date for any group. This is true for both models. Given that there
were shifts in the likelihood that Hispanics were sentenced for both immigration and
drugs trafficking offences, the next four columns consider the last offence to sentencing
durations for these two offence types separately. Columns 3 and 4 present results based
on the Weibull model. The first point to be noted is that there is no significant change
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for any group in duration for immigration offences, one of the most pertinent offences
after 9/11. There was, however, a significant (at the 5% level) increase in the duration for
Hispanics charged with drug trafficking offences. This could indicate that cases involving
Hispanic drug traffickers were better prepared (and thus took longer to bring to trial)
after 9/11, but it is not at all clear why this would be the case. The results from the
Cox model are presented in columns 5 and 6 and differ from the Weibull model results,
in that there are no significant shifts in Hispanic durations for either drugs trafficking or
immigrations offences after the attacks. Thus there is at best rather weak evidence of
any strategic changes in the re-ordering of defendants after 9/11.
Another key issue to consider is whether the key results discussed in section 2.5.1
are really due to a 9/11 response of the federal courts, rather than just picking up
differential ethnic time trends in sentencing, which could reflect differential ethnic trends
in committing offences. An example of such would be seasonal trends in the types of
crimes committed that differ across ethnic groups, with Hispanics being sentenced more
harshly in the winter months. This would invalidate the common time trend assumption
discussed above, and would lead to a spurious attribution of differential time trends to
a post-9/11 shift in ethnic discrimination in sentencing. To consider this issue, I utilise
several years of sentencing data prior to the attacks, and run a set of placebo regressions.
That is, instead of using September 11, 2001 as the reference date, I use a series of
relevant dates at six month intervals from March 11, 1999 to March 11, 2001. If the
results were driven solely by an annual cycle, then I should observe the same patterns for
September 11, 1999 and September 11, 2000, and the opposite patterns for the March 11
placebo regressions.
Table 2.10 presents placebo analogues to my baseline regression (column 5 of Table
2.5). Outcomes are considered in a six month window around the placebo date, with
restrictions on the last offence date as detailed above and represented in figure 2.1, and
all key covariates are controlled for as before. The main point to note here is that there is
no consistent, recurrent pattern in ethnic sentencing outcomes in the years prior to 9/11,
thus at a minimum, the results above were not driven by a seasonal ethnic sentencing
cycle. For both prior September 11ths, significant shifts in whites’ sentencing outcomes
in the post period were essentially offset for both blacks and Hispanics. For instance,
when mean white sentencing outcomes declined by 5.4% after September 11, 1999, black
and Hispanic sentencing rose by 4.9% and 4.7% respectively, indicating stability in the
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ethnic minority sentencing differentials before and after this placebo date.
2.5.5 Decomposition Analysis
In order to better understand the causes of the changes in sentencing differentials post-
9/11, I follow Juhn et al. [1993] in decomposing the sentencing differentials into com-
ponents based on ethnic differences in the penalties associated to, and quantities of,
observable and unobservable characteristics. Such techniques are commonly used in
labour economics to better understand the driving forces behind wage differentials, for
example gender wage differentials [Blau and Kahn, 1997] and the Black-White wage gap
[Juhn et al., 1991]. The primary focus in this section is the Hispanic-white sentencing
differential, but all analysis is run on the black-white differential as well. First consider
a separate sentencing equation for white individual i in year t:
sit = X
′
itβ
W
t + σ
W
t θit (2.5)
where sit is the log of sentence length, Xit a vector of all covariates, β
W
t the coefficients
from the white sentencing equation, σWt the standard deviation of sentencing for whites
in period t and θit is the standardised residual.
The sentencing differential between Hispanics and whites for period t can be written
as:
∆st = s
H
t − sWt = ∆XtβWt + σWt ∆θt (2.6)
where ∆ denotes the average Hispanic-white difference in the variable directly proceeding
it. Equation 2.6 thus splits the Hispanic-white sentencing into two components: the first
based on differences in average observable characteristics weighted by the white sentencing
penalties23 to these characteristics,∆Xtβ
W
t , and a second term based on the differences
between the two groups’ average position in the white residual sentencing distribution,
σWt ∆θt.
The final step is to consider how the ethnic sentencing gap changed from before 9/11
(t=0) to after (t=1). To do so subtract equation 2.6 for t=0 from the corresponding
equation for t=1, add and subtract 2 further terms, i.)
(
∆X0β
W
1 −∆X0βW1
)
and ii.)
23The terms in equation 2.6 are based on the white sentencing equation, thus simulating a “non-
discriminatory” environment, where all individuals are sentenced as if white. As white individuals
are the reference category in the DD analysis above, this is the natural way to write the equation,
although it could be written in terms of the Hispanic sentencing equation, or a pooled equation.
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(
σW1 ∆θ0 − σW1 ∆θ0
)
, and then re-arrange. This yields :
∆s1 −∆s0 = (∆X1 −∆X0)βW1 + ∆X0(βW1 − βW0 )
+ (∆θ1 −∆θ0)σW1 + ∆θ0(σW1 − σW0 ) (2.7)
where the change in the Hispanic-white sentencing differential (∆s1 −∆s0) is decomposed
into four terms. The first term, the X-effect, measures the contribution to the change in
the sentencing gap due to changes in observable characteristics between the two groups,
such as offence severity or type of defence counsel. The second, the β-effect reflects
the role of changes in the sentencing penalties attributed to these characteristics. For
instance, given that Hispanics are more likely to commit immigration offences, if 9/11
led to judges imposing harsher penalties on these offences, then the immigration offence
difference would be weighted more heavily, leading to a larger sentencing gap. The third
element, θ-effect, documents the effect of changes in the sentencing differential once all
explanatory variables have been conditioned upon, i.e. the change in Hispanics position
within the white residual sentencing distribution. For example, shifts in discrimination
against Hispanics post-9/11 would lead to an increase in Hispanic’s average position in
the white residual distribution, thus leading to an increase in the Hispanic sentencing
penalty. The fourth term, the σ-effect, reflects the role that changes in the spread of the
white residual sentencing distribution has, holding fixed the pre-9/11 ethnic residual gap.
The third and fourth terms, based on the residual sentencing gap, will reflect both
discrimination and unobservable offence and defendant characteristics. Given both the
richness of the data, and the identification strategy employed in this study, where only
individuals who committed their last crime prior to 9/11 are considered, the θ- and
σ-effect terms should predominantly reflect shifts in discrimination.
Table 2.11 displays the results from the JMP decompositions, for changes in both the
black-white and Hispanic-white sentencing differential. The first 2 rows of both columns
reflect the raw differential in sentencing also shown in column 1, Table 2.5. Focusing on
Hispanics, the change in differential of -4.2% shows that after 9/11, without conditioning
on any relevant variables, average sentencing outcomes were improved with respect to
whites. The next 2 lines expand on this, highlighting a more complex story. Based
on all observable characteristics, this relative sentencing improvement should have been
double of what it was, with a change of -8.3%. The reason that this did not occur is due
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to a countervailing increase of 4.1% in the gap due to unobservables. This increase is
primarily due to changes in the unobservable quantities - the θ-effect. As noted above,
a key candidate for such a change is a shift in discrimination, particularly in this case
given the richness of the observables. The pattern for the black-white differential is very
different. This differential rose by 1.65% post-9/11, yet the full extent of this change
could be attributed to changes in observables.
Part B of the table documents the roles of specific observables in the sentencing
differential changes. In terms of observable characteristics, the main variable leading to
a sentencing improvement for Hispanics was the guideline cell in which individuals were
sentenced. As seen in Table 2.8, this was due to a decrease in the average offence severity
for which Hispanics were tried. The minimal contribution of the overall β-effect hides
several changes that offset each other in aggregate. The penalties related to individual
characteristics and the court district dummies led to a combined improvement of average
Hispanic sentencing outcomes post-9/11 of 5.1%. However, the penalties associated with
the types of crimes committed led to 4.7% increase in the Hispanic penalty. This was
due predominantly to an increase in the penalty for immigration offences (3.7%).
2.6 Conclusion
By considering 9/11 as an exogenous shift to tastes for discrimination in the US, and
linking this change in discrimination to changes in ethnic sentencing differentials, this
paper aims to address the crucial issue of the source of racial and ethnic disparities
in criminal sentencing outcomes. It is necessary to understand the underlying causes
of such disparities in order to best assess what can be done to address the issue; each
of the explanations implies a very different policy response. The main result is that
post-9/11, Hispanics experienced a 3.5% conditional sentencing penalty relative to their
white counterparts. There was no change in sentencing outcomes for any other ethnic or
racial groups over this period. Decomposition analysis highlights the role that changes in
unobservables played in driving the observed change in conditional sentencing outcomes
for Hispanics. The results are subjected to a set of robustness checks in order to ascertain
whether other factors, such as differential ethnic seasonal trends in sentencing or strategic
re-ordering of when individuals are sentenced post-9/11, could be driving this results. It
appears that this is not the case.
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An issue with the results presented in the paper concerns how to interpret the
coefficients on the post-9/11 terms. What I claim to identify in this paper is the impact
on sentencing differentials of a change in the taste for discrimination. Interpretation is
not straightforward, as this change does not have any obviously quantifiable units, thus I
don’t know how much tastes changed (Note that the evidence in section 2.3 suggests that
firstly such a shift did occur, and secondly that this shift was particularly focussed on
Hispanics.). It is thus helpful to benchmark the findings, both internally (by comparing
the impact of 9/11 on sentencing outcomes to the impact of other covariates on the same
outcomes) and externally (by considering how the results here compare to the wider set
of natural experiment papers that consider the labour market impact of preference shifts
due to certain events such as 9/11, World War 1, the second Intifada etc.).
There is still much to do in this research area. At this point, I am unable to discern
whether the main results are driven by the district attorney or the sentencing judge.
Data that I have collected on previous stages of the criminal justice procedure, in which
sentencing judges and district attorneys play different roles, may help to identify the key
player(s) driving the increased sentencing penalties for Hispanics after 9/11. In order to
assess the external validity of my findings, I am currently performing further analysis on
data from state courts in the US. These courts consider a different set of crimes to those
seen in federal courts, and thus a different set of defendants. I am also in the process of
obtaining data on sentencing outcomes in Crown Courts in England around both 9/11,
as well as the time of the London bombings (July 7, 2005).
21
CHAPTER 2. ETHNICITY, SENTENCING AND 9/11
Figure 2.1: Identification Strategy Overview
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Figure 2.2: Change In Assault Victimisation Rates 2000-2001, by Race
Source: National Incident-Based Reporting System, 2000 and 2001: Extract Files
Dependant Variable:
V ictimisation
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Notes: H denotes Hispanic, W denotes white and B denotes black individuals.
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Figure 2.3: Quantile Regression Estimates
Notes: Each main point represents the coefficient on post-9/11*Hispanic from a separate quantile regression of the type in equation 2.4. 91 Quantile regressions were run for the 10th to the
90th conditional percentile. The regression sample was the same sample of 39597 males used in all other analysis. Controls included the set of ethnicity and post-9/11 dummies, Individual
Characteristics, Guideline cell, Offence Type and District variables (detailed in Table 2.5 Notes).
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Table 2.1: United Sates Sentencing Commission Sentencing Table, 2001
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
I II III IV V VI
Offence Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) (10, 11, 12) (13+)
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
Zone A 5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
Zone B 9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
Zone C 11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
Zone D 28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
43 life life life life life life
Source: United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §3E1.1 (Nov. 2001)
Notes: Each cell represents the guideline range for the sentence length (in months) based on offence level and
Criminal History category.
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Table 2.2: Post-9/11 Survey, selected responses
Ethnicity
Affirmative response to: Middle Eastern Hispanic Asian African-American
US World Influence: Too much 57% 58% 56% 27%
Ethnicity: Prefer to be called “American” 19% 11% 11% 38%
Money Making post-9/11: Less Money 29% 37% 36% 18%
Less Money reason: September 11th 75% 72% 75% 54%
Victim of Discrimination: More often 58% 13% 16% 3%
More depressed Post-9/11: Agree 56% 50% 45% 26%
Sample Size 300 200 300 200
Source: “Post 9/11 Survey,” USC Annenberg Institute for Justice and Journalism, July/August 2002
Sample: 1000 “Ethnic” Californians
25
CHAPTER 2. ETHNICITY, SENTENCING AND 9/11
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics - Legal Variables
Mean, standard deviation in parentheses
Ethnicity:
Variable White Black Hispanic Other Total
Sentence Length 55.15 89.76 48.47 50.56 61.60
(66.67) (91.93) (56.59) (68.02) (72.94)
Offence Severity 20.28 23.43 19.88 19.21 20.93
(7.73) (8.49) (7.76) (8.34) (8.12)
Criminal History Score 2.45 3.23 2.43 2.02 2.64
(1.75) (1.83) (1.68) (1.50) (1.77)
Departure Status:
None 0.62 0.66 0.59 0.63 0.62
(0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49)
Upwards 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.16) (0.09)
Downwards 0.12 0.07 0.26 0.13 0.16
(Other) (0.32) (0.26) (0.44) (0.33) (0.37)
Downwards 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.14 0.16
(Substantial Assistance) (0.40) (0.40) (0.30) (0.34) (0.36)
Pre-sentence Status:
In Custody 0.57 0.73 0.85 0.66 0.73
(0.50) (0.45) (0.36) (0.47) (0.44)
Out on bail/bond 0.31 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.19
(0.46) (0.40) (0.31) (0.41) (0.40)
Own recognizance 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05
(0.30) (0.22) (0.11) (0.30) (0.22)
Other 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
(0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.14) (0.09)
Defence Counsel:
Privately Retained 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.10
(0.35) (0.27) (0.27) (0.35) (0.30)
Court Appointed 0.18 0.16 0.28 0.25 0.22
(0.39) (0.36) (0.45) (0.43) (0.41)
Federal Public Defender 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.19 0.19
(0.34) (0.36) (0.44) (0.39) (0.40)
Self Represented 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Waived Rights 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Sample Size 10962 10758 16626 1251 39597
Notes: Figures based on full regression sample of those individuals sentenced within a six month window of 9/11,
and i.) if sentenced after September 11, 2001, committed their final offence prior to September 11, 2001 ii.) if
sentenced before September 11, 2001, committed their final offence six months prior to September 11, 2001.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics: Non-Legal Variables
Mean, standard deviation in parentheses
Ethnicity:
Variable White Black Hispanic Other Total
Marital Status:
Married 0.33 0.20 0.35 0.31 0.30
(0.47) (0.40) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46)
Single 0.34 0.54 0.33 0.42 0.39
(0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49)
Cohabiting 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.13
(0.28) (0.34) (0.37) (0.31) (0.34)
Divorced 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.09
(0.38) (0.24) (0.23) (0.29) (0.28)
Widow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Separated 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22)
Number Dependants 1.08 1.71 1.87 1.43 1.59
(1.42) (1.83) (1.80) (1.73) (1.74)
Highest Education:
Less than High School 0.29 0.42 0.65 0.37 0.48
(0.45) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50)
High School 0.39 0.37 0.18 0.35 0.30
(0.49) (0.48) (0.39) (0.48) (0.46)
Some College 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.18 0.14
(0.41) (0.38) (0.26) (0.38) (0.35)
College Graduate 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.05
(0.30) (0.17) (0.14) (0.29) (0.21)
Age 37.76 31.52 32.16 33.90 33.59
(11.63) (8.96) (9.09) (10.95) (10.23)
Sample Size 10962 10758 16626 1251 39597
Notes: Figures based on full regression sample of those individuals sentenced within a six month window of 9/11,
and i.) if sentenced after September 11, 2001, committed their final offence prior to September 11, 2001 ii.) if
sentenced before September 11, 2001, committed their final offence six months prior to September 11, 2001.
27
CHAPTER 2. ETHNICITY, SENTENCING AND 9/11
Table 2.5: Baseline Regression with Varying Regressors
Dependant Variable: log(sentence length in months)
OLS
Black 0.534*** 0.387*** 0.319*** 0.258*** 0.055***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.024) (0.011)
Hispanic -0.055 -0.159** -0.176* -0.078*** 0.010
(0.092) (0.076) (0.094) (0.028) (0.014)
Other -0.193** -0.191** -0.128* -0.090 0.025
(0.090) (0.093) (0.069) (0.063) (0.023)
Post 9/11 -0.006 -0.006 -0.014 -0.012 -0.004
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.009)
Black*Post 9/11 0.016 0.007 0.016 0.009 0.006
(0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.014)
Hispanic*Post 9/11 -0.042 -0.051* 0.002 0.000 0.035**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.023) (0.014)
Other*Post 9/11 0.018 -0.003 -0.053 -0.033 -0.032
(0.079) (0.084) (0.058) (0.058) (0.033)
Observations 39597 39597 39597 39597 39597
R2 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.39 0.83
Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Offence Type No No Yes Yes Yes
District No No No Yes Yes
Guideline Cell No No No No Yes
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, and ∗ at 10%. Standard errors clustered at race-district level.
Figures based on full regression sample of those individuals sentenced within a six month window of 9/11, and i.)
if sentenced after September 11, 2001, committed their final offence prior to September 11, 2001 ii.) if sentenced
before September 11, 2001, committed their final offence six months prior to September 11, 2001.
White defendants are the ethnic base category in the table above, so estimated ethnic effects reflect differences in
ethnic-minority outcomes relative to the corresponding white outcomes.
Individual Characteristics include dummies for education level (high School, part-college, college, missing),
marital status (single, cohabiting,divorced, widowed,separated, missing), age decile(23-25,26-27,28-29,30-32,33-
35,36-38,39-43,44-49,50-87), pre-sentence status(bail,own recognizance, other,missing), number of dependants(1,2-
3,4+,missing) and defence counsel(private, federal,self,waived,other,missing). Guideline cell dummies comprise of
dummies for all but one combinations of sentence severity and criminal history, totalling 257 dummies. Offence
Type includes a dummy for all but one of the 41 Offence Types. District contains 93 dummies for all but one
Sentencing District.
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Table 2.6: Sentencing and Departures
Dependant Variable: log(sentence) 1(No Departure=1) log(sentence)
Sample: Full No Downwards
Departure Departure
OLS LPM OLS
Black 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.005 0.054***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.019)
Hispanic 0.010 0.037*** -0.029*** 0.035*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.021)
Other 0.025 0.013 0.034* -0.014
(0.023) (0.029) (0.020) (0.055)
Post 9/11 -0.004 -0.022** 0.000 0.007
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.020)
Black*Post 9/11 0.006 0.006 0.015 -0.014
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.027)
Hispanic*Post 9/11 0.035** 0.030** 0.030*** 0.020
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.024)
Other*Post 9/11 -0.032 0.007 -0.026 0.013
(0.033) (0.032) (0.021) (0.083)
Observations 39597 39597 24492 12657
R2 0.83 0.18 0.92 0.8
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, and ∗ at 10%. Standard errors clustered at race-district level.
Figures based on full regression sample of those individuals sentenced within a six month window of 9/11, and i.)
if sentenced after September 11, 2001, committed their final offence prior to September 11, 2001 ii.) if sentenced
before September 11, 2001, committed their final offence six months prior to September 11, 2001.
White defendants are the ethnic base category in the table above, so estimated ethnic effects reflect differences in
ethnic-minority outcomes relative to the corresponding white outcomes.
1(.=1) denotes an indicator function (equalling 1 if the statement insides the parentheses is true, and 0 otherwise),
and represents binary regressors. Marginal effects and the corresponding standard errors from the Linear
Probability Models (LPM) were similar in sign and magnitude to the corresponding Probit estimates. LPM
estimation was used in order to minimise the assumptions required in this analysis.
In addition to the set of ethnicity and post-9/11 dummies, Individual Characteristics, Guideline cell, Offence Type
and District variables (detailed in Table 2.5 Notes) are controlled for in all regressions.
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Table 2.7: Sentencing and Departures, by Defence Counsel
Dependant Variable: log(sentence)
Defence Counsel: Private Court Appointed Federal PD
Sample: All No All No All No
Departure Departure Departure
OLS
Black 0.106*** -0.013 0.045* -0.013 0.028 0.010
(0.036) (0.030) (0.027) (0.016) (0.024) (0.020)
Hispanic 0.034 -0.061*** 0.001 -0.025 -0.026 -0.047**
(0.033) (0.023) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Other -0.056 -0.062 -0.023 0.063 0.000 0.005
(0.055) (0.070) (0.048) (0.042) (0.063) (0.046)
Post 9/11 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.014 -0.015 -0.043*
(0.027) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023)
Black*Post 9/11 -0.003 0.026 -0.003 0.013 0.013 0.058**
(0.043) (0.038) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029)
Hispanic*Post 9/11 -0.027 0.016 0.062** 0.034 0.045* 0.082***
(0.042) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.024) (0.025)
Other*Post 9/11 0.086 0.058 0.068 -0.090* 0.084 0.086*
(0.085) (0.080) (0.068) (0.047) (0.072) (0.046)
Observations 3911 2099 8694 4370 7699 5170
R2 0.79 0.94 0.84 0.94 0.84 0.92
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, and ∗ at 10%. Standard errors clustered at race-district level.
Figures based on those individuals sentenced within a six month window of 9/11, and i.) if sentenced after
September 11, 2001, committed their final offence prior to September 11, 2001 ii.) if sentenced before September
11, 2001, committed their final offence six months prior to September 11, 2001.
White defendants are the ethnic base category in the table above, so estimated ethnic effects reflect differences in
ethnic-minority outcomes relative to the corresponding white outcomes.
In addition to the set of ethnicity and post-9/11 dummies, Individual Characteristics (excluding defence counsel
dummies), Guideline cell, Offence Type and District variables (detailed in Table 2.5 Notes) are controlled for in
all regressions.
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Table 2.8: Sample Composition
Dependant Variable: Age 1(High Number 1(In Custody Criminal Offence 1(Drug 1(Immigration=1)
School=1) Dependants Pre-Sentence=1) History Severity Trafficking=1)
OLS LPM OLS LPM OLS LPM
Black -3.605*** -0.051*** 0.761*** 0.056*** 0.428*** 1.175*** 0.043*** -0.001
(0.270) (0.011) (0.044) (0.013) (0.039) (0.173) (0.013) (0.008)
Hispanic -3.389*** -0.142*** 0.511*** 0.168*** -0.523*** 0.191 0.100*** 0.136***
(0.269) (0.013) (0.037) (0.011) (0.041) (0.215) (0.017) (0.013)
Other -2.065*** -0.034 0.368*** 0.052** -0.454*** 0.009 -0.149*** 0.011
(0.434) (0.022) (0.075) (0.021) (0.091) (0.441) (0.030) (0.021)
Post 9/11 0.221 -0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.026 -0.026 -0.009 0.005
(0.216) (0.009) (0.026) (0.009) (0.030) (0.128) (0.010) (0.004)
Black*Post 9/11 0.337 0.014 0.003 -0.003 0.021 0.045 -0.011 -0.003
(0.279) (0.014) (0.046) (0.014) (0.044) (0.176) (0.012) (0.005)
Hispanic*Post 9/11 0.241 0.016 0.025 0.001 0.049 -0.367* -0.037*** 0.051***
(0.250) (0.012) (0.040) (0.010) (0.039) (0.195) (0.013) (0.008)
Other*Post 9/11 -0.624 0.011 0.018 0.020 0.003 -0.162 0.042* -0.006
(0.643) (0.022) (0.078) (0.023) (0.086) (0.357) (0.023) (0.016)
Observations 39597 39597 38447 39597 39597 39597 39597 39597
R2 0.31 0.09 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.44 0.47 0.56
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, and ∗ at 10%. Standard errors clustered at race-district level.
Figures based on full regression sample of those individuals sentenced within a six month window of 9/11, and i.) if sentenced after September 11, 2001, committed their final offence prior to
September 11, 2001 ii.) if sentenced before September 11, 2001, committed their final offence six months prior to September 11, 2001.
White defendants are the ethnic base category in the table above, so estimated ethnic effects reflect differences in ethnic-minority outcomes relative to the corresponding white outcomes.
1(.=1) denotes an indicator function (equalling 1 if the statement insides the parentheses is true, and 0 otherwise), and represents binary regressors. Marginal effects and the corresponding standard
errors from the Linear Probability Models (LPM) were similar in sign and magnitude to the corresponding Probit estimates. LPM estimation was used in order to minimise the assumptions
required in this analysis.
Here one of the regular regressors is the dependant variable.Individual Characteristics, Guideline cell, Offence Type and District variables (detailed in Table 2.5 Notes) controlled for in all
regressions, apart from those relevant to the dependant variable itself. For instance, if 1(Offence=drug trafficking) is the dependant variable, then Individual Characteristics, Guideline cell and
District variables also controlled for in this regression.
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Table 2.9: Duration Analysis
Dependant Variable: (sentence date-last offence date)
Sample: Full Drugs Immigration Drugs Immigration
Trafficking Trafficking
Weibull PH, Cox semi- Weibull PH, Cox semi-
Gamma parametric Gamma parametric
Frailty PH Frailty PH
Black 0.093 0.025 -0.176 0.645 -0.021 0.105
(0.071) (0.028) (0.118) (0.425) (0.039) (0.193)
Hispanic 0.421 0.150 0.405 0.246 0.191 0.158
(0.099)** (0.036)** (0.110)** (0.221) (0.038)** (0.078)*
Other -0.238 -0.123 -0.565 0.364 -0.067 -0.107
(0.203) (0.066) (0.477) (0.839) (0.114) (0.256)
Post 9/11 -0.045 -0.028 0.055 0.062 -0.023 0.118
(0.061) (0.018) (0.111) (0.363) (0.041) (0.097)
Black*Post 9/11 -0.059 -0.022 -0.074 -0.458 -0.013 -0.141
(0.078) (0.027) (0.138) (0.618) (0.049) (0.191)
Hispanic*Post 9/11 -0.145 -0.038 -0.284 -0.365 -0.090 -0.152
(0.084) (0.030) (0.130)* (0.396) (0.050) (0.104)
Other*Post 9/11 0.012 -0.021 0.217 -0.852 -0.034 -0.102
(0.159) (0.055) (0.498) (0.637) (0.129) (0.185)
Observations 45128 45128 19911 7031 19911 7031
Notes: ∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗ at 5%. Standard errors clustered at race-district level.
Figures based on full regression sample of those individuals sentenced within a six month window of 9/11, and i.) if sentenced after September 11, 2001, committed their final offence prior to
September 11, 2001 ii.) if sentenced before September 11, 2001, committed their final offence six months prior to September 11, 2001.
White defendants are the ethnic base category in the table above, so estimated ethnic effects reflect differences in ethnic-minority outcomes relative to the corresponding white outcomes.
In addition to the set of ethnicity and post-9/11 dummies, Individual Characteristics, Guideline cell, Offence Type and District variables (detailed in Table 2.5 Notes) are controlled for in the
first 2 columns, Individual Characteristics, Guideline cell and District variables in the last 4 columns.
Regression coefficients reported. A lower coefficient means a lower hazard rate, which in turn means a longer duration.
Weibull PH, Gamma Frailty denotes a Weibull Proportional Hazard model, with Gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity or “frailty”. Cox semi-parametric PH denotes a Cox semi-parametric
Proportional Hazard model.
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Table 2.10: Placebo Regressions
Dependant Variable: log(sentence length in months)
Placebo Date: 11/03/99 11/09/99 11/03/00 11/09/00 11/03/01
OLS
Black 0.045*** 0.032** 0.068*** 0.093*** 0.045***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
Hispanic 0.051*** 0.000 0.037** 0.057*** 0.032**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.013)
Other 0.036 0.012 0.062* 0.042 0.041
(0.030) (0.029) (0.035) (0.044) (0.029)
Post-Placebo 0.023** -0.054*** -0.013 0.069*** 0.009
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.009)
Black*Post-Placebo 0.001 0.049*** 0.017 -0.053*** 0.006
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013)
Hispanic*Post-Placebo -0.035** 0.047*** 0.004 -0.053** -0.026*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.014)
Other*Post-Placebo -0.012 0.045 -0.007 0.000 -0.013
(0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.038) (0.026)
Observations 32521 36426 37894 38626 36024
R2 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.82
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, and ∗ at 10%. Standard errors clustered at race-district level.
Figures based on full regression sample of those individuals sentenced within a six month window of placebo date,
and i.) if sentenced after placebo date, committed their final offence prior to placebo date ii.) if sentenced before
placebo date, committed their final offence six months prior to placebo date.
White defendants are the ethnic base category in the table above, so estimated ethnic effects reflect differences in
ethnic-minority outcomes relative to the corresponding white outcomes.
In addition to the set of ethnicity and post-placebo date dummies, Individual Characteristics, Guideline cell,
Offence Type and District variables (detailed in Table 2.5 Notes) are controlled for in all regressions.
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Table 2.11: JMP Decomposition of pre- to post-9/11 changes in ethnic sentencing
differentials
Dependant Variable: log(sentence length in months)
Sentencing differential: Black-White Hispanic-White
Part A: Main results
Pre-9/11 (raw) differential 0.5341 -0.0550
Post-9/11 (raw) differential 0.5506 -0.0969
Change in differential 0.0165 -0.0419
due to observables 0.0165 -0.0828
due to unobservables 0.0000 0.0409
Observable quantity: X-effect 0.0098 -0.0855
Observable penalties: β-effect 0.0090 -0.0030
Observable interaction -0.0023 0.0057
Unobservable quantities: θ-effect -0.0057 0.0378
Unobservable penalties: σ-effect -0.0045 -0.0005
Unobservable interaction 0.0102 0.0036
Part B: Further decomposition of observables
Observable quantity:
All Xs 0.0098 -0.0855
- Individual Characteristics 0.0017 0.0041
- District Variables 0.0015 0.0029
- Guideline Group Cells 0.0062 -0.0887
- Offence Variables 0.0005 -0.0038
- Offence=Drug Trafficking 0.0008 0.0027
- Offence=Immigration -0.0004 -0.0060
Observable penalties:
All βs 0.0090 -0.0030
- Individual Characteristics -0.0036 -0.0251
- District Variables 0.0118 -0.0257
- Guideline Group Cells -0.0039 0.0011
- Offence Variables 0.0048 0.0467
- Offence=Drug Trafficking 0.0072 0.0063
- Offence=Immigration -0.0010 0.0368
Notes: The differentials above are noted to be “raw” or unconditional sentencing differentials: group average
differentials that do not account for any legal or non-legal controls. These correspond most closely to the first
column of results in 2.5.
Figures based on full regression sample of those individuals sentenced within a six month window of 9/11, and i.)
if sentenced after September 11, 2001, committed their final offence prior to September 11, 2001 ii.) if sentenced
before September 11, 2001, committed their final offence six months prior to September 11, 2001.
Individual Characteristics, Guideline cell, Offence Type and District variables (detailed in Table 2.5 Notes) are
controlled for in both decompositions.
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Abstract
We evaluate the impact on crime of a localized policing experiment that depenalized the
possession of small quantities of cannabis in the London borough of Lambeth. We find
that depenalization policy caused the police to reallocate effort towards non-drug crime.
Despite the overall fall in crime attributable to the policy, we find the total welfare of
local residents likely fell, as measured by house prices. We shed light on what would be
the impacts on crime of a citywide depenalization policy, by developing and calibrating
a structural model of the market for cannabis and crime.
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3.1 Introduction
In nearly every country the market for illicit drugs remains pervasive, despite long running
attempts to restrict such activities. Around the globe various policy approaches have been
tried, ranging from punitive approaches as manifested in the US ‘war on drugs’, to more
liberal law enforcement strategies, such as those in Holland or Portugal, that lead to the
decriminalization or depenalization of the possession of some forms of illicit drug, most
notably cannabis.2
Both approaches have been criticized on theoretical and empirical grounds [Glaeser
and Shleifer 2001, Becker et al. 2006]: the historically tough US policy stance is estimated
to cost tens of billions of dollars annually, and there remain an estimated 3.7 million
individuals regularly using illicit drugs, the majority of whom consume cannabis [DHHS
2008]. At the same time, concerns over more liberal policy strategies relate to the
inherent characteristics of the illicit drugs market: consumption might damage user’s
health [Arseneault et al. 2004, van Ours and Williams 2009]; the use of some drugs might
provide a gateway to more addictive drugs [van Ours 2003]; and there are potentially large
spillover effects on crime and other forms of anti-social behavior.
We contribute to this policy debate by evaluating an increasingly common policy
intervention in the illicit drug market: the depenalization of cannabis possession, so that
the possession of small quantities of cannabis is no longer a criminally prosecutable
offence. We present evidence from a localized UK policing experiment that introduced
such a policy and focus attention on measuring its impact on crime, considered to be a
major social cost of illicit drug markets.
Criminal activity and drug markets might be linked because: (i) the substance itself
leads to more violent or criminal behavior by users; (ii) users commit property crimes to
obtain money to buy drugs; (iii) violence occurs between drug suppliers to control selling
areas. We present evidence over a broad range of crime types to assess the impact of
depenalization both on the size of illicit drugs markets for cannabis and harder drugs, as
2Donohue et al. [2011] categorize illicit drug policies into three types: (i) legalization – a system in
which possession and sale are lawful but subject to regulation and taxation; (ii) criminalization – a
system of proscriptions on possession and sale backed by criminal punishment, potentially including
incarceration; (iii) depenalization – a hybrid system, in which sale and possession are proscribed, but
the prohibition on possession is backed only by such sanctions as fines or mandatory substance abuse
treatment, not incarceration. Following Donohue et al. [2011] we prefer the use of depenalization over
decriminalization as best describing the policy experiment we evaluate, and closely mapping into the
definition of depenalization used by criminologists.
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well as the policy impact on non-drug crime such as property and violent crime.3
The depenalization policy we evaluate was unilaterally introduced by the local police
force in one London borough, Lambeth, in July 2001, a policy known as the Lambeth
Cannabis Warning Scheme (LCWS). We describe the motivation behind the policy and
its implementation in more detail later. It is however worth noting that many aspects of
the policy reflect how other depenalization policies have been implemented around the
world: (i) the possession of small quantities of cannabis for personal consumption was
still a recordable offence, but would no longer lead to the individual being arrested; (ii)
the primary motivation was to free up police time and other resources to focus on crimes
related to other drugs or other non-drug related crimes; (iii) the policy did not alter
penalties for cannabis supply.
The LCWS was first announced as a temporary policing experiment to run for six
months from July 2001. At the end of this trial period the policy was adjudged to have
been a success with the support of local residents. The policy was then announced to have
been extended for a further six months. Following this announcement, media reports of
the deleterious effects of the policy on crime, drug tourism, and drug use by children
began to steadily increase. As local support for the LCWS waned, the policy came to
an end by July 2002, having run for 13 months. We use these various policy switches
to assess the short and long run effects of the depenalization policy on the levels and
composition of drug crime and non-drug crime.
When evaluating localized policy interventions in illicit drug markets, it is important
to recognize interlinkages between drug markets: the equilibrium market size for cannabis
in a given location is partly a function of the endogenous choices of police and cannabis
users in other locations. More precisely, a localized depenalization policy in Lambeth
will likely: (i) impact the size of the market for cannabis in Lambeth as well as the rest
of London as drug users move there to purchase cannabis; (ii) enable the Lambeth police
to reallocate effort towards other types of crime, consequently impacting the number of
3The size of drug markets has previously been linked to crime rates [Grogger and Willis 2000, Pacula
and Kilmer 2003], especially for property crime [Corman and Mocan 2000]. On users, Fergusson and
Horwood [1997] report evidence of a link between the early onset of cannabis use and subsequent crime
using longitudinal data for a birth cohort of New Zealand children. Early onset users had significantly
higher rates of later substance use, juvenile offending, mental health problems, unemployment and
school dropout. On cannabis and violence, there is no clear evidence between the two as cannabis is
usually thought to inhibit aggressive behavior [Resignato 2000]. On crimes by drug suppliers, Kuziemko
and Levitt [2004] find that incarcerating drug offenders is almost as effective in reducing violent and
property crime as locking up other types of offenders. Levitt and Venkatesh [2000] show that workers
in the illicit drugs market are not particularly well remunerated and so pursuing property crime might
provide additional income and the flexibility to continue working in the drugs trade.
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drug and non-drug related crime in all locations.4
We investigate whether such changing patterns of crime and police behavior are
observed during and after the depenalization policy is introduced in Lambeth. To do
so, we use administrative records obtained from the London Metropolitan Police Service
(MPS) to construct a panel data set on crime for all 32 London boroughs, for each month
from April 1998 until January 2006. This contains information on the number of recorded
drug offences at two fine levels of detail: (i) the number of criminal offences related to
any given drug type, e.g. cannabis, heroin, cocaine etc.; (ii) for each drug type, the
specific offence committed: possession, trafficking, intent to supply etc. Such detailed
measurement of drug crime allows us to assess the impact of the policy on the size of
cannabis market (as proxied by the total number of cannabis offences), and whether the
change in market size is predominantly driven by changes in demand-related offences
such as cannabis possession, or by supply-related offences such as cannabis trafficking
etc.
A depenalization policy can free up police resources to tackle non-cannabis drug crime.
The disaggregated drug crime data we exploit allows us to specifically measure such effects
on other illicit drug markets, not just the direct effects on the market for cannabis, as well
as for seven types of non-drug crime: violence against the person, sexual offences, robbery,
burglary, theft and handling, fraud and forgery, and criminal damage. Finally, we note
that the administrative records also contain information on two measures more closely
correlated to police behavior for each disaggregated crime type: the number of individuals
arrested, and the number of crimes cleared-up. These margins help provide evidence on
how police effectiveness across crime types changes in response to the depenalization
policy.
We present four classes of results. First, the depenalization of cannabis in Lambeth
leads to a significant increase in cannabis related crime: offence rates for cannabis related
crime rise by 29.3% more in Lambeth relative to the rest of London between the pre-
policy and policy period; comparing the pre-policy and post-policy periods, they are
61.0% higher in Lambeth vis-a`-vis the rest of London. This longer term effect persists
well after the policy experiment ends. At the same time, we document significant falls in
police effectiveness against cannabis related crime, that also persist well after the policy
4This potential reallocation of police effort across crime types has been hinted at in previous studies. For
example Single [1989] notes that following depenalization in California, there is some evidence that the
police targeted non-cannabis crime to a greater extent.
4
CHAPTER 3. CRIME AND THE DEPENALIZATION OF CANNABIS
officially ends.
Second, we find some evidence the policy causes the police to reallocate their effort
towards crimes relating to the supply of hard drugs, such as heroin, crack and cocaine
(that are known as ‘Class-A’ drugs in the UK drug classification system). However, the
primary benefit of the policy is that it allows the Lambeth police to reallocate their effort
towards non-drug crime: we observe significant reductions in five out of seven other crime
types in the long run, and significant improvements in police effectiveness against such
crimes, as measured by arrest and clear-up rates.5 Overall, these channels cause total
non-drug crime to fall by 9.4% in the long term in Lambeth relative to the rest of London.
This reduction occurs against a backdrop of unchanging offence rates for non-drug crime
in the post-policy period for the rest of London.
Our third class of results document the welfare impacts of the depenalization on local
residents. The welfare effects of the policy are a priori ambiguous: although it caused
total crime to fall, it also led to a dramatic change in the composition of crime. There was
an increase in cannabis related offences, but the rates of many other types of crime fell
in the longer term. To estimate the overall impact of the policy through these changing
crime patterns, as well as through other non-crime channels, we estimate policy impacts
on house prices in Lambeth relative to other London boroughs. Intuitively, the total
social cost of depenalization (not just those costs arising from crime) should be reflected
in house prices [Rosen 1974, Thaler 1978].
We find that despite the overall fall in crime attributable to the policy, the total
welfare of local residents likely fell, as measured by house prices. These welfare losses
are concentrated in Lambeth zip codes where the illicit drug market was most active.
We provide a lower bound estimate of the loss in property values in Lambeth (that has
around 280,000 residents and 119,000 property units) due to the policy to be around
£200mn.
Our final set of results use the lessons from the localized policing experiment to shed
light on the likely impacts on crime if the same policy were to be applied citywide. To do so
we develop and calibrate a structural model of the market demand for cannabis and non-
5Section 2.1 describes in far more detail the definitions of each monthly crime series data related to
offences, arrests and clear-ups. Here we note that we define the offence rate, for a given crime, as
the number of offences per 1000 of the adult population (aged 16 and above). As individuals are not
necessarily immediately arrested for offences committed, we define the arrest rate as the number of
arrests in period t divided by the number of offences committed between month t and the previous
quarter within the borough. The clear-up rate is analogously defined.
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drug crime, accounting for the behavior of police and cannabis users. The model makes
precise interlinkages across cannabis markets, where the number of individuals purchasing
cannabis from a given location depends on the policing strategies in all locations. With
citywide depenalization, an important mechanism driving the impacts of the localized
policing experiment: the movement of cannabis users towards Lambeth to purchase
cannabis, is shut down. Due to this, the counterfactual policy simulation highlights that
many of the gains of the policy can be retained, and some of the deleterious consequences
ameliorated, if all jurisdictions simultaneously depenalize cannabis possession.
Our study builds on the evidence on the effects of depenalization or decriminalization
policies on crime. MacCoun and Reuter [2001] review these studies and find positive but
modest impacts. One reason for the difference with our findings stems from our research
design exploiting within and across borough variation in crime, rather than being based
on nationwide policy changes. US studies have exploited the fact that in the 1970s some
states depenalized cannabis and found weak impacts on crime [NRC 2001]. However,
Pacula et al. [2004] have questioned such studies because, “[so called] decriminalized
states are not uniquely identifiable based on statutory law as has been presumed by
researchers over the past twenty years”.
We contribute to this literature by exploiting a localized policy change and using
detailed administrative records on crime and police behavior. Our evidence provides a
nuanced picture of the impacts of an increasingly observed policy, the depenalization of
cannabis: (i) across crimes related to cannabis, Class-A drugs, and seven non-drug crime
types; (ii) on measures of police behavior, by assessing its impact on arrest and clear-up
rates; (iii) across time, by assessing the short and long run impacts of the LCWS; (iv)
on welfare, as measured by house prices, and how this varies within Lambeth depending
on the prevalence of the illicit drug market across different zip code sectors in Lambeth.
Taken together with our structural model estimates, these results provide new evidence
relevant to the policy debate on interventions in illicit drug markets.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the motivation behind the
LCWS, and reasons for its ending. Section 3 describes our administrative data and
6We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of drug policies on drug usage. The earlier
evidence is mixed: some studies find little evidence of increased drug usage either in the UK [Warburton
et al. 2005, May et al. 2007a, Pudney 2010] or other countries [Single 1989, DiNardo and Lemieux 2001,
MacCoun and Reuter 2005, Hughes and Stevens 2010], and others finding slight increases [Williams 2004,
Damrongplasit et al. 2010]. Our reduced form results suggests there might have been a considerable
increase in the equilibrium market size for cannabis in Lambeth. The structural model sheds light on
how total usage might vary with citywide depenalization.
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empirical method. Section 4 presents the results on the impact of depenalization on
cannabis crime. Section 5 investigates how the policy impacts other drug crime, and
non-drug crime. Section 6 uses house price information to provide a hedonic evaluation
of the depenalization policy. This sheds light on how Lambeth residents value the total
social effects of depenalization in the long run, not just those operating through changes
in crime. In Section 7 we shed light on what would be the impacts on crime if the same
policy were to be applied citywide, by developing and calibrating an equilibrium model of
crime and the demand for cannabis. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains further
information related to the crime and housing data, and further robustness checks.
3.2 The Lambeth Cannabis Warning Scheme (LCWS)
3.2.1 Background
To understand why the LCWS policing experiment was introduced in Lambeth in July
2001, we need to go back to the earlier UK policy debate stimulated by the publication of
the Runciman Report in 2000. This was a high profile inquiry commissioned by the Police
Foundation, whose remit was to review and suggest amendments to the primary piece
of UK legislation governing the policing of illicit drugs: the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
This laid out the three-tiered drug classification system used in the UK, with assignment
from Class-C to Class-A intended to indicate increasing potential harm to users: Class-A
drugs are cocaine, crack, crystal-meth, Heroin, LSD, MDMA and methadone; Class-B
drugs are amphetamines and cannabis; Class-C drugs are anabolic steroids, GHB, and
ketamine. The Runciman Report called for the classification system to more closely follow
the scientific evidence of relative harms, and consequently that cannabis be reclassified
from a Class-B to a Class-C drug. The report emphasized three benefits of doing so:
(i) reduced numbers of individuals being criminalized; (ii) removing a source of friction
between the police and local communities; (iii) freeing up police time.
Subsequent to the Runciman Report, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) pro-
duced their own report on drugs policing, ‘Clearing the Decks.’ This suggested the idea
of a workable depenalization policy in May 2000. This report again emphasized that such
a policy might enable the police to divert resources towards areas of high priority if they
were willing to explore alternatives to arrest for a number of minor crimes, including
possession of cannabis. The notion that such a depenalization policy might actually be
7
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implemented within London began to take hold a year later in early 2001, when the
police commander for the London borough of Lambeth, Brian Paddick, conducted a
staff consultation exercise on drugs policing strategy. During the consultation, officers
complained they spent a considerable amount of time dealing with arrests for cannabis
possession and this detracted from their ability to deal with high priority crime such as
street crime, to tackle Class-A drugs, and to respond to emergency calls.7
With the sanctioning of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir John Stevens,
the LCWS was introduced in Lambeth on July 4th 2001 as a pilot project that was
intended to run for six months. Under the scheme, those found in possession of small
quantities of cannabis for their personal use: (i) had the drugs confiscated; (ii) an offence
was still recorded, although individuals were given a warning rather than an arrest being
recorded – prior to the policy such individuals would have been arrested [Dark and Fuller
2002]. To be clear, the policy was designed to lead to no change in how the police should
record offences related to cannabis possession, all else equal. Rather, it would reduce the
penalties to offending individuals such that they would not be arrested. As such, the
LCWS had all the hallmarks of many policies trialed around the world that have sought
to depenalize rather than decriminalize the possession of small quantities of cannabis
[Donohue et al. 2011].
There are various mechanisms through which such a depenalization policy can impact
drug crime, depending on whether and how such policies alter the behavior of the police,
cannabis users, and local residents. As emphasized throughout, it is likely the policy
induced changes in police behavior: under the policy the police can effectively reallocate
resources from cannabis related crime to other crimes. This has the obvious benefit that
it allows the police to better deal with non-drug related crime, and should be evident in
falling offence rates for other crimes and rising police effectiveness against such non-drug
crime.8
Second, such changes in police behavior will induce endogenous changes in behavior
among cannabis users who perceive reduced penalties for being caught in possession of
7Police officers also reported concerns, following a recent disciplinary case, that they might face formal
sanctions if they continued to follow a long-standing unofficial practice of dealing with people found in
possession of cannabis by informally warning them and destroying the drugs on the streets. Pre-policy,
such actions did not have official sanction [May et al. 2002, Warburton et al. 2005, May et al. 2007a].
8Of course the behavior of illicit drug suppliers could also alter with depenalization. However, given the
lack of information on the supply side, and no reliable time series on drug prices by London borough,
for the bulk of our analysis we do not focus on this channel. We return to this issue in the conclusion.
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cannabis in Lambeth. As emphasized in the structural model developed later, such users
might originate from Lambeth or other parts of London. If users assume there to be
lower penalties of being caught in possession of almost any quantity of cannabis, then
offence rates for cannabis possession should rise with the LCWS because the possession
of such larger quantities of cannabis would still be recorded as an offence and still lead
to an arrest.9 Alternatively, the lower penalties might induce some individuals to start
using cannabis. If such new users then choose to possess sufficiently large quantities, this
would again cause recorded cannabis offences to increase with the policy, all else equal.
Hence changes in police behavior can explain both a simultaneous increase in cannabis
related crime and a reduction in other types of non-drug crime.
An alternative scenario is if any changes in police behavior induce no change in
the behavior of cannabis users, neither in terms of whether to purchase cannabis, nor
where to purchase it from. The LCWS should then lead to no change in recorded
offences in cannabis possession and mechanically reduce arrest and clear-up rates for
cannabis possession: behaviors that previously would have been recorded as offences
would continue to be classified as such, but the LCWS policy would lead to the number
of arrests and clear-ups for cannabis possession falling in this scenario.
Absent any changes in behavior among cannabis users, changes in offence rates for
cannabis possession might also occur through what criminologists refer to as a ‘net-
widening effect’ that operates through changes in police reporting behavior [Christie
and Ali 2000, Warburton et al. 2005, May 2007a]. This states that depenalization
policies allow the police to start formally dealing with cannabis offences where previously
they might have issued informal warnings and no offence recorded. Indeed, given the
documented heterogeneity in behavior of individual police officers in relation to drugs
policing [May 2007a], we would certainly expect some element of net-widening to occur
under the LCWS. In consequence, the LCWS would cause recorded offence rates for
cannabis possession to increase. This channel alone does not suggest any impact on
arrest and clear-up rates for cannabis possession, nor does it imply any change in police
effectiveness against non-drug crime.
Finally, the policy might also induce changes in reporting behavior among local
9Indeed, in an MPS review of the LCWS policy, Dark and Fuller [2002] note the ambiguity officers
themselves faced in regards to establishing a clear threshold for what constituted a small quantity
of cannabis possessed. Christie and Ali [2000] report that in the context of depenalization in South
Australia, small quantities corresponded to less than 100g of cannabis or 20g of cannabis resin.
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residents. If they view the policy as signalling the police were devoting less effort towards
cannabis related crimes, residents might then be less inclined to report incidents involving
cannabis possession. All else equal, this would cause a reduction in recorded cannabis
offences, but this channel alone should have no impact on arrest and clear-ups rates for
cannabis possession, nor on the incidence of non-drug crime. As we sequentially present
evidence on the impacts of the LCWS policy on cannabis offences, on measures of police
effectiveness related to cannabis crime, and on the incidence and police effectiveness
against other types of non-drug crime, we will be able to narrow down the likely dominant
channels through which the policy operates. It is these first order channels we then
capture in our structural model, that allows us to take the key lessons from the localized
LCWS policing experiment and predict the likely impacts of a counterfactual citywide
depenalization policy.
2.2 Initial Public Reaction and the Evolution of the Policy
To gauge the initial local public reaction towards the LCWS, an IPSOS-MORI poll was
commissioned during the six month policy experiment. This found broad support for the
scheme among locals: 36% of surveyed residents approved outright of the policy; a further
47% approved provided the police actually reduced serious crime in Lambeth. Following
this ground swell of support, at the end of the trial period, the policy was then announced
to have been extended for a further six months. It is plausible this extension might have
been interpreted by cannabis users and the police as representing a permanent change in
drug policing strategy.
Anecdotal evidence then suggests local support for the scheme began to decline once
the policy was announced to have been extended beyond the initial pilot. Media reports
cited that local opposition arose due to concerns that children were at risk from the
scheme, and that the LCWS had led to an increase in drug tourism in Lambeth. The
LCWS formally ended on 31st July 2002. In part because of disagreements between
the police and local politicians over the policy’s true impacts, post-policy Lambeth’s
cannabis policing strategy did not return identically to what it had been pre-policy.
Rather, it adjusted to be a firmer version of what had occurred during the pilot. More
precisely, the MPS announced that in Lambeth officers would continue to record offences
for cannabis possession, and they would continue to issue warnings rather than necessarily
arrest those in possession of cannabis, but would now also have the discretion to arrest
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where the offence was aggravated. Aggravating factors included: (i) if the officer feared
disorder; (ii) if the person was openly smoking cannabis in a public place; (iii) those aged
17 or under were found in possession of cannabis; (iv) individuals found in possession of
cannabis were in or near schools, youth clubs or children’s play areas.
3.2.2 Other Police Operations
To place the LCWS into the wider context of other police operations conducted in London,
we have constructed a novel panel dataset of police operations by London borough-month
for our sample period. This is described in Table A1: As shown in Panel A, for each
borough specific police operation, we note the type of criminal offence targeted and
dates of operation. Some operations occur like the LCWS, within one borough; others
are coordinated across boroughs. The length of police operations varies between a few
months and two years. There is no evidence of a spike in police operations immediately
after the LCWS is introduced, to perhaps reinforce or compensate for its effects. Panel
B shows borough specific police operations for which we have incomplete information
on their dates of operation: many of these also operate within a single borough. Panel
C shows police operations that are London wide. Panel D records police operations
that are referred to in Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) reports, but that we have
insufficient detail on to code in Panels A to C. Overall, there is little evidence from
Table A1 suggesting the impacts of the LCWS could be confounded with other police
operations. In the Appendix we show the robustness of our baseline results when these
other police operations are explicitly controlled for.
3.3 Data, Descriptives and Empirical Method
3.3.1 Data Sources
We exploit two sources of data to analyze how the LCWS impacted crime in each London
borough. First, we use administrative records obtained from the London Metropolitan
Police Service (MPS) to construct monthly panel data sets for various crime related
series. For any criminal act – such as the supply of cannabis – the administrative records
provide information on three crime series: the number of offences, the number of arrests,
and the number of clear-ups. Each crime series panel covers all 32 London boroughs for
each month from April 1998. The crime series cover drug related crime as well as seven
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broad categories of non-drug crime: violence against the person, sexual offences, robbery,
burglary, theft and handling, fraud and forgery, and criminal damage.
Second, we use the Quarterly Labor Force Survey Local Area (QLFS-LA) data to
obtain borough level demographic and labor market characteristics. We interpolate this
quarterly data to the borough-month level, and use this to define our main outcome
variable, offence rates for any given crime: the number of recorded offences for that crime
per 1000 of the adult population (aged 16 and over). We also use the QLFS-LA data
to control for demographics and unemployment rates at the borough-month level in our
empirical specifications, as described later.
3.1.1 Crime Data: Series Definitions
We describe the core definitional issues related to each crime series, focusing on: (i) official
Home Office guidelines for the recording of criminal offences; (ii) the link between offences
and arrests data; (iii) the use of warnings by the police; (iv) the definition of clear-ups
and their link to arrests data.10 The Appendix documents some of the important changes
the Home Office has instigated in the way in which offences and clear-ups are defined
over our study period. Such nationally determined definitional changes in crime series
data apply equally in all London boroughs, and so do not explain differences over time
between Lambeth and other London boroughs.
Home Office guidelines state that as a result of a reported incident, whether from
victims, witnesses or third parties, the incident will be recorded as a crime by the
police for offences against an identified victim if, on the balance of probability: (a) the
circumstances as reported amount to a crime defined by law (the police will determine
this, based on their knowledge of the law and counting rules), and; (b) there is no credible
evidence to the contrary. For offences against the state, the points to prove to evidence
the offence must clearly be made out, before a crime is recorded.
There are additional guidelines specifically related to how drug offences are counted.
While these do not appear to provide any exceptions to the above instructions for
how drug related offences are recorded, these additional guidelines make clear that: (i)
the general rule is one crime per offender, so for example, a stop and search of three
individuals all carrying cannabis will lead to three recordings of cannabis possession; (ii)
10The Home Office is the UK government department that set the crime recording rules in our study
period. It corresponds most closely to the Departments of Homeland Security and Department for
Justice in the US.
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when an individual is found to be carrying more than one drug, the most serious class of
drug possessed is that recorded; (iii) if an individual is found with several Class-B drugs
including cannabis, this is recorded as a cannabis offence.11
On the link between offences and arrests, a recorded offence of cannabis possession
need not translate into an arrest if, for example, a member of the public witnesses the
offence, but by the time the police show up to the scene (if at all) there are no individuals
to arrest. Hence there can be a wedge between the number of offences and the number of
arrests, and the size of this wedge differs across crime types because, for example, crimes
vary in the extent to which: (i) they are reported by witnesses; (ii) they bring victims
and perpetrators into direct contact etc.
On the issuance of warnings by police (rather than arrests), we note that for the bulk
of our study period, warnings for cannabis possession were not separately recorded for
all boroughs. From our correspondence with the statistical office of the MPS, they have
also confirmed that during the period in which the LCWS was in operation, actual
cannabis possession offences would continue to be recorded, but no arrests made or
clear-up recorded. This is precisely as the policy was originally designed.12 Hence, if
the behavior of cannabis users remains unchanged, then the introduction of the LCWS
policy should lead to no change in recorded offences for cannabis possession: this is
because policy was designed and practiced to lead to no change in how the police should
record offences related to cannabis possession, all else equal. However, under the policy,
arrest and clear-up rates for cannabis possession should mechanically decline given such
incidents have been depenalized under the LCWS.
Finally, for any crime to be counted as a clear-up, Home Office guidelines state that
sufficient evidence must be available to claim a clear-up, and the following conditions
must be met: (i) a notifiable offence has been committed and recorded; (ii) a suspect has
been identified and has been made aware that they will be recorded as being responsible
11Home Office guidelines are available here (accessed Sunday June 9th 2013):
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/177103/count-general-april-
2013.pdf
12The Crime in England and Wales 2006/7 Report states that, “From 1 April 2004 information on police
formal warnings for cannabis possession started to be collected centrally as part of the information held
(prior to this a pilot scheme was run in parts of London). Those aged 18 and over who are caught in
simple possession of cannabis can be eligible for a police formal warning which would not involve an
arrest. An offence is deemed to be cleared up if a formal warning for cannabis possession has been
issued in accordance with guidance from the Association of Chief Police Officers.” Hence for the bulk
of our study period (that runs from April 1998 until January 2006) warnings for cannabis possession
are not separately recorded for all boroughs.
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for committing that crime and what the full implications of this are; (iii) a sanctioned
clear-up or non-sanctioned clear-up method applies. In consequence, not every case where
the police know, or think they know, who committed a crime can be counted as a clear-
up, and some crimes are counted as a clear-up even when the victim might view the case
as being far from solved. In short, a clear-up means that the case was closed, whether or
not anyone was actually sentenced.
Hence, the primary reason why the series for arrests and clear-ups can diverge is
because an individual is arrested for an offence, but is not charged.13 The relative
frequency with which this occurs varies across crimes. For some offences such as cannabis
possession, arrest and clear-up time series are near identical. For other crimes, such as
violent crime or sexual offences, there is a greater divergence between the number of
arrests and clear-ups. In studying the impacts of the LCWS on drug and non-drug
crime, we exploit information on both arrests and clear-up series: this information is
crucial to measure the police’s ability to effectively reallocate resources towards non-drug
crime as a result of the depenalization of cannabis possession.
Drug Crime Data: Offence Types
For the crime series related to drug offences, the administrative records contain inform-
ation at two fine levels of detail. First, the records specify the number of criminal
offences by drug type, e.g. cannabis, heroin, cocaine etc. We focus attention on cannabis
and Class-A drug crime as these account for 95% of all drug crime, as shown below.
Second, for each drug type, the data records the specific offence committed: possession,
trafficking, intent to supply etc. To shed light on whether any observed change in the
number of cannabis offences is driven predominantly by demand or supply side factors,
we split cannabis offence types into two categories: we proxy changes in demand with
the number of offences related to cannabis possession, and we proxy changes in supply
with the number of offences related to trafficking, intent to supply etc.14 Both levels of
disaggregation by drug and offence type are also available for the other two crime series:
on arrests and clear-ups. We exploit the full richness of this data when studying the
13Charging must occur within 24 hours of arrest, unless the crime is serious, in which case it may be
extended by a police superintendent (36 hours) or a court (96 hours).
14These supply side offences include: possession with intent, possession on a ship, production, supply,
unlawful export, unlawful import, carrying on a ship, inciting others to supply, manufacture, and
money laundering. There are a very small number of other offences that cannot be classified as either
demand or supply related.
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impacts of the depenalization of cannabis on drug crime in Lambeth relative to the rest
of London.
To make clear the levels and patterns of drug crime pre-policy, Table 1 provides
descriptive evidence on drug crime in Lambeth and other London boroughs before the
LCWS was introduced. We define the offence rate for cannabis related crime as the
number of offences per 1000 of the adult population (aged 16 and above). Panel A
highlights that Lambeth has historically higher rates of drug offences than other London
boroughs: in the average month pre-policy since April 1998, there were .608 offences
per 1000 of the adult population in Lambeth, while the rest of London average was
.400. To put this into perspective, we note the pre-policy adult population in Lambeth
was approximately 240, 000, so around 146 drug related offences were being recorded in
Lambeth each month pre-policy. Out of 32 boroughs, Lambeth would be ranked 6th
highest in terms of drug related offence rates pre-policy.
Panel B highlights the composition of drug offences by drug type. In line with some of
the motivations for depenalization, the majority of drug offences relate to cannabis: 60%
of all drug offences relate to cannabis in Lambeth; for other London boroughs this figure
is closer to 74%. The incidence of offences related to Class-B drugs (excluding cannabis)
and Class-C drugs is relatively minor, corresponding to less than 5% of all recorded drug
offences. In consequence, Lambeth has relatively more drug offences related to Class-A
drugs that other London boroughs.
Panel C shows how cannabis offences break down by crime types, that can be roughly
classified as demand and supply side offences. In Lambeth 91% of cannabis offences are for
the cannabis possession, with the remainder mostly related to intent to supply offences.
This breakdown by cannabis offence type is not significantly different between Lambeth
and other London boroughs. The levels of cannabis related drug crime documented
in Table 1 certainly make it plausible that a cannabis depenalization policy could save
considerable amounts of police time and resource, that could potentially be reallocated
towards Class-A drug crime or non-drug crime.
Descriptive Time Series Evidence on Crime
To begin to establish whether and how the LCWS policy might have impacted drug
and non-drug crime in London, we present three pieces of descriptive evidence. Figure
1A shows the monthly time series for the number of cannabis drug offences per 1000 of
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the adult population, for Lambeth and the average for all other London boroughs. The
period during which the LCWS is in place is indicated by the dashed vertical lines. Four
points are of note.
First, prior to the introduction of the LCWS, there is a downward trend in cannabis
offence rates in Lambeth and London more generally. Second, there is a large increase
in cannabis offence rates in Lambeth during the policy. Averaging within the pre and
policy periods, cannabis offences in Lambeth rose by 61% in the policy period relative to
pre-policy. For the rest of London, there was no significant change in cannabis offences
between these time periods. Third, the dramatic upturn in offences occurs six months
after the policy starts – precisely the time when the policy extension is announced –
rather then immediately after the policy experiment is first introduced. This suggests the
impact of the announcement of the policy’s extension, rather than its mere introduction,
is key for understanding changes in cannabis crime. At face value this casts further
doubt on whether all the change in cannabis offences can be understood through merely
a net-widening effect of changes in police reporting behavior, or changes in reporting
behavior of local residents. Fourth, the rise in cannabis offences is quantitatively large
and appears permanent. There is little evidence from Figure 1A that the time series for
Lambeth begins to converge back to its pre-policy level or those of the other boroughs
in the post-policy period. Indeed, post-policy, cannabis related offences continue to rise
by a further 46% in Lambeth.
Figure 1B then focuses exclusively on offences of cannabis possession. This time series
mimics the pattern for cannabis offences as a whole so that possession related offences,
that constitute the bulk of cannabis related crime as shown in Table 1, do indeed drive
the increase in cannabis offences in aggregate.
It seems unlikely that these policy impacts simply reflect changes in the likelihood
that either police or local residents report the cannabis possession offenses that they
witness. Before, during, and after the LCWS policy, the police were required to report
all cannabis offenses they observed. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect local
residents to became more likely to report cannabis offenses during the LCWS since they
had reason to expect that the introduction of LCWS decreased the probability that such
reports would result in sanctions for offenders. Thus, our evidence strongly suggests
that, both in levels and relative to other boroughs, cannabis use in Lambeth increased
substantially following the implementation of the LCWS. In the remainder of the paper,
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we focus on how changes in the behavior of Lambeth police may have induced this increase
in cannabis consumption.
A key dimension along which changes in police behavior could then impact crime is
through non-drug crime. The final piece of descriptive evidence we therefore present is
the time series for all non-drug offences aggregated to a single series for Lambeth and
the rest of London. As Figure 1C shows, prior to the LCWS’s introduction, we observe
upward trends in such crime rates in Lambeth and across London as a whole. However,
a few months into the policy period, rates of criminal offence for non-drug crime begin
declining in Lambeth and this downward trend continues in the long run. In contrast for
the rest of London, non-drug offences remain relatively constant for the second half of the
sample period. While far from definitive, this is the first piece of evidence that hints at the
importance of changes in police behavior and potential reallocations of police resources
from cannabis related crime towards non-drug crime, that might then induce changes in
behavior among cannabis uses, to best explain the full set of descriptive evidence.
3.3.2 Empirical Method
To establish whether there is a causal impact of the LCWS policy on crime, we estimate
the following panel data specification for borough b in month m in year y,
lnCbmy = β0Pmy + β1 [Lb × Pmy] + β2PPmy + β3 [Lb × PPmy] (3.1)
+γXbmy + λb + λm + ubmy,
where Cbmy is the offence rate, for a given crime type. The offence rate is defined as the
number of criminal offences per thousand of the adult population (aged 16 and over).
Pmy, PPmy are dummies for the policy and post-policy periods respectively. Lb is a
dummy for the borough of Lambeth. The parameters of interest are estimated from
within a standard difference-in-difference research design: β1 and β3 capture differential
changes in crime rates in Lambeth during and after the LCWS policy period, relative to
other London boroughs. β0 and β2 capture London-wide trends in offence rates during
the policy and post-policy periods.
All other London boroughs are included as part of the sample when estimating (3.1).
Given the interlinkages across locations in cannabis markets, it is likely that after the
LCWS is introduced, some individuals will be induced to start travelling to Lambeth
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to purchase cannabis there. This impact is spread over all 31 other London boroughs
(and beyond), and so is unlikely to lead to a discernible upward bias in the coefficients of
interest. However, to shed some light on this, in the Appendix we present a robustness
check that estimates (3.1) when boroughs neighboring Lambeth are excluded from the
sample (and find very similar results to the baseline estimates presented).
While administrative data on offences is available for each month from April 1998
onwards, the QLFS-LA data from which the denominator for offence rates is measured,
is only available until Q4 2005. Hence our study period for analyzing the impacts of the
LCWS runs from April 1998 until January 2006, covering three years pre-policy, the 13
months of the policy, and three and a half years post policy. In Xbmy we control for
the following borough-specific time varying variables: the share of the adult population
that is ethnic minority, that is aged 20-24, 25-34, 35-49, and above 50 (those aged 16-19
are the omitted category), and the male unemployment rate. The fixed effects capture
remaining time invariant differences in offence rates across boroughs (λb) and monthly
variation in crime (λm). We weight observations by borough population. Finally, defining
time t as the number of months since January 1990: t = [12 × (y − 1990)] + m, in our
baseline specification we assume a Prais-Winsten borough specific AR(1) error structure,
ubmy = ubt = ρbubt−1 + ebt,where ebt is a classical error term. ubmy is borough specific
heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Cannabis Crime in Aggregate
Table 2 presents estimates of (3.1) where we focus on how the policy affects the rate of
cannabis offences in aggregate. Column 1 estimates (3.1) conditioning only on borough
and month fixed effects. The results replicate the descriptive evidence presented earlier:
offence rates for cannabis related crime rise by 32.5% more in Lambeth relative to the
rest of London between the pre-policy and policy period. The coefficient on the policy
period dummy, β̂0, is close to zero, suggesting there is no citywide time trend in cannabis
crime rates during the policy period. Comparing the pre-policy and post-policy periods,
cannabis offences are 61.5% higher in Lambeth vis-a`-vis the rest of London. The post-
policy period dummy, β̂2, is positive and significant suggesting that the long run rises in
Lambeth occur against a backdrop of significantly smaller, but rising, offence rates for
18
CHAPTER 3. CRIME AND THE DEPENALIZATION OF CANNABIS
the rest of London between August 2002 and January 2006.
Column 2 shows the results to be robust to including the full set of covariates in
(3.1). These baseline results suggest the depenalization of cannabis in Lambeth led to
a significant increase in cannabis offences both during the policy period, and well after
the policy officially ended. The next two specifications additionally control for within-
borough linear and quadratic time trends respectively. As expected, the policy effects are
less precisely estimated and of slightly smaller magnitude. As Columns 3 and 4 show,
once we also control for a within-borough time trends it is no longer possible to identify
an effect of the policy during its period of operation. This is hardly surprising given the
policy is only in operation for 13 months. However in both specifications the post-policy
effect remains highly significant suggesting that post-policy offence rates for cannabis
crime were at least 41.4% higher than the rest of London, all else equal.15
Following the time series evidence in Figure 1A, the specification in Column 5 checks
for differential policy responses during the first six months of the policy, when the LCWS
was announced to be a temporary policing experiment, and the last seven months, after
it was announced to have been extended. In line with the evidence in Figure 1A, all of
the significant within policy effect on cannabis offences occurs after the second policy
announcement. We can only speculate on why this second announcement is the trigger
for cannabis offences to rise. If, for example, it is interpreted as a signal of the policy’s
permanence, then as there are fixed costs to re-structuring police resource allocations,
the police might have incentives to delay any large changes in their organization until
the policy is presumed to be permanently in place.
Clearly understanding such dynamic and announcement effects of policy needs more
research, but this finding does help however to immediately address two issues. First,
it suggests the LCWS was not introduced in response to rising cannabis crime rates: as
Figure 1A shows, cannabis offences were generally trending downwards in Lambeth in
the years prior to the introduction of the LCWS. Second, this casts doubt on whether all
the change in cannabis offences can be understood through changes in reporting behavior
of local residents, or solely through a net-widening effect caused by changes in the way
15As a related robustness check, we estimated (3.1) restricting the sample to a 12 month window around
the policy, that is from July 2000 until July 2003. Hence the policy and post-policy effects are not
identified assuming any particular underlying long run time trends. The previous results are robust to
using this narrower time frame. Indeed, this specification shows that over this shorter time frame when
drug offences are still found to have risen in Lambeth, drug offences are declining elsewhere in London
as suggested by Figure 1A.
19
CHAPTER 3. CRIME AND THE DEPENALIZATION OF CANNABIS
the police recorded cannabis offences. If so, we would expect such effects to be picked up
as soon as the LCWS comes into effect amid much media publicity, and we would expect
such effects to be impacted by the policy officially ending.16
In the Appendix we detail robustness checks on the baseline specification estimated in
Column 2 of Table 2. These address concerns related to: (i) the exclusion of neighboring
boroughs as valid controls; (ii) accounting for common citywide shocks to cannabis crime
through the inclusion of year fixed effects; (iii) controlling for a series of dummies that
capture each period when specific Home Office reporting guidelines are in place; (iv)
controlling for other police operations in London; (v) estimating standard errors allowing
for spatially correlated error structures. In all cases we find qualitatively similar results
to the baseline estimates presented: the magnitude of the long run policy impact on
cannabis offences in aggregate varies between 41.4% and 68.2% across the robustness
checks, and is significantly different from zero in each specification.
3.4.2 Cannabis Crime: Demand and Supply lmpacts
We now further unpack the mechanisms lying behind the main result from Table 2, that
aggregate cannabis crime rises in Lambeth relative to the rest of London, in both the
short and long term, after the depenalization of cannabis possession in Lambeth. To do
so we exploit the fact that the administrative crime records break down cannabis crime
into specific types of crime. We do so along two natural margins: (i) offences related
to cannabis possession, that might be more attributable to changes in the demand for
cannabis; (ii) offences related to cannabis trafficking and supply, that might be more
attributable to changes in cannabis supply.17
For both demand and supply side cannabis crimes, we also explore measures of police
behavior such as (the log of) arrest rates and clear-up rates. As individuals are not
necessarily immediately arrested for cannabis related offences they commit, we define the
arrest rate as the number of arrests in the borough in period t divided by the number of
offences committed between month t and the previous quarter within the borough. The
16We also estimated a specification breaking down the post-policy response for each year. This confirmed
the post-policy effects on cannabis crime to be long-lasting: we cannot reject the null that the effect
in Lambeth is the same in the first and fourth year post-policy. These helps address concerns that
cannabis crime rates in Lambeth were naturally diverging away from the rest of London.
17Of course, this classification of offences into demand and supply related is only approximate. For
example, it might be substantially more difficult to prove an offence of intent to supply, so that in
practice the police use their discretion so some drug suppliers are charged with a lesser offence of
possession.
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clear-up rate is analogously defined: the number of clear-ups in the borough in period t
divided by the number of offences committed between month t and the previous quarter
within the borough.18
Table 3 presents the results. In each column, specifications analogous to (3.1) are
estimated, where the crime series now refer to sub-categories of cannabis crime. Columns
1 to 4 have as dependent variables (Cbmy) crime series related to cannabis possession,
proxying the demand for cannabis; Columns 5 to 8 explore crime series related to cannabis
supply (the sample size drops slightly in these specifications because crimes related to
cannabis supply do not necessarily occur in every borough-month). Furthermore, given
the earlier finding in Column 5 of Table 2, we divide the policy period into two halves
to more precisely understand the effects of the LCWS on the market for cannabis when
it is announced as a temporary policy experiment vis-a`-vis a more permanent change in
policing strategy.
Cannabis Demand
On the demand for cannabis, Column 1 shows offence rates for cannabis possession only
rise after the policy is announced to have been extended: this increase of 67.5% in offence
rates for cannabis possession in the second half of the policy period closely matches the
descriptive evidence in Figure 1B. We find no evidence that rates of cannabis possession in
other London boroughs change significantly during the policy period. In the longer term,
post-policy cannabis possession offence rates remain 68.6% higher in Lambeth relative to
the rest of London.
To focus in on changes in police behavior that the LCWS induced, we next estimate
(3.1) but where the dependent variable is the arrest rate for cannabis possession. Column
2 shows that relative to the pre-policy period, arrest rates for cannabis possession in
Lambeth significantly drop by 43.6% in the first half of the policy period, and by 94.6%
in the second half of the policy period. However, post-policy, arrest rates return back to
their pre-policy levels (β̂3 = 0).
The next specification considers another dimension of police behavior: clear-up rates
for cannabis possession offences. Column 3 shows a significant fall in clear-up rates in
Lambeth for cannabis possession as soon as the LCWS policy is introduced.19 In the
18Ideally, the clear-up rate in time period t would be defined as the number of clear-ups in time t divided
by the stock of unsolved offences at the time, but such data is unavailable.
19The fact that the impacts on arrest and clear-up rates for cannabis possession are qualitatively similar is
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longer term, police effectiveness in Lambeth for crimes related to cannabis possession
appears weakened relative to the pre-policy period: clear-up rates remain significantly
lower. This occurs at a time when there are no London wide trends in clear-up rates (β̂2
is not significantly different from zero in Column 3). At the same time, as previously
noted in Column 1, in the longer term, post-policy offence rates remain 68.6% higher in
Lambeth than in the pre-policy period suggesting that the demand for cannabis remains
permanently higher long after the LCWS policy officially ends.
Perhaps the cleanest way to measure police effectiveness is to consider the (log of)
clear-ups per arrest in any given period t month as the dependent variable in (3.1):
this captures the rate of conversion of arrests into clear-ups as arrestees are charged for
cannabis possession. The result in Column 4 shows a significant fall in clear-ups per
arrest in Lambeth during the policy period, and more notably, a significant fall of 57.6%
post-policy. This occurs against a backdrop of significantly rising clear-ups per arrest for
cannabis possession in the rest of London in the post-policy period.
In summary, the measures of police behavior used in Columns 2 to 4 indicate that
once depenalization is in place, the police immediately devote less effort towards targeting
cannabis users. On the one hand, this is reassuring because it is precisely what the
depenalization policy prescribes: cannabis possession no longer leads to arrests (although
offences should be recorded in the same way as pre-policy) and so we expect to observe
immediate falls in arrest and clear-up rates as soon as the policy is introduced. However,
such a weakened deterrence effect of depenalization might in turn impact the behavior
of cannabis users, ultimately feeding through to drive the significant rise in cannabis
possession offences six months into the policy, as shown in Column 1.20
In the longer term, there remains evidence that police effectiveness against cannabis
possession offences is lower than in the pre-policy period, in line with the description
of the policy evolution given in Section 2.3: in the longer term, policing strategies in
Lambeth did not revert back to identically what was in place pre-policy. This opens
up the possibility that in Lambeth police resources are permanently reallocated towards
Class-A drug crime and non-drug crime, as we explore in detail in Section 5.
not surprising: as described in Section 3.1.1, the arrest and clear-up series only diverge if individual are
arrested but not charged for cannabis possession. This occurs far more rarely for cannabis possession
offences than for some other non-drug crime we later analyze.
20Durlauf and Nagin [2010] provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on the evidence in favor
of deterrence effects from a range of crime policies.
22
CHAPTER 3. CRIME AND THE DEPENALIZATION OF CANNABIS
Cannabis Supply
The remaining Columns of Table 3 repeat the analysis for crime series related to the
supply of cannabis. We find: (i) evidence the LCWS significantly increased offences
related to cannabis supply during its official period of operation: by the second half
of the policy period offence rates for cannabis supply were 50.5% higher in Lambeth
relative to the pre-policy period, an impact significant at the 1% level; (ii) in the post-
policy period, cannabis supply offences rose by 67.6% more in Lambeth relative to the
rest of London, and there is no long term citywide time trend in such crimes. On police
effectiveness against crime related to supplying cannabis, Columns 6 to 8 document no
changes during the policy period in terms of arrests, and a fall in clear-up rates that
is significant at the 10% level. For our preferred measure of police effectiveness, clear-
ups per arrest do not change significantly during the policy period, and in the longer,
rise slightly in Lambeth relative to the rest of London (an effect significant at the 10%
level), at a time when citywide police effectiveness against cannabis supply related crime
appears to be either falling (Columns 6 and 7) or stable (Column 8).21
Taken together the results suggest that any change in the underlying size of the
market for cannabis in Lambeth as a result of the policy was driven by demand and
supply side factors. However, while police effectiveness against demand side offences
remaining permanently lower post-policy, police effectiveness against crimes related to
cannabis supply marginally improved in Lambeth in the longer term even after the LCWS
was officially ended.22 This hints at the possibility that the police were able to reallocate
their effort away from incidents related to cannabis possession, towards other drug crime
and non-drug crime. We now explore this in more detail.
3.5 The Reallocation of Police Effort
The results in Tables 2 and 3 document changes in levels and composition of cannabis
related crime following the depenalization of cannabis possession in Lambeth. These
results suggest the primary mechanisms at play driving the policy impacts are changes
21We note all the results presented in Columns 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 are largely robust to defining arrest and
clear-up rates as being per 1000 of the adult population, rather than per the number of offences in the
previous quarter. The results are not therefore driven by the increase in offences previously noted.
22For brevity, we have not shown the dynamic policy response along these margins when we split the
post-policy period year by year. Doing so we find the significant increase in cannabis possession offences
remains in each of the four years post policy, as does the increase in cannabis supply related offences.
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in behavior of the police and cannabis users. Focusing in on these channels, we now
investigate the short and long term impacts the depenalization policy had on the incidence
of, and police effectiveness against, crime related to Class-A drugs and non-drug crime
in seven categories: violence against the person, sexual offences, robbery, burglary, theft
and handling, fraud and forgery, and criminal damage.
3.5.1 Crime Related to Class-A Drugs
As the administrative crime data records drug crime by drug-type, we first examine
whether the LCWS policy allowed police in Lambeth to reallocate their effort towards
Class-A drugs, that constitute the bulk on non-cannabis drug crime (Table 1, Panel B).
As described in Section 2, that the policy might enable the re-targeting of police resources
towards crime related to Class-A drugs was one motivation behind the introduction of
the LCWS, as if often the case for depenalization policies in other contexts.
We estimate specifications analogous to (3.1) breaking the results down along two
margins: (i) crime series related to the possession of Class-A drugs, proxying the demand
for such illicit substances; (ii) crime series related to the supply of Class-A drugs. As
for cannabis crime, we do so for crime series on offence rates, and measures of police
effectiveness such as arrest and clear-up rates. Table 4 shows the results. To facilitate
comparison with the previously documented impacts on cannabis crime, we again divide
the policy period into two halves.
On the demand side, Table 4 shows: (i) during the policy period there is an impact
of depenalizing cannabis possession on the demand for Class-A drugs as proxied by
possession offences for such substances (Column 1); (ii) in the longer term, offences
related to the possession of Class-A drugs significantly rise by 12.0% in Lambeth relative
to the rest of London – this increase occurs against the backdrop of no change in citywide
offence rates for Class-A drug possession; (iii) there is little robust evidence of a change in
police effectiveness against crime related to the possession of Class-A drugs, as measured
by arrest rates, clear-up rates, and clear-ups per arrest (Columns 2 to 4). Hence, the
evidence does not suggest the Lambeth police turned a blind-eye towards Class-A drug
possession in Lambeth during or after the LCWS policing experiment.
The remaining Columns of Table 4 show crimes series related to supply of Class-A
drugs. We find: (i) no evidence of the LCWS policy impacting offence rates related to the
supply of Class-A drugs during the policy period, but a significant fall in such offences
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post-policy; (ii) somewhat mixed evidence on any impact on the police effectiveness
against crimes related to the supply of Class-A drugs: we observe no significant changes
in arrest or clear-up rates (Columns 6 and 7), but there is a significant increase of 12.3%
in clear-ups per arrest (Column 8).
Taken together, the results shows that in the long term, the patterns of demand
related Class-A drug crime in Lambeth along all three margins of offences, arrests and
clear-ups, do not differ much from London-wide trends more generally. This is in sharp
contrast to the previously documented effects on cannabis demand offences, arrests and
clear-ups shown in Table 3. However, the evidence in the second half of Table 4 hints
at the possibility the police might have reallocated effort towards supply related Class-A
drug crime: offence rates for crimes related to the supply of Class-A drugs significantly
fall in the longer term, and police effectiveness against such crimes, at least as measured
by clear-ups per arrest, significantly rise.
3.5.2 Non-Drug Crime
Motivated by the earlier descriptive evidence from Figure 1C on trends in non-drug crime
in Lambeth relative to other London boroughs, we now broaden the search for evidence
of the reallocation of police effort, by examining seven types of non-drug crime. Table
5 reports the results. In Column 1 we first estimate (3.1) where the dependent variable
is the (log of) offence rate for total non-drug crime. During the policy period, offence
rates for total non-drug crime were not significantly different in Lambeth than other
London boroughs. Remarkably, in the post-policy period, the offence rate for total non-
drug crime in Lambeth significantly fell by 9.4% more than the London-wide average.
Quantitatively, this translates into a large reduction in total crime in Lambeth: pre-
policy, 97% of all offences in Lambeth are non-drug related. This long term reduction in
Lambeth occurred in a period when city-wide offence rates for non-drug crimes are flat,
as Figure 1C suggested.
The remaining Columns of Table 5 show significant falls post-policy in recorded
offence rates for five out of seven crime types. These categories: robbery, burglary, theft
and handling, fraud and forgery and criminal damage, account for 81% of all criminal
offences pre-policy. The point estimates on the other three categories, violence, sexual
offences and robbery, are all negative but not significantly different from zero. To aid
exposition, Figure 2A shows the eight coefficients of interest (β̂2) from Table 5, along
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with their associated 95% confidence intervals.
To pin down whether this long run decline in non-drug crime is due to a reallocation
of police effort, Table A3 estimates the short and long run policy effects on our measures
of police effectiveness: arrest rates (Panel A), clear-up rates (Panel B), and clear-ups per
arrest (Panel C). Given the large number of coefficients to read in Table A3, Figures 2B to
2D show the coefficients of interest of the long-run policy impacts from each specification,
along with their associated 95% confidence interval.
In terms of police effectiveness against non-drug crime, we find that: (i) arrest rates
for total non-drug crime rose significantly (Table A3, Panel A, Column 1): the long run
difference-in-difference estimate is 28.4% for Lambeth relative to the rest of London;
(ii) considering specific crime types, the remaining Columns in Panel A and Figure 2B
highlight how in the long run there are significant increases in arrest rates for nearly
all crime types; (ii) Panel B of Table A3 and Figure 2C show these higher arrest rates
actually feed into significantly higher clear-up rates, again for nearly all crime types;23
(iii) Panel C of Table A3 and Figure 2D show that clear-ups per arrest do not change
for most crime types. Hence the likelihood an arrestee is charged with the offence is not
driving the earlier result; rather any change in police effort leads to more arrests and
clear-ups per se, for these six broad crime types and for non-drug crime overall.
Taken together the evidence suggests a significant re-allocation of policing intensity
after the introduction of the LCWS, away from cannabis crimes and towards other non-
drug crimes (Table 5), but not especially towards Class-A drug crime (Table 4). This
re-allocation appears to persist long after the LCWS officially ends, and is reflected in
marked increases in arrest and clear-up rates for a broad range of crime types (Table A3,
Panels A and B). These changes in police effectiveness of course feedback into lowering
offence rates (Table 5).24
23The one exception relates to crimes of theft and handling, where we see no long run differential change
between Lambeth and the rest of London in arrest or clear-up rates. As with some of the earlier
evidence and existing literature, this might suggest such crimes are especially colinear with the market
for cannabis, that is of course expanding in the long run in Lambeth. Unlike for offences related to
cannabis possession, there is generally a divergence between arrest and clear-up numbers for these
non-drug offences.
24These results are largely robust to defining arrest and clear-up rates as being per 1000 of the adult
population, rather than per offences in the previous quarter. Hence these patterns in arrest and clear-
up rates likely reflect real changes in police behavior rather than being driven solely by declines in the
number of offences in each crime type.
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3.5.3 Police Resources
Given the central role the re-allocation of policing effort plays in explaining changing
patterns of crime and police effectiveness as a result of the depenalization policy, it is
important to understand whether the results could in part be confounded by a change
in total police resources, rather than a mere re-allocation of existing resources. While
detailed borough-month level information on police manpower or task allocations does
not exist for our study period, there is evidence from MPA reports that police officer
numbers in Lambeth rose in the post-policy period.25 These suggest that in the summer
of 2001 the Lambeth police were running at 11% below their budgeted workforce target,
equivalent to 102 officers below strength. By January 2002 the situation had improved
with an additional 43 officers in Lambeth, reducing the deficit to 6.3%.
To investigate whether this change in Lambeth can explain the differential patterns
of crime documented in Table 5, we have collated the available data on annual police
numbers for all 32 London boroughs from 1997 to 2010. This shows that police numbers
certainly rose in Lambeth during and after the policy: between 2001 and 2006, police
numbers increased by 20.5% in Lambeth. However, this pattern is by no means excep-
tional to Lambeth. Over the same period, the police numbers for London as a whole
rose by 22.7%, slightly more than in Lambeth. This suggests changing police strength in
Lambeth vis-a`-vis other London boroughs is unlikely to explain the large reductions in
non-drug crime documented.26
A second way to understand whether changing police numbers might plausibly explain
the documented impact on non-drugs crime is to use estimates from the literature on the
elasticity of crime with respect to police strength. In this setting, the estimates provided
by Draca et al. [2011] are perhaps most informative. They use the exogenous shift
in police deployment following the July 2005 terror attacks in London to estimate an
elasticity of crime with respect to police numbers to be around −0.3. For the LCWS,
over the post-policy period from January 2002 to March 2006, police numbers in Lambeth
increased by 13.2%. Ignoring the change in other London boroughs and so assuming the
13.2% increase in Lambeth represents the difference-in-difference with other boroughs,
we can then combine the elasticity estimate from Draca et al. [2011] and our regression
25Source: http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020926/17/
26We have probed this time series on police numbers by borough-year to understand what drives changes
in police strength. This suggests that police numbers track the borough population with some lag.
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coefficient, this should have led to a 4% drop in non-drugs crime. Hence, even under this
most conservative approach where we ignore changing police numbers in other boroughs,
the drop in non-drugs crime that can be explained through this channel is just less than
half the actual long run fall in non-drug crime we find of 8.8%.
In short, the evidence suggests the documented reduction in non-drug crime and
increased police effectiveness against such crimes was primarily due to a differential re-
allocation of police resource in Lambeth relative to the rest of London, rather than
increased numbers of police officers per se. As such, the policy likely had small monetary
costs of implementation. The next section moves onto establishing the monetized welfare
impacts of the policy on Lambeth residents.
3.6 House Prices
Understanding the welfare consequences of any given drugs policy is important given
the large number of illicit drug users around the world. This is especially so for policies
related to the market for cannabis, the most frequently used illicit drug in most countries.
Miron [2010] estimates, in the US context, the budgetary consequences of liberalizing drug
policy. We add to this nascent literature by evaluating the welfare effects of the localized
LCWS depenalization policy.
From the documented impacts on crime, the welfare effects of the policy are ambigu-
ous: although the policy caused total crime to fall, it also caused a dramatic change in the
composition of crime. Depenalization led to an increase in cannabis offences, but on the
other hand, many other types of crime were reduced in the longer term. To estimate the
overall impact of the policy through these changing crime patterns, as well through other
non-crime channels, we estimate the impact of the depenalization of cannabis possession
on house prices in Lambeth relative to other London boroughs. This approach uses the
intuition that the total social cost of depenalization (not just those arising from crime)
should be reflected in house prices [Rosen 1974, Thaler 1978].
To do so, we exploit information at the zip code level on house prices from the UK
Land Registry to estimate a specification analogous to (3.1). The unit of observation is
zip code sector s in quarter q in year y, where zip code sectors are within borough.27
27A London zip code (e.g. WC1E 6BT) is generally 10-12 neighboring addresses (that would include flats
and maisonettes, as well as separate houses). Our house price data was obtained from the UK Land
Registry at a lightly more aggregated level, that of a zip code sector (e.g. WC1E). In London there are
an average of 215 zip codes per zip code sector (so 2000-2500 addresses in each zip code sector). There
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This allows us to later explore whether and how the effects of depenalization affect house
prices within Lambeth. To begin with we estimate a panel data specification of the form,
lnhsqy = β0Pqy + β1 [Lb × Pqy] + β2PPqy + β3 [Lb × PPqy] (3.2)
+γXbqy + λs + λq + usqy,
where hsqy is the mean house price sale for terraced houses in zip code sector s in quarter
q in year y, deflated to 1995 Q1 prices;28 Pqy, PPqy are dummies for the policy and
post-policy periods respectively; Lb is a dummy for whether the zip code sector is in
Lambeth. To reflect the lag between house buying decisions and recorded house sales,
all time-varying covariates are lagged one quarter. In Xbqy we continue to control for
socio-demographic controls, as in (3.1). We also allow for borough specific time trends
(λb× qy) to capture common house price movements, and control for fixed effects for zip
code and quarter. The sample runs from January 1995 until December 2005, standard
errors are clustered at the zip code-sector level, and observations are weighted by the
numbers of terraced house sales in the zip code-sector during the quarter.
House price information is available for terraced houses, detached, semi-detached, and
flats. When estimating (3.2) our baseline estimates focus on terraced housing to strike a
balance between using a housing type that has both frequent sales, and high values per
sale. When documenting the total impact of the policy on house prices in Section 6.2,
we do so by aggregating the policy impacts across all four housing types.
3.6.1 Results
Table 6 reports the results. Column 1 presents the baseline finding: in the long run
after the LCWS is introduced, house prices fall by 5.0% more in Lambeth relative to
the London wide average, an effect significant at the 1% level. Column 2 shows the
impact to be even more negative after controlling for borough specific linear time trends.
are on average 20 zip code sectors per borough. In Lambeth (that is of total are 10.36 square miles
(26.82 km2)), there are 31 zip code sectors, so that each covers on average .33 square miles (.87 km2).
28The house price data cover 25 of the 32 boroughs used for the crime analysis. The boroughs
not covered are Barking and Dagenham, Bexley, Harrow, Havering, Hillingdon, Kingston-upon-
Thames and Sutton. There are 509 distinct zip codes in the final sample, with an average of
25.3 zip codes per borough. House prices are deflated to the first quarter of 1995 prices, using
the Land Registry house price index for Greater London, which is based on repeat sales (see
http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/houseprices/housepriceindex/.) We drop zip code sectors that have
the lowest 10% of house sales, as these are unlikely to correspond to residential neighborhoods. The
reported results are robust to dropping zip codes that straddle borough boundaries.
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To reiterate, these negative effects on house prices in the long run occur despite the
overall falls in total crime experienced in Lambeth post-policy: as Table 5 showed, total
non-drug crime fell by 9.4%. At the same time, the results from Table 2 showed the
incidence of cannabis related crime rose by at least 40% in the longer term. To reconcile
these policy impacts on crime and house prices, Lambeth residents might either place
disproportionate weight on cannabis related crime relative to all other crimes, or there
might exist other social costs beyond crime associated with a rapidly expanding market
for cannabis.29
As house price data is available by zip-code, the remaining specifications in Table 6
examine whether there are heterogeneous effects of depenalization on house prices within
Lambeth and other boroughs. The heterogeneity we focus on relates to the location of
drug crime within each borough, and leads us to designate each zip code sector as a drug
crime ‘hotspot’ or not. The Appendix describes in detail how we use disaggregated drug
crime data to determine whether a zip code sector is a hotspot. We then explore whether
house prices vary differentially within borough between hotspots and non-hotspots, using
a triple-differenced estimation strategy, across boroughs, time, and hotspot/non-hotspot
areas.
The disaggregated data from which hotspots are defined are ‘ward’ level crime stat-
istics published by the MPS. Wards are small administrative districts nested within
boroughs. There are, for example, 21 wards in Lambeth, that closely matches the London
borough average. However, such ward level crime data only exists for each month from
April 2001 onwards. Hence for our baseline results, we classify zip code sectors into
hotspots based on crime rates measured ex post in 2008/9, long after the LCWS is
initially implemented. Given obvious concerns over using such ex post data to define
hotspots, we also use the available crime ward data for the few months pre-policy to
re-estimate our main specification classifying zip code sectors into hotspots based on ex
ante crime rates. To provide evidence of the geographic stability of hotspot locations in
Lambeth over time, Figure A1 shows the classification of each Lambeth zip code sector
into hotspots based on both definitions: reassuringly there is considerable stability in
29Other studies have found a negative association between certain crime types and house prices: Gibbons
[2004] documents how a one standard deviation increase in property crime is associated with a 10%
reduction in house prices in the UK; Linden and Rockoff [2008] present evidence from the US that the
revelation of information of a sex offender being resident next door leads to a 12% reduction in house
prices. Our results likely differ because the policy we evaluate impacts both the level and composition
of crime.
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these classifications over time. The Appendix presents further robustness checks based
on alternative hotspot definitions.
Column 3 of Table 6 then presents estimates of this triple-differenced specification
where we allow the policy impacts to vary across hotspots within each borough. We
find all of the previously documented long run negative effect of depenalization on house
prices within Lambeth occurs in drug crime hotspots. There is no significant effect of
depenalization on house prices on non-hotspot zip codes in Lambeth. As a result, the
magnitude of the house price fall in Lambeth hotspots, −13.4%, is significantly larger
than in the earlier all-Lambeth estimates.30 In the post-policy period, hotspot areas in
other boroughs appear to have positive and significant house price rises, consistent with
there being convergence in house prices across neighborhoods.
Column 4 then shows the main results to be very stable using ex ante ward level crime
data to classify zip code sectors as hotspots: the relative house price decline in Lambeth
hotspots is very similar at −13.5%, and we still observe rising prices in hot spots in
other London boroughs in the post policy period (6.6%). The similarity of findings using
ex ante and ex post hotspots is unsurprising given the geographic stability over time in
where drug crime is concentrated in Lambeth, as Figure A1 shows.
The remaining Columns demonstrate the robustness of the results to alternative
methods by which to calculate standard errors. In Column 5 we cluster at a higher level
of aggregation: given the baseline estimates cluster by zip code sector, the natural next
level of aggregation is to cluster by borough. Comparing this specification in Column 5
to the baseline definition using ex post hotspots in Column 3, we see the standard errors
to be considerably smaller when clustering by borough, supporting the view that the
baseline approach is conservative.31
The Appendix presents robustness checks that probe these results in two directions:
(i) the policy impacts on other housing types; (ii) using alternative definitions of crime
hotspots. In each case we find results very much in line with these baseline findings.
30May et al. [2007b] provide detailed descriptive evidence on drug dealing in Brixton: a hot spot area in
our definition covering more than one zip code, and the most important commercial centre in Lambeth.
They describe the geography of drugs crime in Brixton, how it affects other crimes.
31Cameron et al. [2008] note that cluster-robust standard errors may be downwards biased when the
number of clusters is small, leading to an over-rejection of the null of no effect. The authors propose
various asymptotic refinements using bootstrap techniques, finding that the wild cluster bootstrap-
t technique performs particularly well in their Monte Carlo simulations. We have implemented this
method on our preferred specification in Column 3, with 1000 bootstrap iterations and using rademacher
weights for the procedure. The resulting estimated standard errors are very similar to those reported
and all the reported coefficients remain of the same significance.
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For all variant specifications we see that post-policy, house prices are significantly lower
in Lambeth hotspots than other boroughs, where the magnitude of the impact varies
between 7.7% and 13.9%.
The results from Table 6 suggest that for local residents, the total welfare impacts
of depenalizing the possession of small quantities of cannabis likely went far beyond
the impacts on crime. For example, there might have been other deleterious impacts on
behaviors associated with the market for illicit drugs, such as alcohol use and other forms
of visible anti-social behavior. These are important channels through which the effects of
depenalization might operate in the long run [Miron and Zweibel 1995], and that we are
investigating in ongoing research.32 Such wider changes appear to reduce the willingness
to pay to reside in these neighborhoods and increase within borough inequality in house
prices between high and low drug crime zip codes.
The magnitude of these house price impacts can be compared relative to other
studies, albeit in some cases, we have to extrapolate out of sample to have changes
in local characteristics that would correspond to an equivalent reduction in house prices
of −13.4%. Notwithstanding this caveat, comparing our estimates to those linking house
prices with school quality, implies that an equivalent reduction in house prices could be
generated by: (i) a 19% reduction in pupils achieving UK government targets at the end
of primary school [Gibbons and Machin 2003]; (ii) a four standard deviation decrease in
value-added scores of primary schools in the UK [Gibbons et al. 2013]; (iii) test scores
that are 32% below the mean, based on US data estimates [Black 1999]. Comparing our
estimates to those linking house prices with crime, we find that an equivalent reduction in
house prices could be generated by either a greater than one standard deviation increase
in property crime, based on UK data [Gibbons 2004]; for the US, Linden and Rockoff
[2008] show the revelation of a sex offender residing next door reduces house prices by
12%. Finally, we can also benchmark our findings against the documented impacts of
environmental quality on house prices: for the US, Davis [2004] shows a severe increase
32For example, Kelly and Rasul [2013] evaluate the impact of the LCWS on hospital admissions related
to illicit drug use. They exploit administrative records on individual hospital admissions classified by
ICD-10 diagnosis codes. They find the depenalization of cannabis had significant longer term impacts
on hospital admissions related to the use of hard drugs, raising hospital admission rates for men.
Among Lambeth residents, the impacts are concentrated among men in younger age cohorts. Model
[1993] explores the effect decriminalizing cannabis in 12 US states between 1973 and 1978 had on
hospital emergency room drug episodes. He finds evidence that decriminalization was accompanied by
a significant reduction in episodes involving drugs other than marijuana and an increase in marijuana
episodes suggesting consumers substitute towards the less severely penalized drug. There is mixed
evidence on whether alcohol and cannabis are substitutes for young individuals: DiNardo and Lemieux
[2001] and Conlin et al. [2005] find they are substitutes; Pacula [1998] finds them to be complements.
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in the risk of pediatric leukemia is associated with a 14% reduction in house prices.
3.6.2 Interpretation
The documented impacts of the LCWS on house prices can reflect changing amenity
values of residing in Lambeth, changes in the quality of the existing housing stock,
or changes in value of newly constructed homes in Lambeth. To tease apart these
explanations would require far more detailed information on housing characteristics that
is not easily available. Although we use data on house prices and sales from the main
UK data source, the Land Registry, even their most disaggregated administrative records
on individual sales provide little information on house characteristics: they relate only
to whether the house is a new build and information on its freehold/leasehold status.33
We now focus attention on estimating the total implied loss in property values in
Lambeth as a result of the policy, proceeding as follows. First, we run our preferred
house price specification (3.2) for each of the four housing categories in the Land Registry
data: terraced houses, flats, semi-detached and detached houses. Table 7 shows the
estimated β-coefficients from each specification, where each Column refers to a different
housing type. The relevant parameter of interest is the long run post-policy impact
on house prices: β̂3. This is negative and significant for three of the four house types:
semi-detached, terraced and flats.
These parameter values are then multiplied by the base level of house prices in
Lambeth pre-policy, for each property type, and then multiplied by the number of
property types actually sold over the post-policy sample period. Rows A and B show
the mean and median pre-policy sales for each housing type. There is little divergence
between the two and so for the remainder of the analysis we focus attention on using the
mean price in row A. Row C shows the number of house price sales in the post-policy
period until December 2005 by housing type.
Combining this information then provides an implied total loss in value for a given
property type. We first provide a lower bound estimate on this implied loss by assuming
that only those houses that are actually sold experience any loss in value. Doing so,
row D shows for each housing type, the implied loss in value over the post-policy period.
33However, we note that there is very limited scope for new builds in Lambeth (as for all inner London
boroughs). With more that 280,000 residents, Lambeth is one of the most densely populated boroughs
in the country, with more than 100 residents per hectare. As such, our prior is that the documented
house price effects reflect changing amenity values and changing quality of the existing housing stock.
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Summing across the four housing types in Columns 1 to 4, the final Column on the right
hand side of Table 7 gives the total implied loss: this amounts to £233mn.34
This corresponds to a lower bound on welfare losses because it ignores any reductions
in property price values that are experienced by those residents that chose not to sell.
To better capture any such impacts, we conduct another thought experiment assuming
all properties in Lambeth of a given type experience the same implied loss in value,
irrespective of whether or not they are actually sold post-policy. This approach requires
additional information on the total housing stock. This is shown in the far right column
in row E: there are 119, 000 properties in Lambeth. However, as the information to break
this down by property type does not exist, we assume the share of all properties sold of
a given type for the post-policy period (based on row C) is the same as the share of all
households that exist of a given type in Lambeth. This share is then given in row F.
Using this information, we are then able to derive something more akin to an upper
bound estimate of the implied total loss in property value: row G gives the implied loss
for the entire post-policy period: £1.1bn, almost five times the lower bound estimate
derived in row D. In short, whichever way the implied loss in Lambeth property values
is calculated, it dwarfs any direct costs of the LCWS, a policing change that largely
amounted to a change in how existing police resources were allocated, rather than any
change in the level of resources per se.
3.7 Citywide Depenalization
The reduced form analysis emphasized how a localized depenalization of cannabis pos-
session impacts the levels and composition of crime. We now build on the key lessons
from this policing experiment to shed light on what would be the impacts on crime if the
same policy were to be applied citywide, as is relevant for many current policy debates
around the world. To do so, we develop a structural model of the market demand for
cannabis, accounting for the endogenous choices of the police and cannabis users. We first
calibrate the model to the localized policing experiment in Lambeth, and then consider
34This aggregate loss in property value is almost unchanged if we ignore any impacts on detached houses,
as shown in Column 1. The likely reason for a non-significant impact for such house types is because
there are only 52 recorded sales of such homes in Lambeth post-policy.
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a counterfactual policy experiment of citywide depenalization.35,36
3.7.1 A Model of Cannabis Use, Non-Drug Crime and Policing
Cannabis Users
There are two locations, indexed by b: the borough of Lambeth (b = 1) and the rest of
London (b = 0), with a population Nbt in location b at time t. Individuals make two
choices: whether to buy (and thus consume) cannabis, and if they buy, which location b
to buy cannabis from. Individuals are heterogenous in two dimensions: the propensity
to consume cannabis, and the cost of moving from one location to another. We assume
individuals can only be caught for cannabis crime in the location of purchase.
The utility of consuming cannabis comprises three components: an individual specific
utility δ, the moving cost incurred if the individual travels to the other location to
purchase cannabis λD, and a cost of being apprehended with cannabis by the police
if purchasing in location b, denoted αbtpi
D
bt . pi
D
bt is the (endogenous) likelihood that an
individual is caught in possession of cannabis, and we refer to this as the ‘detection rate’.
αbt is the location specific cost when apprehended. This is indexed by time t as the
LCWS experiment in Lambeth can be seen as partly operating though a reduction in α1t
relative to α0t, as those caught in possession of cannabis are no longer arrested unless
there are additional aggravating factors, as described in Section 2.
Assume individual i resides in location b. Her utility from consuming in her own
borough is denoted uDibt, her utility from consuming in the other borough is u
D
i,−bt, and
her utility from not consuming is uNDit , and we normalize this last term to zero. Hence
the utility of consuming cannabis is given by uDit ,
uDit = max[u
D
ibt, u
D
i,−bt], (3.3)
35The structural model does not emphasize how the behavior of cannabis suppliers might alter with
depenalization, and as such, the model is not used to make price predictions on cannabis across locations.
We make this modelling choice because: (i) information about the criminal supply side is lacking; (ii)
information on drug prices at the borough-month level is also unavailable, and it is unclear how reliable
such price information would be given that it is often based on selective samples of drug busts, and
there is considerable dispersion in price-quality ratios for illicit drugs [Galenianos et al. 2012].
36Our approach is related to Imrohoroglu et al. [2004], Conley and Wang [2006] and Fu and Wolpin [2013],
who develop equilibrium models of crime and policing. Our approach differs as we allow for endogenous
mobility across location and specialization in different types of crime. Moreover, identification of the
parameters of the model is achieved using quasi-experimental variation through the introduction of the
LCWS policy.
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uDibt = δ − δb − αbtpiDbt
uDi,−bt = δ − δb − λD − α−btpiD−bt
if consuming in b,
if consuming in − b.
(3.4)
An individual purchases cannabis from some location if uDit > 0. We assume δ is uniformly
distributed over [0, 1]. The parameter δb determines the share of the population that
consumes cannabis absent policing (if piDbt = 0). We allow this parameter to vary across
locations, to capture different preferences between Lambeth residents and the rest of
London. We assume the moving cost λD, is uniformly distributed over [0, λ] and that δ
and λD are uncorrelated.37
Dbt denotes the market demand for cannabis in location b and period t, namely the
number of cannabis users in b. This is the sum of the number of users that reside in
location b and prefer to consume there, and users from location −b, that prefer to move
and buy cannabis from b:
Dbt(pi
D
bt , pi
D
−bt) = Nbt Pr(u
D
ibt > u
D
i,−bt, u
D
ibt > 0)+N−bt Pr(u
D
i,−bt > u
D
i,−bt, u
D
i,−bt > 0). (3.5)
The model makes precise the interlinkages in cannabis markets across locations. The
equilibrium market size for cannabis in each borough is a function of: (i) the detection
rates in both boroughs (piDbt , pi
D
−bt) that are endogenously determined as described below;
(ii) the punishment for cannabis related criminal activities in both locations (αbt, α−bt);
(iii) the populations of both boroughs (Nbt, N−bt). As cannabis markets across loca-
tions are interlinked, depenalization policies in one borough will change the behavior of
cannabis users in all boroughs, and potentially induce drug tourism across boroughs.
As the population in the rest of London (N0t) is orders of magnitude larger than
that in Lambeth (N1t), there can be very large impacts on the size of cannabis market
in Lambeth as the result of a localized depenalized policy. As made precise below, this
channel of consumers moving location to buy cannabis would be considerably weakened in
the presence of a citywide depenalization policy that ensures the punishment for cannabis
related criminal activities remained homogenous across locations (αbt = α−bt).
37The assumption that δ and λD are uncorrelated is driven by the available data: we do not have individual
crime data to identify the provenance of offenders, so any correlation between these parameters cannot
be identified.
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Policing and Arrests for Cannabis Offenses
Each borough has its own police force, and we assume each acts independently of the
other.38 The size of the police force, or total police resources, in location b is denoted Pbt.
A fraction, φbt, of these resources are devoted to cannabis related crime. The number of
individuals arrested for cannabis crime is a function of police resources allocated towards
such crime and the market demand for cannabis in location b, Dbt.
39 We postulate a
Cobb-Douglas specification for this relation,
ArrestsDbt = γD(φbtPbt)
ωDD1−ωDbt , ωD ∈ [0, 1]. (3.6)
7.1.3 Non-Drug Crime
Individuals from both locations choose whether to commit non-drug crime, and where
to commit it. Following a similar formulation as above, we assume individuals are
heterogenous in two dimensions: the propensity to commit crime, and the cost of moving
from one borough to another. The utility of committing crime depends on: (i) an
individual specific utility component, χ; (i) the moving cost if there is a change of location,
λC ; (iii) the cost of being apprehended by the police, βpiCbt: pi
C
bt is the (endogenous)
detection rate for non-drug crime in location b at time t, where we assume individuals
are caught for non-drug crime in the location of the crime. β is the cost of committing
non-drug crime when apprehended and is the same across locations. Normalizing the
utility from not committing crime to zero, the utility of committing crime in one of the
two locations is then given by uCit where,
uCit = max[u
C
ibt, u
C
i,−bt], (3.7)
uCibt = χ− χb − βpiCbt
uCi,−bt = χ− χb − λC − βpiC−bt
if committing crime in b,
if committing crime in − b.
(3.8)
38This matches the evidence in Table A1 on police operations in London boroughs in our study period:
there is little evidence of a spike in police operations in other London boroughs around the time of the
LCWS to potentially offset any of its impacts.
39We are implicitly assuming that all (or a fixed fraction of) cannabis crimes are notified to the police, so
the number of cannabis offences equals Dbt(pi
C
bt, pi
C
−bt) (or some fraction of Dbt(.)). As discussed earlier,
the depenalization policy should have no impacts on police behavior in terms of their searching for
cannabis offences. Hence we focus on how these offences convert to arrests, that is a margin directly
affected by the policy.
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Individual i commits crime if uCit > 0. We assume χ is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]; χb
determines the share of individuals that commit crime in the absence of policing (if piCbt =
0). Again, we allow for different propensities to commit crime between Lambeth and
the rest of London, by allowing χ¯b to vary across location. We assume χ is uncorrelated
with the moving cost λC . In consequence, χ is also then uncorrelated with δ so that
an individual’s underlying propensity to use cannabis is unrelated to their underlying
propensity to commit non-drug crime.40 The number of crimes committed in location b
is then given by,
Cbt(pi
C
bt, pi
C
−bt) = Nbt Pr(u
C
ibt > u
C
i,−bt, u
C
ibt > 0) +N−bt Pr(u
C
i,−bt > u
C
i,−bt, u
C
i,−bt > 0), (3.9)
and we assume all crimes are notified to the police, so the number of non-drug criminal
offences equals Cbt(pi
C
bt, pi
C
−bt). As with the market demand for cannabis, the number of
crimes committed in location b depends on characteristics and police behavior across both
locations.
Finally, the number of arrests for non-drug crime in location b will then depend on
the fraction (1− φbt) of police resources Pbt are devoted to non-drug crime in location b,
and the actual number of non-drug crimes committed. We again assume a Cobb-Douglas
relationship so that,
ArrestsCbt = γC((1− φbt)Pbt)ωCC1−ωCbt , ωC ∈ [0, 1]. (3.10)
Equilibrium Detection Rates
The key endogenous outcomes in the model are detection rates for cannabis and non-drug
crime in each location, (piDbt , pi
C
bt). Detection rates are the ratio of the number of offenders
caught by the police, to the total number of offenders. Hence they are determined through
an interaction of the police and cannabis users and are the solution to the following system
40Of course this assumption could be relaxed to capture the fact that cannabis markets might correlate
with some non-drug crimes, such as property crime [Fergusson and Horwood 1997, Corman and Mocan
2000]. However, we would need to find more detailed individual crime data, that for example recorded
multiple offences where relevant, to incorporate this feature into the model.
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of equations:
piDbt =
γD(φbtPbt)
ωDDbt(pi
D
bt , pi
D
−bt)
ωD
Dbt(pi
D
bt , pi
D
−bt)
, (3.11)
piCbt =
γC((1− φbt)Pbt)ωCCbt(piCbt, piC−bt)ωC
Cbt(pi
C
bt, pi
C
−bt)
.
Given the non-linearity of this system, there are no closed form solutions for (3.11). We
therefore solve the model numerically, by searching for the detection rates that bring
the left- and right-hand sides in (3.11) as close as possible, where a solution consists of
four detection rates: {piD0t, piD1t, piC0t, piC1t}. By looking at the whole support of the detection
rates, [0, 1], we find all the sets of detection rates that solve the system of equations
(3.11), for a given value of the parameters. For any set of equilibrium detection rates
we then compute the market demand for cannabis, the number of offences for cannabis
and non-drug crime, the number of arrests for non-drug crimes in all locations. This is
done by using equations (3.5), (3.6),(3.9) and (3.10). There can be multiple equilibria
generated, and how we make the choice between these equilibria is explained below when
we detail the calibration procedure.
Modeling the Localized Policing Experiment
We define two time periods and denote by t = tB the time period before the policy is
implemented (corresponding to the period from April 1998 to June 2001) and denote by
t = tA the time period after policy is introduced (from January 2002 to March 2004). We
discard the first six months of the policy to allow for transitional dynamics. We model
the localized policing experiment in Lambeth as operating through two channels. First,
a reduction in the penalty of being caught in possession of cannabis, closely matching
the policy description in Section 2. The penalty is α1tB in Lambeth before the policy,
and decreases to α1tA < α1tB in the post-policy period.
41 We assume that in the rest
of London, the penalty for cannabis arrest is the same during the two periods, and that
pre-policy it is similar to the penalty in Lambeth (α0tB = α0tA = α1tB ).
Second, we allow the police to reallocate their resources between cannabis and non-
drug crime. In our model, this is captured by the fact that, in Lambeth, φ1tA < φ1tB .
41As described in Section 2.2, Lambeth’s cannabis policing strategy did not return identically to what it
had been pre-policy. Rather, it adjusted to be a firmer version of what had occurred during the pilot.
As evidenced in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, there was a permanent reduction in police effectiveness
against cannabis possession crime in Lambeth.
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We assume that in the rest of London, there is no change in the fraction of the police
force dealing with cannabis crime (φ0tB = φ0tA). This channel creates a linkage between
cannabis crime and non-drug crime, that the reduced form evidence suggested was an
important policy impact to consider.
Such a localized policy change operating only in Lambeth (b = 1), will then have two
impacts on the market demand for cannabis in Lambeth (D1tA(pi
D
1tA
, piD0tA)): (i) Lambeth
residents will be more prone to consume cannabis; (ii) residents in the rest of London will
be more inclined to travel to Lambeth to purchase cannabis. These changes will affect
the equilibrium detection rates for cannabis crime (piDbtA), that will in turn determine the
equilibrium proportion of the population consuming cannabis and the number of cannabis
users caught by the police. If the policy allows a re-allocation of the police force towards
non-drug crime (so 1 − φbt increases), the policy impacts will then spill over to other
crimes, changing the equilibrium detection rates for non-drug crime (piCbtA) and thus the
proportion of the population that chooses to commit non-drug crime.
3.7.2 Calibrating the Model to the Localized Policing Experiment
Calibration Method
The model has 16 parameters: (i) five parameters describe preferences towards cannabis
consumption, moving across boroughs, and penalties associated with arrests: δ¯0, δ¯1, λ¯,
α1tB , α1tA ; (ii) three parameters describe non-drug crime preferences and penalties: χ¯0,
χ¯1, β; (iii) eight parameters describe the arrest production functions: γD0, γD1, ωD, γC ,
ωC , φ0tB , φ1tB , φ1tA . We allow the arrest technology parameter for cannabis crime γD to
vary between boroughs, as the two locations have different arrest rates, conditional on
offences. For non-drug crime, a good model fit is achieved with a common parameter γC .
We calibrate all but two of the model parameters based on the localized LCWS policy
to reproduce key features in the data. It is difficult to identify the parameter φbt, which
is the fraction of the police force devoted to cannabis crime, based only on observed
crime in the pre-policy period. We therefore identify this parameter from other sources
of data as detailed below. The variation introduced by the LCWS, and in particular
the differential change in non-drug crimes across boroughs and time then allows us to
identify the change in the fraction of police time devoted to cannabis crime in Lambeth
(i.e. φ1tA/φ1tB ).
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We rely on data moments computed for Lambeth and the rest of London, and for
two periods: before the LCWS policy is in place, and the post-policy period. We have a
total of 17 moments which describe: (i) the prevalence of cannabis consumption; (ii) the
number of recorded offences for cannabis; (iii) the number of offences for other crimes;
(iv) the number of arrests for other crimes; (v) the share of cannabis users in Lambeth
from other London boroughs pre-policy. These moments are chosen because they are
direct outputs of the model and because they best capture all the key policy impacts
documented in the earlier reduced form evidence. We now describe how each of these
empirical moments is measured.
On (i), data on cannabis consumption for the rest of London is derived from the
British Crime Survey (BCS), that asks about cannabis usage. We use the 2000/1 and
2006 survey waves to measure cannabis consumption pre- and post-policy in the rest of
London. As the BCS has only few respondents in Lambeth, we estimate the prevalence
of cannabis consumption in Lambeth by scaling the BCS-derived figure for the rest of
London by the ratio of cannabis offences in Lambeth to those in the rest of London. We
do so for the pre- and post-policy periods. Implicit in this scaling is the assumption that
the relationship between cannabis use and offences for cannabis possession is the same
in all locations. As highlighted throughout, LCWS policy would not alter how the police
would track or record offences, all else equal.
For moments (ii) to (iv), data on offences and arrests are taken from the same
administrative crime records from the MPS as used in the reduced form analysis. For the
calibration exercise, offence and arrest rates are expressed per 1,000 inhabitants. Finally,
on (v) the share of cannabis consumers in Lambeth from outside the borough in the
pre-period is recovered from an MPA document.42
Our model requires three additional inputs: population size, the number of police
officers in each location, and the fraction of police time dealing with cannabis crime. The
former is obtained from the QLFS-LA data described earlier. For the second, we use data
from MPA reports described in Section 5.3, that reports the number of police officers both
in Lambeth and the rest of London, during the pre-policy and the post-policy periods.
As described earlier, during this time span, the number of officers have increased in both
locations, at approximately equal rate.
42The share of cannabis consumers in Lambeth from outside the borough in the pre-period
is mentioned in Appendix 6 of the minutes of the following MPA committee meeting:
http://policeauthority.org/Metropolitan/committees/mpa/2002/020926/17/index.html
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To compute the fraction of police devoted to cannabis crime before the policy, φbtB , we
rely on additional data that characterize the number of hours taken up by arrests linked
to cannabis possession and total effective police time. We denote by Hours ProcD the
hours taken to process a cannabis arrest, which includes the transfer of the offender to
the police station, file processing and time spent in prosecution. We use data from police
reports which evaluates the time required to process each arrest linked to cannabis to
about seven hours [Wood 2004].43
We obtain an estimate of total effective police time by multiplying the size of the
police force in a given borough, as recorded by the MPA and discussed in Section 5.3,
by an estimate of the time spent by the average police officer on effective policing in
London each year (namely net of time on holiday, sick days, training attendance and
other administrative work). Herbert et al. [2007] provide an estimate of this effective
police time. The fraction of police time devoted to cannabis arrests is then obtained by
φbtB =
Arrests
D
btB
∗Hours ProcD
Total effective police timebtB
. (3.12)
where Arrests
D
btB
is the average number of arrests for cannabis offences in borough b, in
the pre-policy period.44
Given these inputs to the model from other data sources, the calibration of the
remaining parameters is obtained using a minimum distance method, where we minimize
the quadratic distance between the observed and predicted moments, equally weighting
each moment. For a given value of the parameters, we may have several predictions, due
to multiple equilibria. We compute the distance for all possible equilibria and select the
one that brings the predicted and observed moments the closest. The model was solved
numerically using 20,000 simulations draws, a number large enough so that increases in
43The PRS consultancy group, which evaluated the pilot scheme at the 6 month point, estimated that
for every individual apprehended with cannabis where a caution rather than an arrest was issued, three
police hours were saved by avoiding custody procedures and interviewing time. However, the MPA
noted that the three hours per offence figure was conservative, as it “was based on the premise of an
officer working alone. It took no account of the time spent transporting the arrested person to a police
station and the time waiting to book them in on arrival”. A later MPA report following the nationwide
declassification stated the time saving was five hours dealing with a cannabis arrest and two more hours
operational time at police stations [Wood 2004]. We use this stated seven hour reduction in processing
time to calibrate the model.
44Hence we focus on modeling the time devoted to processing arrests rather than the time devoted to
recorded offences or warnings. On the time devoted to offences, there should be no change in how
offences are recorded because of the policy, as discussed earlier. On time devoted to warnings, we make
the simplifying assumption that the time involved issuing a warning is negligible compared to the time
involved in arresting and processing an offender. This seems reasonable as a warning can be issued
verbally with no formal paperwork being required.
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simulations did not change the objective function. The search was done using a gradient
free optimizer built on the Simplex method. Finally, we note that the estimation was
started with many different initial parameter values, to ensure that it converged to a
global minimum.
Results
Panel A of Table 8 presents the observed and predicted moments described above: the
model does a good job in matching the moments. For 8 (15) of the moments, the difference
between the observed and predicted moment is less than 5% (10%). A χ2 goodness-of-fit
does not reject the hypothesis that the predicted moments are jointly the same as the
observed ones. Column 5 of Table 8 displays a transformation of the key moments related
to crime: the difference-in-difference for recorded log offences of cannabis and non-drug
crimes. These are calculated across locations and time and transformed into percentages,
and are therefore comparable to the reduced-form results discussed earlier. Along this
dimension, our model is able to reproduce two of the keys impacts of the policy quite
well: (i) the model predicts a 66.4% increase between the pre and post policy periods,
in recorded cannabis offences in Lambeth relative to the rest of London (compared to
an observed difference-in-difference increase of 64.8%); (ii) the model predicts a 4.95%
reduction in non-drug crime, compared to an observed decrease of 7.26%.
Moreover the model highlights an important mechanism that was not captured in the
reduced form results, shown in Panel B: there is a re-location of cannabis consumers from
the rest of London towards Lambeth post policy. The share of cannabis consumers in
Lambeth that are from the rest of London matches the observed one (39%) before the
policy was in place. The model predicts that this share rises from 39% pre-policy to 60%
under the localized depenalization policy. This near doubling of drug tourists shows how
the interlinkage in cannabis markets across locations is a key reason why offence rates
for cannabis related crime in Lambeth rises so much with the localized depenalization
policy.
Table A5 shows the calibrated parameter values from this exercise. Panel A focuses
on the two parameters describing the initial (exogenous) channels through which the
policy operates as discussed above: α1tA/α1tB and φ1tA/φ1tB . As shown in the first row,
the data is matched with a reduction in the penalty of getting caught with cannabis in
Lambeth by about 82%. This captures the fact that all recorded offences lead to arrests
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pre-policy, while most offenders were left with only a caution afterwards (the exception
being those offences that occurred post-policy that had aggravating factors). The policy
is also associated with a re-allocation of about 53% of police time in Lambeth devoted to
cannabis pre-policy, to non-drug crime afterwards. To be clear, this change in Lambeth
should be interpreted as the combined effect from any re-allocation of police resources,
changes in processing times for arrests post-policy, or the differential hiring of police for
cannabis and other crimes post-policy: all these channels are captured in a reduction in
φ1tB relative to φ1tA.
45
Panel C of Table 8 displays the equilibrium detection rates for cannabis and non-drug
crime, for each location and period. The detection rates for cannabis consumption are
very small, reflecting the fact that a sizeable fraction of the population uses cannabis
and very few of them are actually arrested each year. For non-drug crimes, offences are
rarer and arrests relatively more frequent: Panel C shows around 12% of non-drug crimes
lead to an arrest (in contrast, only 0.2% of cannabis users are arrested). In Column 5 of
Table 8 we also report the difference-in-difference for the detection probabilities, again
normalized by their pre-policy levels in Lambeth. Detection rates for cannabis crime
declined in Lambeth relative to the rest of London by around 5.13%, while the detection
rate for non-drug crimes remains almost unchanged.
To assess the plausibility of our calibrated model, we compute the elasticity of total
recorded criminal offences with respect to the size of the police force, namely the elasticity
of Cbt(pi
C
bt, pi
C
−bt, .)+Dbt(pi
C
bt, pi
C
−bt, .) with respect to Pbt, the total number of police officers
in location b. Earlier studies have estimated this elasticity, exploiting very different
research designs. Our structural model predicts an elasticity of −0.3 in Lambeth and
about −0.9 in the rest of London. The estimates of this elasticity in the literature range
from 0 [McCrary 2002] to −0.9 [Lin 2009], and many studies find an elasticity of the
order of −0.3 to −0.5 [Levitt 1997, 2002, Corman and Mocan 2000, Draca et al. 2011].
Hence, although our model was not calibrated to match these elasticities, they appear to
be consistent with previous results and provide external validity to our method.
45On the other calibrated parameters, Panel B of Table A5 shows the preference parameters are such that
a higher share of the Lambeth population would consume cannabis absent policing (δ¯1 < δ¯0), but that
the disutility from committing crime is near identical across locations (χ¯1 = χ¯0). Panel C shows the
calibrated policing technology parameters and suggests the TFP-like parameter on the apprehension
technology for cannabis crime is higher in London than Lambeth (γD0 > γD1). The corresponding
TFP-like parameter for non-drug crime is fixed to be the same across locations, but we note its value
is orders of magnitude higher (γC > γD0, γD1) so that individuals are far more likely to be arrested for
non-drug crime than for cannabis related crime.
44
CHAPTER 3. CRIME AND THE DEPENALIZATION OF CANNABIS
3.7.3 A Counterfactual Policy Experiment: Citywide Depenalization
We now use the calibrated model to perform a counterfactual policy analysis, which
decreases the penalty of cannabis consumption citywide. Hence in both locations we
allow the penalty to fall by the same extent, as captured by the ratio α1tA/α1tB . We also
adjust the police time devoted to cannabis crime in each borough to match the change we
observe (φ1tA/φ1tB ). Table 9 shows the change over time in a number of key statistics,
expressed as a percentage change from the baseline level of the statistic in the pre-policy
period, as a result of a citywide depenalization.
This exercise shows the following. First, Panel A highlights that the citywide depenal-
ization of cannabis possession leads to a modest increase in the prevalence of cannabis
consumption, of about 1% in Lambeth and 2% in London (where the baseline prevalence
is lower).46 Second, other crimes in the rest of London would actually fall in the citywide
policy (by around .3%) as all police forces reallocate effort towards non-drug crime.
Third, Panel B highlights that in Lambeth, the share of cannabis users originating
from outside the borough decreases by 4% compared to the baseline (and by more than
60% compared to the actual localized policy period). In short, a citywide policy would
much eliminate drug tourism, that is a key driving force in the localized experiment.
Fourth, Panel C highlights how a citywide policy would impact equilibrium detection
probabilities across crime types: in both locations the structural model predicts a fall in
the detection rate for cannabis consumption by around 7%, and an increase in equilibrium
detection rates for non-drug crimes of around .2%.47
Linking these findings back to the documented welfare impacts in Section 6, we
see that because citywide depenalization eliminates incentives for drug tourism, the
cannabis market in Lambeth increases in size less dramatically than under a localized
depenalization policy. As such, any anti-social behaviors that are correlated to the size of
46This result contributes to the literature on the impact of drug policies on drug usage, on which the
evidence remains mixed [DiNardo and Lemieux 2001, Pudney 2010, Damrongplasit et al. 2010].
Braakmann and Jones [2012] evaluate the impact of the declassification of cannabis in the UK in
2004 on cannabis consumption: they find the policy to increase cannabis consumption, predominantly
because of individuals starting to consume cannabis.
47We can validate some of the model’s predictions using the actual nationwide depenalization of cannabis
possession that took place from January 2004 until January 2009. This was implemented in a rather
similar way as the Lambeth policy. We estimate the reduced form impacts of this policy on crime using
a simple before-after comparison, that is obviously subject to far more caveats than the difference-
in-difference design we used to evaluate the LCWS. In addition, the demographic controls from the
QLFS-LAD data are only available until 2006 Q1 so these have to be extrapolated until 2010 to
estimate the impacts of the nationwide policy. Doing so we find that crimes related to cannabis
possession significantly rise when the nationwide policy is in place, and that offence rates for other
non-drug crimes significantly fall during this period (and police effectiveness against them rises).
45
CHAPTER 3. CRIME AND THE DEPENALIZATION OF CANNABIS
the cannabis market but are not captured in crime rates, might then be reduced. Hence
citywide depenalization might then have far smaller negative impacts on property prices
in Lambeth compared to the documented impacts of a localized policing experiment.
3.8 Conclusion
Cannabis users account for 80% of the 200 million illicit drug users in the world [WDR
2010]. Understanding the impacts of government intervention in the market for cannabis
is of huge importance. In this paper we study the impacts of a common intervention:
the depenalization of cannabis, where the possession of small quantities of cannabis no
longer leads to individuals being arrested (although such incidents are still recorded as
offences). More precisely, we evaluate the impacts on the level and composition of crime,
and social welfare as measured by house prices, of a localized depenalization policy that
was implemented in the London borough of Lambeth.
We have documented how the policy changed crime patterns during and after the
depenalization policy, using administrative records on criminal offences by drug type,
by specific drug offences that proxy demand and supply side criminal activities, and for
seven types of non-drug crime. We find that depenalization in Lambeth led to an increase
in cannabis possession offences that persisted well after the policy experiment ended. We
find evidence the policy enables the police in Lambeth to be able to re-allocate their
effort towards non-drug crime: there are significant long run reductions in five non-drug
crime types, and significant improvements in police effectiveness against such crimes as
measured by arrest and clear-up rates.
The totality of evidence is best interpreted through the depenalization policy causing a
behavioral response of the police among two dimensions: to reduce the penalties of being
caught in possession of cannabis, and to reallocate resources towards non-drug crime.
Both channels then cause an endogenous response among potential users of cannabis in
terms of the choices over whether and where to buy and consume cannabis from. We use
the key lessons from this localized policing experiment to shed light on what would be
the impacts on crime if the same policy were to be applied citywide, by developing and
calibrating a model of the market for cannabis and crime, accounting for the behavior of
police and cannabis users.
While our model highlights some novel and important channels through which a
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depenalization of cannabis affects the level and composition of crime, it still leaves open
areas for future research on how illicit drug policy affects the behavior of drug suppliers
and the police. In particular, on drug suppliers, research on how drug policies change the
organization of criminal activity remains scarce; and on police behavior, much remains to
be understood regarding the extent to which police across jurisdictions should coordinate
strategies.
We have provided a comprehensive review of the impact of depenalization policies
along four margins: drug and non-drug crimes, the location of crimes, short and long
run policy responses, and impacts on welfare as measured by house price changes. Our
detailed and nuanced reduced form and structural form results are relevant for other
settings given the depenalization policy we study reflects how liberal drugs policies have
been implemented by many other countries [Donohue et al. 2011], and the issue of
whether and how governments should intervene in illicit drug markets remains at the top
of the political agenda across the world.48
.1 A Appendix
.1.1 A.1 Crime Data: Definitions
Home Office counting rules for criminal offences are periodically revised, including in
1998, so coinciding with the start of our sample period. Importantly, changes in Home
Office guideline/definition are uniformly applied across all London boroughs, and hence
will not drive the difference-in-difference estimates on crime. There was another revision
in the recording of crime in April 2002, with the introduction of the National Crime
Recording Standard (NCRS). The Crime in England and Wales 2004/5 Report states
the NCRS “aimed to introduce greater consistency to the process of recording crime
and to establish a more victim-oriented approach to recording. The impact of the
NCRS. . . was to increase the numbers of crimes recorded and less serious violent offences
were particularly affected.” In a robustness check in Table A2, we re-estimate our baseline
results on the impact of the LCWS policy on drug crime by additionally adding in a series
of dummies equal to one for when each data regime is in place, and zero otherwise.
48For example, Colorado and Washington states legalized possession of one ounce or less of marijuana
for recreational use by adults (those 21 years or older) in November 2012. At least twelve other states
are considering similar policies. In Europe, Croatia decriminalized the possession of small amounts of
cannabis in 2013. In Latin America, Uruguayan president Jose´ Mujica has proposed to put into place
a legal state-controlled market for cannabis.
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There have been a number of changes to recording practices and the sanctions avail-
able that have affected the recorded clear-up (detection) rates. The Home Office Counting
Rules for recorded crime changed from April 1998. These brought new offences into
the series with varying clear-up rates. It is estimated that the effect of the changes
was to increase the overall clear-up rate from 28% to 29%. Additional changes were
implemented with effect from April 1999. Any recorded clear-up required: ‘sufficient
evidence to charge’, and, an interview with the offender and notification to the victim.
In addition, clear-ups obtained by the interview of a convicted prisoner ceased to count.
The overall effect of the April 1999 change is estimated as a single percentage point
decrease in clear-up rates (although the effect varied between crime types). Finally, the
implementation of the NCRS in April 2002 is thought to have had an inflationary effect on
recorded crime and the assumption is that it has depressed clear-up rates since additional
recorded crimes are generally less serious and possibly harder to clear-up.
.1.2 A.2 Cannabis Crime: Robustness Checks
Table A2 presents a series of robustness checks on the baseline result documented in
Table 2, that the LCWS policy led to a significant increase in offence rates for cannabis
related crime in Lambeth relative to the rest of London between the pre-policy and policy
period; this effect persisted in the long run post-policy.
The first robustness check excludes geographic neighbors to Lambeth when estimating
(3.1). We define the geographic neighbors of Lambeth to be the boroughs that have
contiguous land borders with Lambeth: Croydon, Merton, Southwark and Wandsworth.
Given the interlinkages between cannabis markets and the dense network of public trans-
port across boroughs in Lambeth, we expect cannabis users to travel to Lambeth to
purchase cannabis in response to the policy (the lower costs of apprehension and the
endogenous reduction in detection rates). If such users originate only from neighboring
boroughs, then by excluding such neighbors from (3.1), we will estimate the true impact
of the policy on cannabis crime in Lambeth. The result in Column 2 shows the impacts
to be almost unchanged if the neighbors to Lambeth are excluded as controls. This
suggests that cannabis users that switch to purchasing cannabis from Lambeth because
of the policy are likely to originate from all over London.
The next robustness check in Column 2 accounts for common citywide shocks to
cannabis crime through the inclusion of year fixed effects into (3.1). The differential
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impacts of the LCWS policy in Lambeth during and after the policy period are identified
because these periods cut across years. We see the coefficients of interest are very similar
to the baseline specification. Column 3 then shows the results to be robust to including
a series of dummy variables for when different data regimes are in place (as described in
the subsection above); Column 4 shows the baseline results to be robust to additionally
including the full set of police operations operating in single or groups of boroughs (Panel
A in Table A1) where start and end dates of the operation are known.
Finally, Column 5 allows for spatially correlated error structures. Given the inter-
linkages in cannabis markets across locations, as well as the possibility of police across
boroughs coordinating strategies, then there might be correlation in the error structure
in (3.1). To account for this possibility we model the error term as follows,
ubmy = ubt = ρWubt + ebt, (13)
where ρ is the coefficient on the spatially correlated errors, and W is the spatial weighting
matrix of dimension (32 × 32) as there are 32 London boroughs. We specify W to be a
contiguity spatial weighting matrix, where wij = 1 if borough j neighbors borough i, and
0 otherwise. The result in Column 5 is similar to the baseline estimate: the parameters of
interest remain of the same sign and significance, and both point estimates are marginally
larger. For this model, ρ̂ = .346 with a standard error of .0224, indicating the presence of
spatial correlation in the error terms. We have also experimented with several other W
specifications, including inverse distance and inverse distance squared matrices (distance
is calculated as the Euclidian distance from the centroid of each borough to all others),
and found results to be robust to these different weighting matrices.
.1.3 A.3 Defining Crime Hotspots
In analyzing the impact of the depenalization policy on house prices in Lambeth relative
to other London boroughs, we exploit the fact that data on house prices and crime is
available, for some years, at a more disaggregated level within each borough. House price
data is available at the zip code sector level from the UK Land Registry. Ward-level
crime data is available monthly from April 2001, from the MPS. We use the ward level
crime data to first define each ward as a crime hotspot, and we first describe how this
is done. We then describe how we match ward level crime data to zip code sectors that
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house price data is available for (as wards and zip codes do not correspond to the same
geographic areas), to ultimately define zip codes as being crime hotspots.
Given our policy focus, our primary hotspot measure is based on the incidence of
drug crime in each ward. A ward is defined as a hotspot if drug offences are above the
median for all wards in the same borough. One of the robustness checks described below
experiments with using an alternative threshold for defining ward hotspots.
The ward-level crime data is available monthly from April 2001. We use this to create
hotspots based on two definitions: (i) ex ante levels of drug crime, using the three months
of data prior to the start of the LCWS; (ii) ex post levels of drug crime, based on ward
level drug crime rates in the period October 2007 to September 2009.
Once the ward-level hotspots are defined, these must be mapped onto zip code sectors,
to be able to create zip code sector hotspot markers to include as three-way interactions
in the house price regression (3.2). In general, zip code sectors are smaller than wards,
but more importantly the two do not perfectly overlap. The average number of wards in
a zip code sector is 4.1 (even though zip code sectors are the smaller unit of the two).
For our baseline specifications, we then define a zip code sector (e.g. WC1E), to be a
hotspot if any ward within a zip code sector is defined as a drug crime hotspot. A second
set of robustness checks described below experiment with using alternatives methods for
defining a zip code as being a hotspot. Each zip code sector is then ascribed to be either a
hotspot or not. Figure A1A shows for Lambeth, the classification of zip code sectors into
hotspots and non-hotspots based on the ex-post definition. Given the concerns described
of using an ex post definition, Figure A1B shows the classification of zip code sectors into
hotspots if we use the three months of ex ante ward level crime data to define hotspots.
Reassuringly, there is considerable stability in the definition of hotspots over this time
period and using this method: as a result the empirical house price results are very similar
when using either definition (Columns 3 and 4, Table 6).
.1.4 A.4 House Price Impacts: Robustness Checks
Table A4 presents robustness checks on the main house price regression in Table 6.
Column 1 repeats the baseline specification using zip code sector hotspots, but for another
housing type: flats, that actually correspond to the most frequent house type sale in our
study period (although the lowest price per sale for any house type). The basic pattern of
results holds for this housing type also: post-policy, house prices for flats are significantly
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lower in Lambeth than other boroughs, and there is enormous variation within Lambeth
between zip codes classified as hotspots (where house prices are 20.2% lower than in
other London boroughs post-policy), and zip codes in Lambeth that are not classified
as hotspots (where house prices are actually 5.3% higher in Lambeth than comparable
areas in other London boroughs post-policy).
The remaining robustness checks examine the robustness of the findings to alternative
definitions of hotspots. The first check redefines how a ward is first defined to be a
hotspot. More precisely, we define a ward as a hotspot if drug offences are above the
75th percentile median for all wards in the borough. We then define a zip code to be a
hotspot if it contains any hotspot wards so defined. Column 3 examines the robustness
of the baseline result to changing how we translate ward hotspots into defining a zip code
sector as being a hotspot. While the baseline specification denotes the zip code sector to
be a hotspot if any ward is defined to be a hotspot, in Column 3 the zip code is defined
to be a hot spot if the modal ward is itself defined to be a hotspot. Column 4 then uses
an alternative method to define zip code sectors as hotspots that uses information on
all wards in the zip code sector. In this case, the hotspot variable is no longer binary,
but rather a weighted average of all wards’ hotspot classifications within the zip code
sector. These weights are based on the percentage of the zip code that overlaps with the
ward. Finally, Column 5 uses information on total crimes (not drug crime) to redefine
wards and then zip codes as hotspots using otherwise the same method as the baseline
specification.
The results in Columns 2 to 5 on Table A4 are all very much in line with the baseline
findings in Table 6. In particular, for all variant specifications we see that post-policy,
house prices are significantly lower in Lambeth hotspots than other boroughs, where the
magnitude of the impact varies between 7.7% and 13.9%.
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Table 1: Detailed Drug Offences, Pre-policy Period 
Means and standard deviations in parentheses
(1) Lambeth (2) Other London Boroughs              
A. Total
Total drugs offences per 1000 of adult population .608 .400
(.124) (.298)
B. Drug Type
Share of drug offences relating to any cannabis offences .600 .735
(.052) (.108)
Share of drugs offences related to Class-A drugs .344 .204
(.054) (.106)
Share of drugs offences related to Class-B drugs (including cannabis) .628 .770
(.057) (.110)
Share of drugs offences related to Class-C drugs .002 .004
(.004) (.010)
C. Cannabis Offences Breakdown
Share of cannabis offences relating to having possession of cannabis .907 .918
(.044) (.055)
.055 .049
(.031) (.043)
.015 .013
(.016) (.021)
.023 .019
(.020) (.027)
Share of cannabis offences relating to having possession of cannabis with 
intent to supply
Share of cannabis offences relating to production/being concerned in 
production of cannabis
Share of cannabis offences relating to supply or offer to supply cannabis
Note: The pre-policy period runs from April 1998 until June 2001. Other London boroughs are all London boroughs, except Lambeth. Standard deviations are in
parentheses. Class-A drugs are cocaine, crack, crystal-meth, Heroin, LSD, MDMA and methadone; Class-B drugs are amphetamines and cannabis (in the pre-
policy period); Class-C drugs are anabolic steroids, GHB and ketamine.
Table 2: The Effect of the Depenalization on Cannabis Offences in Aggregate
Dependent Variable: Log (total recorded cannabis offences, per 1000 of adult population)
(1) Fixed 
Effects
(2) Baseline
(3) Borough 
Specific Linear 
Time Trend
(4) Borough Specific 
Quadratic Time Trend
(5) Within Policy 
Dynamics
Lambeth x Policy Period .325*** .293** .195 .182
(.117) (.118) (.148) (.145)
Policy Period .018 .034 .023 .182*** .034
(.056) (.056) (.065) (.051) (.056)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period .615*** .610*** .414** .479** .682***
(.092) (.096) (.201) (.186) (.076)
Post-Policy Period .171*** .181*** .160* .237*** .180***
(.043) (.047) (.090) (.066) (.047)
Lambeth x Policy Period [1-6 months] -.026
(.120)
Lambeth x Policy Period [7-13 months] .647***
(.118)
Borough and Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the borough-month-year level. The sample period runs from April 1998 until
January 2006. Control boroughs are all other London boroughs. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression, where a borough
specific AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs.
Observations are weighted by the share of the total London population that month-year in the borough. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one from July
2001 until July 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy period dummy variable is equal to one from July 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. Column 1 only
additionally controls for borough and month fixed effects. In Column 2 onwards, the following socio-demographic control variables, measured in logs, are controlled
for at the borough-month-year level: the share of the adult population that is ethnic minority, that is aged 20 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, and aged above 50, and the
male unemployment rate. Column 3 (4) additionally controls for a borough specific linear (quadratic) time trend.
Table 3: The Effect of the Depenalization on the Demand and Supply of Cannabis Related Crime
Crime Series:
Offence Type: (1) Offences (2) Arrests (3) Clear-ups
(4) Clear-ups per 
Arrest
(5) Offences (6) Arrests (7) Clear-ups
(8) Clear-ups per 
Arrest
Lambeth x Policy Period [1-6 months] -.036 -.436** -1.556*** -1.199*** .236 -.250 -.287* -.043
(.127) (.192) (.349) (.212) (.167) (.176) (.173) (.087)
Lambeth x Policy Period [7-13 months] .675*** -.946*** -1.558*** -.490* .505*** -.149 -.095 .039
(.124) (.181) (.393) (.266) (.165) (.166) (.163) (.081)
Policy Period .035 -.010 -.027 -.017** -.016 -.024 -.023 .007
(.055) (.063) (.065) (.008) (.064) (.043) (.043) (.015)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period .686*** -.094 -1.047*** -.576** .676*** -.007 .077 .077*
(.080) (.102) (.357) (.288) (.101) (.093) (.089) (.046)
Post-Policy Period .192*** -.049 -.028 .022*** .034 -.069** -.064** .003
(.046) (.047) (.048) (.007) (.043) (.032) (.031) (.012)
Borough and Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3008 3008 3008 3008 2756 2722 2711 2987
Cannabis Possession (Demand) Cannabis Supply
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the borough-month-year level. The sample period runs from April 1998 until January 2006. Control boroughs are all other London boroughs. The
dependent variable in Columns 1 and 5 is the log of the number of offences for each offence type, per 1000 of the adult population. The dependent variable in Columns 2 and 6 is the arrest rate for each offence type, defined as the
log of the number of arrests divided by the number of offences in the borough in the same month and previous quarter. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 7 is the clear-up rate for each offence type, defined as the log of the
number of clear-ups divided by the number of offences in the borough in the same month and previous quarter. The dependent variable in Columns 4 and 8 is the ratio of clear-ups to arrests, defined as the log of the number of clear-
ups divided by the number of arrest in the same month. In Columns 1-4 the offence type relates to cannabis possession. In Columns 5 to 8 the offence type is the sum of all offences related to cannabis supply including: possession
with intent, possession on a ship, production, supply, unlawful export, unlawful import, carrying on a ship, inciting others to supply, manufacture, and money laundering. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-
Winsten regression, where a borough specific AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations are weighted by
the share of the total London population that month-year in the borough. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one from July 2001 until July 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy period dummy variable is equal to one
from July 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The following socio-demographic control variables, measured in logs, are controlled for at the borough-month-year level: the share of the adult population that is ethnic minority, that is
aged 20 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, and aged above 50, and the male unemployment rate. In addition, the log of the adult population is included as a control in Columns 2 to 4 and Columns 6 to 8.
Table 4: The Effect of the Depenalization on the Demand and Supply of Class-A Drugs Related Crime
Crime Series:
Offence Type: (1) Offences (2) Arrests (3) Clear-ups
(4) Clear-ups per 
Arrest
(5) Offences (6) Arrests (7) Clear-ups
(8) Clear-ups per 
Arrest
Lambeth x Policy Period [1-6 months] -.236** -.114 -.059 .034 -.343 -.380 -.335 .028
(.115) (.155) (.149) (.024) (.340) (.347) (.389) (.110)
Lambeth x Policy Period [7-13 months] .081 -.070 -.098 -.026 -.330 .188 .210 .031
(.109) (.144) (.138) (.023) (.303) (.320) (.362) (.102)
Policy Period -.036 -.118 -.107 .007 .292*** -.077 -.061 .013
(.043) (.080) (.081) (.007) (.081) (.105) (.107) (.018)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period .120* -.032 -.028 -.001 -.316** -.088 .019 .123**
(.070) (.080) (.076) (.013) (.146) (.137) (.155) (.059)
Post-Policy Period .005 -.040 -.015 .020*** .241*** -.096 -.078 -.003
(.035) (.058) (.058) (.006) (.067) (.083) (.088) (.015)
Borough and Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2950 2944 2943 3005 2558 2543 2517 2978
Class-A Drugs Possession (Demand) Class-A Drugs Supply
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the borough-month-year level. The sample period runs from April 1998 until January 2006. Control boroughs are all other London boroughs. Class-
A drugs are cocaine, crack, crystal-meth, Heroin, LSD, MDMA and methadone. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 5 is the log of the number of offences for each offence type, per 1000 of the adult population. The dependent
variable in Columns 2 and 6 is the arrest rate for each offence type, defined as the log of the number of arrests divided by the number of offences in the borough in the same month and previous quarter. The dependent variable in
Columns 3 and 7 is the clear-up rate for each offence type, defined as the log of the number of clear-ups divided by the number of offences in the borough in the same month and previous quarter. The dependent variable in Columns
4 and 8 is the ratio of clear-ups to arrests, defined as the log of the number of clear-ups divided by the number of arrest in the same month. In Columns 1 to 4 the offence type relates to possession of Class-A drugs. In Columns 5 to
8 the offence type is the sum of all offences related to Class-A drugs supply including: possession with intent, possession on a ship, production, supply, unlawful export, unlawful import, carrying on a ship, inciting others to supply,
manufacture, and money laundering. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression, where a borough specific AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough specific
heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations are weighted by the share of the total London population that month-year in the borough. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one from
July 2001 until July 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy period dummy variable is equal to one from July 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The following socio-demographic control variables, measured in logs, are controlled
for at the borough-month-year level: the share of the adult population that is ethnic minority, that is aged 20 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, and aged above 50, and the male unemployment rate. In addition, the log of the adult population is
included as a control in Columns 2 to 4 and Columns 6 to 8.
Table 5: The Effect of Depenalizing Cannabis on Non-Drug Related Crime
Dependent Variable: Log (recorded offences of a given type, per 1000 of adult population)
Crime Type:
(1) Total (without 
drugs)
(2) Violence Against 
the Person
(3) Sexual (4) Robbery (5) Burglary
(6) Theft and 
Handling
(7) Fraud or 
Forgery
(8) Criminal 
Damage
Lambeth x Policy Period .023 .010 -.112 -.053 -.007 .064* -.257* -.046
(.033) (.038) (.084) (.096) (.060) (.037) (.141) (.053)
Policy Period .033 .077*** .100*** .223*** -.012 .049** -.031 -.012
(.020) (.027) (.025) (.053) (.021) (.021) (.065) (.020)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period -.094*** -.046 -.096 -.321*** -.250*** -.083** -.355*** -.090**
(.033) (.034) (.060) (.093) (.049) (.033) (.128) (.044)
Post-Policy Period .024 .200*** .110*** .228*** -.113*** .039** -.183*** -.064***
(.018) (.024) (.020) (.046) (.017) (.018) (.055) (.018)
Share of All Offences Pre-policy .973 .155 .009 .034 .128 .401 .089 .159
Borough and Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008 3008
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the borough-month-year level. The sample period runs from April 1998 until January 2006. Control boroughs are all other London
boroughs. In Column 1 the dependent variable is the log of the number of all non-drugs related crime per 1000 of the adult population. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten
regression, where a borough specific AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations are
weighted by the share of the total London population that month-year in the borough. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one from July 2001 until July 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy period
dummy variable is equal to one from July 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The following socio-demographic control variables, measured in logs, are controlled for at the borough-month-year level: the share of
the adult population that is ethnic minority, that is aged 20 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, and aged above 50, and the male unemployment rate. At the foot of the table we show the proportion of all criminal offences
(drug and non-drug related) that each category makes up in the pre-policy period in Lambeth from April 1998 until June 2001.
Dependent Variable: Log (zip code-quarter mean house price, deflated to 1995 Q1 prices)
(1) Baseline
(2) Time 
Trends
(3) Ex Post 
Hotspot
(4) Ex Ante 
Hotspot
(5) Higher 
Level 
Clustering
Lambeth x Policy Period .026** -.028 .022 -.021 .022
(.013) (.019) (.037) (.021) (.016)
Policy Period .004 -.025*** -.054*** -.036** -.054***
(.006) (.006) (.011) (.014) (.013)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period -.050*** -.126*** -.016 -.011 -.016
(.016) (.034) (.030) (.031) (.029)
Post-Policy Period .033*** -.046*** -.111*** -.108*** -.111***
(.010) (.011) (.015) (.017) (.028)
Lambeth x Hotspot -.087** -.084* -.087**
(.044) (.046) (.039)
Hotspot .039 -.211*** .039
(.024) (.019) (.026)
Lambeth x Policy Period x Hotspot -.062* -.009 -.062***
(.036) (.021) (.012)
Policy Period x Hotspot .033*** .012 .033**
(.011) (.015) (.012)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period x Hotspot -.134*** -.135*** -.134***
(.022) (.020) (.021)
Post-Policy Period x Hotspot .073*** .066*** .073***
(.014) (.016) (.021)
Zip code and Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borough-Specific Linear Time Trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331
Table 6: The Effect of Depenalizing Cannabis on House Prices
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the zip code-sector-quarter-year level. House prices are deflated to
the first quarter of 1995 prices, using the Land Registry house price index for Greater London, which is based on repeat sales. More information on the
index can be found at http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/houseprices/housepriceindex/. For all specifications, the sample runs from January 1995 until
December 2005, and observations are weighted by the numbers of sales for terraced housing in that quarter-year in the specific zip code-sector.
Standard errors are clustered by zip code sector in Columns 1 to 4, and by borough in Column 5. To reflect the lag between the house buying decision
and the recorded sale of the house, all time-vary explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. The (one quarter lagged) policy period dummy
variable is equal to one from the fourth quarter (starts October 1) of 2001 until the third quarter of 2002 (ends September 30), and zero otherwise. The
(one quarter lagged) post-policy period dummy variable is equal to one from the fourth quarter of 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The following
socio-demographic control variables, measured in logs, are controlled for at the borough-month-year level: the share of the adult population that is
ethnic minority, that is aged 20 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, and aged above 50, and the male unemployment rate. All of these socio-economic variables
are lagged one quarter. We also control for fixed effects for zip code and quarter throughout. In Column 2 onwards we also control for a borough
specific linear time trend. In Columns 3 and 5 zip code sectors are defined to be hotpots based on ex post ward level crime data. In Column 4 we use
ex ante  ward level crime data. 
Housing Type: (1) Detached (2) Semi-Detached (3) Terraced (4) Flats
Lambeth x Policy Period -.244*** -.028 -.028 -.018
(.087) (.031) (.019) (.018)
Policy Period -.017 -.030*** -.025*** -.024***
(.026) (.008) (.006) (.006)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period [β3] -.070 -.118*** -.126*** -.099***
(.121) (.041) (.034) (.031)
Post-Policy Period -.087*** -.050*** -.046*** -.089***
(.033) (.011) (.011) (.009)
A. Mean Pre-Policy House Price (deflated to 1995 Q1 Prices) £201,653 £140,697 £122,691 £70,208
B. Median Pre-Policy House Price (deflated to 1995 Q1 Prices) £185,792 £118,086 £110,311 £62,487 Row Total
C. Post-Policy Sales Total 51 1200 5796 17707 24754
D. Mean Loss Based on Post-Policy Sales Total =  β3 x A x C -£719,903 -£19,922,653 -£89,600,527 -£123,073,484 -£233,316,567
E. Number of Households in Lambeth in 2001 UNKNOWN UNKNOWN UNKNOWN UNKNOWN 119000
F. Housing Type Share of Post-Policy Sales Total 0.002 0.048 0.234 0.715
G: Mean Loss Based on Post-Policy Total = β3 x A x E x F -£3,460,791 -£95,774,246 -£430,736,962 -£591,651,636 -£1,121,623,634
Table 7: Implied Loss in House Prices due to the Depenalization Policy
Dependent Variable: Log (zip code-quarter mean house price, deflated to 1995 Q1 prices)
Lower Bound Estimate: Assume Unsold Houses Experience No Loss in Value
Upper Bound Estimate: Assume All Households Experience Same Loss in Value
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the zip code-sector-quarter-year level. House prices are deflated to the first quarter of 1995 prices, using the Land
Registry house price index for Greater London, which is based on repeat sales. More information on the index can be found at http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/houseprices/housepriceindex/. For all
specifications, the sample runs from January 1995 until December 2005, standard errors are clustered by zip code, and observations are weighted by the numbers of sales for the housing type in that
quarter-year in the specific zip code-sector. To reflect the lag between the house buying decision and the recorded sale of the house, all time-vary explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. The
(one quarter lagged) policy period dummy variable is equal to one from the fourth quarter (starts October 1) of 2001 until the third quarter of 2002 (ends September 30), and zero otherwise. The (one
quarter lagged) post-policy period dummy variable is equal to one from the fourth quarter of 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The following socio-demographic control variables, measured in logs, are
controlled for at the borough-month-year level: the share of the adult population that is ethnic minority, that is aged 20 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, and aged above 50, and the male unemployment rate. All of
these socio-economic variables are lagged one quarter. When calculating the higher house price estimates (row E down), we do not know the number of household in Lambeth for each property type. Iin
2001, there were 119000 households (source: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-household-projections). We then estimate the number of each type of houses, using the
sales shares from the post-policy period multiplied by the total number of owned houses in Lambeth.
Table 8: Fit of the Structural Model
(1) Lambeth (2) Rest of London (3) Lambeth (4) Rest of London
(5) Difference in Difference: Lambeth 
versus Rest of London
A. Matched Moments
Cannabis Consumption Observed .184 .123 .187 .123
Predicted .176 .135 .197 .117
Cannabis Crime Offence Rate Observed .366 .284 .825 .335 64.8%
Predicted .366 .288 .820 .332 66.4%
Non-drug Crime Offence Rate Observed 18.9 14.1 18.2 14.6 -7.26%
Predicted 18.2 14.9 18.6 16.0 -4.95%
Non-drug Crime Arrest Rate Observed 2.30 2.40 2.04 1.96
Predicted 2.02 1.88 2.00 1.96
B. Drug Tourism
Observed .39
Predicted .39 .60
Cannabis Crime .00127 .0022 .0017 .0031 -5.13%
Non-drug Crime .111 .126 .107 .122 -.444%
Note: Offences and arrests are expressed per 1000 inhabitants. The difference-in-difference in percentages reported in Column 5 is calculated as ((Col 3 - Col 1) - (Col 4 - Col 2)) for each observed and predicted
moment, where each value is first logged. The data on offences and arrests are taken from the administrative crime records from the MPS. Data on cannabis consumption are derived from the British Crime Survey
(that has borough identifiers) and from data on recorded offences.
Predicted
C. Detection Probabilities
Share of Cannabis Offenders in 
Lambeth from the Rest of London
Pre-Policy Period Post-Policy Period
(April 1998 - June 2001) (January 2002 to March 2004)
Table 9: Predicted Impacts of Citywide Depenalization
(1) Lambeth (2) Rest of London
A. Cannabis and Crime
Cannabis Consumption 1% 2%
Cannabis Crime Offence Rate -7.4% -4.0%
Non-drug Crime Offence Rate -.3% -.3%
Non-drug Crime Arrest Rate 0% -.1%
B. Drug Tourism
Cannabis Crime -6.9% -7.4%
Non-drug Crime .20% .22%
Note: Offences and arrests are expressed per 1000 inhabitants.
C. Detection Probabilities
Share of Cannabis Offenders in Lambeth from 
the Rest of London
-4%
Table A1: Coding Police Operations
Information Source Operation Name Borough Start End Focus URL Other Links
A. Borough Specific Police Operations, Complete Information on Start and End Dates
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Recover Greenwich, Lewisham, Southwark, Bromley, Croydon 10/2005 17/12/2007 Recovery of Abandoned Stolen 
Vehicles
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2007/071220/10/ http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-f/2008/080221/11/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Blunt
Lambeth, Southwark, Hackney, Newham, Haringey, Tower Hamlets, Brent, 
Croydon, Waltham Forest, Lewisham, Enfield, Hammersmith and Fulham
11/2004 11/2005 Knife Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2005/050526/10/
http://cms.met.police.uk/news/major_operational_announcements/we
_launch_the_next_phase_of_operation_blunt
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Safer Streets
Lambeth, Westminster, Southwark, Hackney, Haringey, Camden, Tower 
Hamlets, Brent, Islington
04/02/2002 31/03/2002 Street Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020523/11/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Safer Streets Phase 2
Lambeth, Westminster, Southwark, Hackney, Haringey, Camden, Tower 
Hamlets, Brent, Islington, Newham, Ealing, Waltham Forest, Lewisham, 
Wandsworth, Croydon
15/04/2002 31/03/2003 Street Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020523/11/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Strongbox-Windmill Lambeth 08/05/1999 02/07/1999 http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020523/10/ http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2001/010208/07/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Strongbox-Empire Hackney 17/07/1999 10/09/1999 http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020523/10/ http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2001/010208/07/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Strongbox-Regis Camden, Islington 02/10/1999 03/12/1999 http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020523/10/ http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2001/010208/07/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Strongbox-Victory Westminster 22/01/2001 18/03/2001 http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020523/10/ http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2001/010208/07/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Strongbox-Castille Haringey 17/04/2001 10/06/2001 http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020523/10/
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2001/010208/07/         
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2001/010726/08/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Strongbox-Claymoor Brent 16/07/2001 09/09/2001 http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020523/10/ http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2001/010208/07/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Strongbox-Sabre Tower Hamlets 17/09/2001 09/12/2001 http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2002/020523/10/ http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2001/010208/07/
Planning, Performance & Review Committee reports archive
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/reports/
Safer Homes
Barnet, Bromley, Croydon, Enfield, Greenwich, Harrow, Hilling don, Hounslow, 
Lewisham, Redbridge, Southwark, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth
28/10/2002 6/2004 Burglary http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/2003/030313/10/ http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/2003/030109/06/
MPA - Annual Reports Solstice Brent, Hackney, Westminster, Hammersmith & Fulham, Lewisham, Camden 01/12/2003 08/12/2003 Transport Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Alnwick Haringey 16/09/2002 13/10/2002 Street Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2002-03.pdf www.haringeycpcg.org.uk/documents/Police_Report_Nov_2002.doc
Draca et al (2008) Theseus Westminster, Camden, Islington, Tower Hamlets, Kensington & Chelsea 7/7/2005 17/08/2005 7/7 Bombings Draca et al 2008: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0852.pdf http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-f/2005/050915/07/
B. Borough Specific Police Operations, Incomplete Information on Start and End Dates
MPA - Annual Reports Bantam Hackney 11/2001 Unknown Trident-related http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2002-03.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Footbrake Redbridge 04/2003 03/2004 Vehicle Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Anuric Kennington Drug Trafficking http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Dobbi Enfield Unlicensed Minicabs http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Michaelmas Enfield Street Crime, Burglary http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Garm Tower Hamlets Robbery http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2004-05.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Lewark Lewisham, Southwark Robbery http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2004-05.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Challenger Lambeth, Southwark, Hackney, Brent, Lewisham, Tower Hamlets Robbery http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2004-05.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Orion Hackney Drugs http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2004-05.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Foist Hackney, Haringey, Newham Uninsured Cars http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2006-07.pdf
Other Sources - ref URL Alliance 5 boroughs South London 11/2007 Unknown Gang Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2008/080529-agm/06/#h2002 http://ken.3cdn.net/d23b2ee136d273b37d_xrm6bhcgf.pdf
Other Sources - ref URL Kartel 11 Boroughs 25/02/2008 http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2008/080529-agm/06/#h2004
Other Sources - ref URL Coalmont Southward, Lambeth, Lewisham Gun Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-eodb/2008/080207/07/
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Blunt 2 All London 14/05/2008 Present Youth Knife Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2008/080529-agm/06/
http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-events/news/operation-blunt-
2?version=1
MPA http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/reports/ Blunt All London 12/2005 Unknown Knife Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2005/050526/10/
Planning, Performance & Review Committee reports archive
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/reports/
Maxim All London 24/03/2003 Unknown Immigration, People Trafficking http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/2006/061109/08/
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/2003/030508/09/, 
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/2004/040212/11/
Planning, Performance & Review Committee reports archive
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/reports/
Safer Homes All London 25/10/2002 27/10/2002 Burglary http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/2003/030313/10/
MPA - Annual Reports Payback All London 09/2003 http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports All London Hate Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Rainbow All London Terrorism http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2004-05.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Copernicos All London High-valued Property Theft http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2004-05.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Halifax IV All London 17/01/2005 28/02/2005 Fail to Appear Warrants http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2004-05.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Bluesky All London Immigration http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2005-06.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Jigsaw All London Sex Offenders http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2005-06.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Anchorage 2 All London Violent Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2005-06.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Erica All London Anti Social Behaviour http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2007-08.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Argon All London 09/2007 01/2008 Gun Crime in Nightclubs
Other Sources - ref URL Curb All London 06/2007 03/2008 Youth Violence http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2008/080529-agm/06/#h2003
Other Sources - ref URL Kontiki All London Human Trafficking http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/2006/061109/08/
Other Sources - ref URL Sterling All London Fraud
http://www2.le.ac.uk/ebulletin/news/press-releases/2000-
2009/2009/02/nparticle.2009-02-13.8756898007
Other Sources - ref URL Evader All London http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/x-ppr/2003/030109/06/
MPA - Annual Reports Enver 19/12/2003 Tamil Criminals http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Tullibardine http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Grafton 04/2003 Crime Around Heathrow http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Bright Star Anti-terror http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Amethyst Child Sex Abuse http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2003-04.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Nemo Drugs http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2004-05.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Vanadium Drugs http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2004-05.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Chicago Bus Crime http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2006-07.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports BusTag Bus Vandalism http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2006-07.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Overt Anti-terror http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2006-07.pdf
MPA - Annual Reports Overamp Anti-terror http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/annualrep2006-07.pdf
Other Sources - ref URL Suki
Other Sources - ref URL Lateen Violent Crime
http://www.haringeycpcg.org.uk/documents/CPCG%20police%20report%
20April%2008.pdf
Volume Crime: Burglary, 
Robbery, Vehicle Crime, Drugs
C. London Wide Police Operations
D. Police Operations, Incomplete Information
Note: All websites were accessed in September and October 2009. 
Table A2: The Effect of the Depenalization on Cannabis Offences in Aggregate 
Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable: Log (total recorded cannabis offences, per 1000 of adult population)
(1) Neighbors 
Excluded as Control 
Boroughs
(2) Year Fixed 
Effects
(3) Data 
Regime Fixed 
Effects
(4) Police Operation 
Controls
(5) Spatially 
Correlated 
Errors
Lambeth x Policy Period .298** .335*** .349*** .259** .151***
(.117) (.105) (.103) (.112) (.028)
Policy Period .038 -.008 .066 .019 .001
(.056) (.065) (.055) (.053) (.008)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period .606*** .623*** .636*** .555*** .253***
(.095) (.082) (.080) (.091) (.020)
Post-Policy Period .185*** .034 .072 .179*** .052***
(.047) (.094) (.081) (.046) (.006)
Borough, Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2632 3008 3008 3008 3008
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the borough-month-year level. The sample period runs from April 1998 until
January 2006. For all Columns except Column 1, control boroughs are all other London boroughs. In Column Lambeth's neighbors (Croydon, Merton,
Southwark and Wandsworth) are excluded as controls. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression, where a borough
specific AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across
boroughs. The exception is Column 5 where a spatial error model is estimated. The spatial weighting matrix used here is a contiguity matrix; all neighbors are
allocated ones, and all non-neighbors are allocated zeroes. We also experimented with several other spatial weighting matrices, including inverse distance
(between borough centroids) and inverse distance squared weighting matrices. The results are robust to these different spatial error specifications.
Observations are weighted by the share of the total London population that month-year in the borough. The exception again are Columns 1 and 5. In Column 1
observations are weighted by the share of the (non-neighboring borough) total London population that month-year in the borough. In Column 5 observations
are not weighted. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one from July 2001 until July 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy period dummy variable
is equal to one from July 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The following socio-demographic control variables, measured in logs, are controlled for at the
borough-month-year level: the share of the adult population that is ethnic minority, that is aged 20 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, and aged above 50, and the male
unemployment rate. Data regime fixed effects allow for any changes in the recording of the data in each of these separate time periods, as well as a dummy for
the change in crime recording rules from April 2002 onwards. The police operation controls variables are indicators for whether the borough was part of a
recent Police Operation. Operations that targeted a group of specific boroughs include the Safer Streets Initiative Phase 1 (04/02/2002 – 31/03/2002) and
Phase 2 (15/04/2002 – 31/03/2003), Operation Recover (10/2005-17/12/2007), Operation Blunt 1 (11/2004-11/2005),Operation Safer Homes (28/10/2002-
06/2004) and Operation Solstice (01/12/2003-08/12/2003). Lambeth was part of Safer Streets Phase 1 and 2, and Blunt 1. Further operations (past of a larger
operation named Strongbox) that targeted single boroughs include Operation Windmill (Lambeth: 08/05/1999-02/07/1999), Operation Empire (Hackney:
17/07/1999-10/09/1999), Operation Regis (Camden, Islington: 02/10/1999-03/12/1999), Operation Victory (Westminster: 22/01/2001-18/03/2001), Operation
Castille (Haringey: 17/04/2001-10/06/2001), Operation Claymoor (Brent: 16/07/2001-09/09/2001) and Operation Sabre (Tower Hamlets: 17/09/2001-
09/12/2001). 
Table A3: The Effect of the Depenalization on Police Effort on Non-Drug Crime
Crime Type:
(1) Total (without 
drugs)
(2) Violence Against 
the Person
(3) Sexual (4) Robbery (5) Burglary
(6) Theft 
and 
Handling
(7) Fraud or 
Forgery
(8) Criminal 
Damage
Lambeth x Policy Period .065 .096 .158 .383*** -.197 -.152* .058 .024
(.108) (.128) (.182) (.142) (.142) (.090) (.160) (.158)
Policy Period -.101* -.178** -.164*** -.242*** .128*** -.173*** -.154* -.168***
(.058) (.087) (.054) (.054) (.049) (.044) (.080) (.062)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period .284*** .344*** .454*** .417*** .325*** -.062 .567*** .299**
(.105) (.124) (.132) (.106) (.105) (.072) (.121) (.130)
Post-Policy Period -.015 -.076 -.114*** -.112*** .185*** -.209*** -.056 -.033
(.048) (.072) (.043) (.043) (.039) (.035) (.062) (.048)
Share of All Arrests Pre-policy .861 .281 .016 .034 .086 .297 .049 .098
Borough, Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3008 3008 2936 2986 3008 3008 3006 3008
Crime Type:
(1) Total (without 
drugs)
(2) Violence Against 
the Person
(3) Sexual (4) Robbery (5) Burglary
(6) Theft 
and 
Handling
(7) Fraud or 
Forgery
(8) Criminal 
Damage
Lambeth x Policy Period .028 .066 .161 .317** -.192 -.119 .063 .131
(.112) (.129) (.179) (.145) (.146) (.090) (.274) (.159)
Policy Period -.073 -.159* -.169*** -.176*** .154*** -.154*** .001 -.157**
(.062) (.088) (.053) (.054) (.048) (.045) (.046) (.063)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period .270** .319** .484*** .436*** .314*** -.077 .554*** .305**
(.115) (.128) (.131) (.109) (.109) (.072) (.194) (.134)
Post-Policy Period .067 -.022 -.094** -.039 .242*** -.145*** .396*** .026
(.052) (.073) (.042) (.042) (.038) (.036) (.041) (.049)
Share of All Clear-ups Pre-policy .846 .311 .019 .029 .084 .293 .007 .104
Borough, Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3008 3008 2934 2980 3007 3008 2630 3008
Crime Type:
(1) Total (without 
drugs)
(2) Violence Against 
the Person
(3) Sexual (4) Robbery (5) Burglary
(6) Theft 
and 
Handling
(7) Fraud or 
Forgery
(8) Criminal 
Damage
Lambeth x Policy Period .018 .021* -.006 -.037 .012 .030** -.027 .057*
(.014) (.012) (.038) (.070) (.039) (.015) (.145) (.031)
Policy Period .023*** .022*** .002 .072*** .029** .018*** .194*** .027***
(.008) (.006) (.012) (.021) (.015) (.007) (.054) (.008)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period .010 .006 .015 .014 -.014 -.020* -.019 .025
(.010) (.009) (.028) (.051) (.028) (.011) (.099) (.022)
Post-Policy Period .081*** .066*** .030*** .088*** .056*** .064*** .465*** .061***
(.006) (.005) (.010) (.017) (.012) (.005) (.039) (.007)
Share of All Clear-ups Pre-policy .846 .311 .019 .029 .084 .293 .007 .104
Borough, Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3008 3008 3002 3002 3007 3008 2632 3008
A. Dependent Variable: Log (arrest rate for a given crime category)
B. Dependent Variable: Log (clear-up rate for a given crime category)
C. Dependent Variable: Log (clear-up per arrest)
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the borough-month-year level. The sample period runs from April 1998 until January 2006. Control
boroughs are all other London boroughs. In Panel A the dependent variable is the log of the number of arrests divided by the number of offences in the borough in the same month and
previous quarter, for each crime type. In Panel B the dependent variable is the log of the number of clear-ups divided by the number of offences in the borough in the same month and previous
quarter, for each crime type. In Panel C the dependent variable is the log of the number of clear-ups divided by the number of arrests in the borough, in the given month. Panel corrected
standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression, where a borough specific AR(1) process is assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough specific heteroskedastic,
and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations are weighted by the share of the total London population that month-year in the borough. The policy period dummy variable
is equal to one from July 2001 until July 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy period dummy variable is equal to one from July 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The following socio-
demographic control variables, measured in logs, are controlled for at the borough-month-year level: the share of the adult population that is ethnic minority, that is aged 20 to 24, 25 to 34, 35
to 49, and aged above 50, and the male unemployment rate. At the foot of each panel we show the proportion of all arrests and clear-ups (drug and non-drug related) that each category makes
up in the pre-policy period in Lambeth from April 1998 until June 2001.
Dependent Variable: Log (zip code-quarter mean house price, deflated to 1995 Q1 prices)
(1) Flats
(2) Ward Hotspot 
Definition: 75th PC
(3) Zip Code Sector 
Hotspot Definition: 
Modal Ward
(4) Zip Code Sector Hotspot 
Definition: Weighted Average 
of Wards
(5) Hotspots Based 
on Total Crime
Lambeth x Policy Period .011 -.013 -.032 -.027 .010
(.022) (.023) (.024) (.027) (.020)
Policy Period -.050*** -.044*** -.033*** -.041*** -.057***
(.015) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.011)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period .070** -.083** -.099*** -.064 -.010
(.027) (.041) (.038) (.039) (.028)
Post-Policy Period -.155*** -.079*** -.068*** -.091*** -.107***
(.016) (.012) (.012) -0.013 (.012)
Lambeth x Hotspot .006 -.056* -.126*** -.296*** -.086*
(.039) (.029) (.027) (.081) (.044)
Hotspot -.058** -.091* -.045** -.001 -.001
(.027) (.054) (.018) (.212) (.014)
Lambeth x Policy Period x Hotspot -.033 -.017 .011 -.002 -.044**
(.030) (.025) (.023) (.028) (.018)
Policy Period x Hotspot .031** .031*** .016** .031*** .035***
(.015) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.012)
Lambeth x Post-Policy Period x Hotspot -.199*** -.070*** -.077*** -.139*** -.133***
(.030) (.025) (.022) (.026) (.018)
Post-Policy Period x Hotspot .080*** .051*** .043*** .085*** .066***
(.016) (.010) (.011) (.013) (.011)
Zip code and Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borough-Specific Linear Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20706 17331 17331 17331 17331
Table A4: Robustness Checks on the Effect of Depenalizing Cannabis on House Prices
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the zip code-sector-quarter-year level. House prices are deflated to the first quarter of 1995 prices, using the
Land Registry house price index for Greater London, which is based on repeat sales. More information on the index can be found at http://www1.landregistry.gov.uk/houseprices/housepriceindex/.
For all specifications, the sample runs from January 1995 until December 2005. In Column 1 (2 to 5) observations are weighted by the numbers of sales for flats (terraced housing) in that quarter-
year in the specific zip code-sector. Standard errors are clustered by zip code sector throughout. To reflect the lag between the house buying decision and the recorded sale of the house, all time-
vary explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. The (one quarter lagged) policy period dummy variable is equal to one from the fourth quarter (starts October 1) of 2001 until the third quarter
of 2002 (ends September 30), and zero otherwise. The (one quarter lagged) post-policy period dummy variable is equal to one from the fourth quarter of 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The
following socio-demographic control variables, measured in logs, are controlled for at the borough-month-year level: the share of the adult population that is ethnic minority, that is aged between 20
to 24, aged between 25 to 34, aged between 35 to 49, aged above 50, and the male unemployment rate. All of these socio-economic variables are lagged one quarter. We also control for fixed
effects for zip code and quarter throughout, and a borough specific linear time trend. In Column 2 we define a ward as a hotspot if drug offences are above the 75th percentile median for all wards in
the borough. We then define a zip code to be a hotspot if it contains any hotspot wards so defined. In Column 3 the zip code sector is defined to be a hot spot if the modal ward is itself defined to be
a hotspot. In Column 4 the hotspot variable is no longer binary, but rather a weighted average of all wards' hotspot classifications within the zip code sector. These weights are based on the
percentage of the zip code that overlaps with the ward. Finally, Column 5 uses information on total crimes (not drug crime) to redefine wards and then zip codes as hotspots using otherwise the
same method as the baseline specification.
Table A5: Calibrated Parameters
Notation Location
Calibrated 
Parameter
A. Direct Depenalization Policy Channels
Penalty Reduction During Policy Lambeth .178
Reduction in Police Hours During Policy for Cannabis Crime Lambeth .530
B. Preference Parameters
Disutility of Cannabis Consumption Lambeth .799
Rest of London .823
Disutility of Committing Non-drug Crime Lambeth .956
Rest of London .955
Maximum Mobility Cost All .753
C. Policing Technology
Apprehension Technology for Cannabis Crime Lambeth .0127
Rest of London .0191
Apprehension Technology for Non-drug Crime All .218
Cobb Douglas Parameter, Cannabis Crime Arrests All .270
Cobb Douglas Parameter, Non-drug Crime Arrests All .356
D. Other
Penalty of Arrest, Cannabis Crime All 21
Penalty of Arrest, Non-drug Crime All 0.229
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Figure 1A: Aggregate Cannabis Offences Figure 1B: Cannabis Possession Offences
Figure 1C: Aggregate Non-Drug Offences
Note : The sample period runs from April 1998 until January 2006. The two red vertical lines represent the start and end of the Lambeth policy (July 2001 and July 2002 respectively). In each Figure, the black time
series represents the relevant time series for Lambeth. The grey series represents the mean offences per capita for the rest of London, Figure 1A shows the time series for the number of cannabis related offences in
aggregate, per 1000 of the adult population. Figure 1B shows the time series for the number of cannabis possession offences, per 1000 of the adult population. Figure 1C shows the time series of the number of non-
drug offences, per 1000 of the adult population. Non-drug offences include those for violence against the person, sexual offences, robbery, burglary, theft and handling, fraud or forgery, and criminal damage.
Figure 2: Impacts of the Depenalization Policy on Non-Drug Crimes
Note: Each point on the graph above represents the point estimate on the Post-Policy*Lambeth interaction term from a separate regression. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The point estimates are from
regressions as described as follows. All observations are at the borough-month-year level. The sample period runs from April 1998 until January 2006. Control boroughs are all other London boroughs. The dependent
variable in the offence graph is the log of the number of offences for each offence type, per 1000 of the adult population. The dependent variable in the arrest graph is the arrest rate for each offence type, defined as
the log of the number of arrests divided by the number of offences in the borough in the same month and previous quarter. The dependent variable the clearance graph is the clearance rate for each offence type,
defined as the log of the number of clearances divided by the number of offences in the borough in the same month and previous quarter. The dependent variable in the clearance: arrest ratio graph is defined as the
log of the number of clear-ups divided by the number of arrest in the same month. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression, where a borough specific AR(1) process is
assumed. This also allows the error terms to be borough specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across boroughs. Observations are weighted by the share of the total London population that
month-year in the borough. The policy period dummy variable is equal to one from July 2001 until July 2002, and zero otherwise. The post-policy period dummy variable is equal to one from July 2002 onwards, and
zero otherwise. The following socio-demographic control variables, measured in logs, are controlled for at the borough-month-year level: the share of the adult population that is ethnic minority, that is aged between
20 to 26, aged between 25 to 34, aged between 35 to 49, aged above 50, and the male unemployment rate. The log of the total borough population (by month-year) aged 16 and over is also included as a control in all
except the offence regressions.
Figure A1A: Ex Post Drug Hotspots in 
Lambeth
Figure A1B: Ex Ante Drug Hotspots in 
Lambeth
Note: Hotspots are set to one if total drug offences in the ward are equal to or above the median within the borough,. The ex post period runs from October
2007-September 2009. The ex ante period runs from April-June 2001. The darker shaded wards are those that are defined to be a hotspot using the ex
post and ex ante data. The lighter shaded wards are those defined to be non-hotspot wards under each definition.
Hotspot Wards 
Non-hotspot 
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
By considering 9/11 as an exogenous shift to tastes for discrimination in the US, and
linking this change in discrimination to changes in ethnic sentencing differentials, the
first paper aims to address the crucial issue of the source of racial and ethnic disparities
in criminal sentencing outcomes. It is necessary to understand the underlying causes of
such disparities in order to best assess what can be done to address the issue; each of the
explanations implies a very different policy response. There is still much to do in this
work, not least in order to identify the key agents driving the results. In on-going work,
I have collected data on previous stages of criminal justice procedure (similar to that of
Rehavi and Starr [2012]), in order to link defendants from arrest to sentence. Different
criminal justice agents (including the initial hearing judge, district attorneys, sentencing
judges and defense counsel) play different roles at each of these stages. Using the same
identification strategy, but considering earlier stages, will allow me to better understand
the key channels underlying the observed post-9/11 effect
While the model in the second paper highlights important channels by which the
depenalization of cannabis impacts the level and composition of crime, there still remain
key questions regarding how police and drug suppliers respond to changes in illicit drugs
policy. Research on how drugs policies affect the organization of criminal activity remain
scarce, not least due to the paucity of data regarding suppliers. Related in part to this
issue is a study by Dobkin and Nicosia [2009], which examines the impact of a large
government intervention to reduce supply of methamphetamine precursors found large,
but short lived impact on both the purity and price of the drug. This gives some insight
into the dynamic nature of the supply side. Less is known, however, about how drug
suppliers alter both the size and location of their operation(s) as a response to both
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supply-side interventions and policy changes.
Better understanding of how police across different areas should coordinate activity
is also required, particularly where policies are implemented unilaterally across jurisdic-
tions. There is a small body of research, mainly theoretical, considering cross-jurisdiction
policing coordination, motivated by the concept of spatial displacement effects of crime
[Hesseling, 1994; Gonzalez-Navarro, 2013]. Theoretical work, including that of Marceau
[1997], has found that where spatial externalities in crime exist, communities may com-
pete in deterring crime (in order to displace criminals elsewhere), and thus over-invest in
policing (Detterring crime also makes communities more attractive to investors).
The spatial displacement effects of crime as a response to differentials in policing are
difficult to identify for several reasons. Individuals Tiebout sort over areas, which may be
reflected in differential levels of local spending, as well as result in different levels of crime.
Second, the relationship between policing levels and crime are endogenous [Levitt, 1997;
Draca et al., 2011; Buonanno and Mastrobuoni, 2012], and thus the correlation between
policing and crime across different jurisdictions is likely to conflate the true impact of
police on crime, as well as spatial displacement of crime resulting from differences in
jurisdictional policing strength [Newlon, 2001].
The house price analysis provides evidence of how the policy impacted upon valuations
of the Lambeth area during this time. What is noteworthy is that although cannabis
drugs crime increased during and after the policy, the area experience a marked decline
in the majority of other types of crime post-policy. At the same time house prices fell
significantly, particularly in drug hot-spot areas. As noted in the paper, there were likely
other factors influencing the documented declines in Lambeth house prices associated
with the change in illicit drug use in the area. Of interest to me for future research,
however, is the role of crime perceptions in the measured effects. What role do the
visibility of different crime types play in when individuals form percetions of crime in an
area, and how does better information on crime (such as publicly available crime mapping
websites) impact these perception formations?
A final point to consider is the role played by both dynamic behavior and behavioral
biases in how crime is modeled, and studied empirically. The Becker model is static.
However, there are various reasons to suspect that current crime may affect future crime
(for instance by lowering social capital and thus the perceived cost of crime [Sickles and
Williams, 2008], or by increasing criminal capital accumulation through experience), and
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also that current sanctions may affect future crime (through affecting legal work options
[Grogger, 1995], or by exposure to criminals when incarcerated [Bayer et al., 2009]).
There is evidence that in the study of the LCWS, the increase in cannabis offenses
in Lambeth occurred with a lag, rising only after six months, and then persisted long
after the policy had commenced. Recent work has begun to consider such dynamics
[Kleiman and Kilmer, 2009; Lee and McCrary, 2009; McCrary, 2010], but as yet few
papers empirically incorporate such dynamics.
Related to the issue of dynamics is the importance of considering the decisions made
by individuals engaging in crime. Is rationality a reasonable assumption? One potential
avenue of relevance to the dynamic nature of both crime and the related sanctions is
the role of time-inconsistent preferences. The benefits of committing a crime are realized
in the present, although sanctions are future-based (and uncertain). Work by Mark
Kleiman [Kleiman, 2009] on changing the nature of sanctions to be more certain and
more instant (as well as less severe in nature) speaks to this issue. Other authors have
also suggested the role played by individuals’ perception of the criminal justice system
(notably, the “legitimacy” of the system), and how this shapes the criminal participation
decision. If individuals view the criminal justice system as illegitimate, then these people
may be more likely to disregard the law and commit crimes [LaFree, 1998]. A key
application of this, and of relevance to the implications of the first paper in this thesis, is
the over-representation of ethnic minorities in the criminal justice system, and how this
may affect future criminal engagement of such groups. A recent paper by Rocque [2011]
considers precisely this issue from a theoretical framework. Regarding legitimacy theory,
it is worth noting that one of the key justifications for implementing the LCWS was to
ease community tensions caused by the criminalizing of individuals in the community
for possessing small amounts of cannabis. Such a shift in policy may have played a role
in changing local perceptions of the legitimacy of the local police, and thus change to
criminal behavior. Developing a better understanding of how such perception impacts
criminal participation (not present in the standard Becker model) would enrich our
understanding of the causes and the dynamics of crime.
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